XVI. LICYMNIUS 1. ποίησιν εὐεπείας Licymniο adsignat Plato Phaedr. 267 C (B XIV 10), quod quadrat et ad dithyramborum poetam et ad rhetora, Γοργίου συνουσιαστής audit Dionysio de Lys. p. 11, 3 U. R., hinc eius παρισώσεις καὶ παρομοιώσεις καὶ παρονομασίαι καὶ ἀντιθέσεις Dionys. de Thuc. p. 363, 1 sq. (p. 424, 13 sq.).
2. Hermias in Platοnis Phaedr. p. 239, 12 (p. 192 Ast): ὁ Λικύμνιος τὸν Πῶλον ἐδίδαξεν ὀνομάτων τινὰς διαιρέσεις, οἷον ποῖα κύρια, ποῖα σύνθετα, ποῖα ἀδελφά, ποῖα ἐπίθετα, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ πρὸς εὐέπειαν. Schol. ad Platonis Phaedr. 267 C: ὁ Λικύμνιος δὲ Πώλου διδάσκαλος. ὃς διῄρει τὰ ὀνόματα εἰς κύρια, σύνθετα, ἀδελφά, ἐπίθετα, καὶ εἰς ἄλλα τινά. At Polus Licymnii praeceptor sec. Sudam (s. v. Πῶλος). Contrarium fortasse ductum e Platonis verbis (Phaedri 267 C) ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνείων, ἃ ἐκείνῳ (i. e. Πώλῳ) ἐδωρήσατο (scil. Λικύμνιος).
3. Aristot. rhet. 1405 b 6: καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν: κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον: οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ψεῦδος: ἔστιν γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον, τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων. ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλου ἄλλο κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον: ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ᾗ αἰσχρόν: ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλου ἄλλο κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον: ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸνἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ᾗ αἰσχρόν: ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει. διαφέρει δ᾽ εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠὼς μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος.
4. Aristot. rhet. 14l4 b 15: δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους. 3 ἐπόρουσιν vel ἐπέρωσιν libri dett. Ductum ἐπούρωσις a verbo ἐπουρόω quod est ‘secundo vento vehiʼ (οὖρος), inde narratio intellegi videtur, quae bene fluit. Hamberger 80 sq. (Immisch, Rh. M. 48, 522 sq.). – Plato Politici 263 A–C: ἡμεῖς... ἀπὸ τοῦ προτεθέντος λόγου πεπλανήμεθα... ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν... (C) τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως ὁπόθεν ἡμᾶς δεῦρʼ ἤγαγεν. Ceterum huius saltem generis atque aetatis etiam ἐποικοδομεῖν sive ἐποικοδόμησιν fuisse puto, quam augendi formam postea κλίμακα nominaverunt (Aristoteles rhet. 1365 a 16, de animal. gen. 724 a 29, Anaxim. 3 p. 30, 6 H., auctor de subl. XXXIX 3, Eustathius B 101, Υ 214.)
5. Crat. Juniοr fr. Ταραντίνων, Mein. fr. Com. III, p. 376: ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἄν τινʼ ἰδιώτην ποθὲν λάβωσιν εἰσελθόντα, διαπειρώμενον τῆς τῶν λόγων ῥώμης, ταράττειν καὶ κυκᾶν τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις, τοῖς πέρασι, τοῖς παρισώμασιν, τοῖς ἀποπλάνοις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν νουβυστικῶς. περαντικός Phaeax dicitur, v. s. B XIII 1
6. Anon. in Aristot. rhet. p. 227, 34 Rabe: ὁ Λικύμνιος ῥήτωρ ἦν. τὰς ἐπαναλήψεις ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος ἐπορούσεις. τὸ οὖν ὄνομα τοῦτο τὸ ἐπόρουσίς ἐστιν ἀσαφὲς καὶ οὐ παριστᾷ καὶ δηλοῖ, τί σημαίνει. καὶ λοιπόν, εἰ οὐ δηλοῖ, τί σημαίνει, λοιπὸν κενόν ἐστι τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο, εἴ γε ἀγνωστόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. [f. 71v] ἐπόρουσις κυρίως ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπενθυμήματα τὰ συνεπουρίζοντα καὶ βοηθοῦντα τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι· καὶ ἁπλῶς, ὅσα λέγονται βοηθοῦντα τῇ ἀποδείξει τοῦ πράγματος, κἂν τοῦ πράγματος ἐκτός εἰσι, λέγονται ἐπορούσεις. [b 17] ἀποπλάνησίν τινες λέγουσι τὴν ἐπιδιήγησιν, τινὲς δὲ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λεγόμενα, συμβαλλόμενα δὲ εἰς τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ βοηθοῦντα. ὄζους λέγει τὰ ἄκρα, ἤτοι τὰ προοίμια καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλόγους.
7. Schol. B Il. B 106: Λικύμνιος δὲ παραδηλοῦσθαί φησι λεληθότως τὴν ἔχθραν, ἵνα μὴ λοιδορήσῃ τὸ γένος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ‘δῶκεʼ φιλίας τεκμήριον, τὸ δέ ‘καταλιπεῖνʼ ἀνάγκης, διὸ ἐφʼ ὧν μὲν τῷ ‘ἔδωκενʼ ἐχρήσατο, έφʼ ὧν δὲ τῷ ‘ἔλιπενʼ. Similiter schol. Townl. Fusius de hoc loco egit W. O. Friedel, Diss. Halens. I 185 sq.
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XVI. Licymnius 1. Plato (Phdr. 267C) attributes “creation of good diction” (poiêsis euepeias, cf. XIV 10) to Licymnius, which corresponds to both the dithyrambic poet and the rhetorician, “companion of Gorgias” (D.H. On Lysias 11.3, where his parisoseis and paromoioseis and paronomasia, D.H. On Thucydides 1- (p. 424.13-14)
2. Hermias, On Plato’s Phaedrus p. 239.12: Licymnius taught Polus certain distinctions among words: which kinds are principal, which are combined, which are related, which are supplemental, and many others with regard to good diction. Scholion ad Phdr. 267C Licymnius is the teacher of Polus who divided words into principal, combined, related, supplemental, and some others. However, according to the Suda, on “Polus”, Polus was teacher of Licymnius. The contrary is perhaps inferred from Phdr. 267C: “the Licymnian terms, which he (Licymnius) had taught that man (Polus).”
3. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.2.13 1405b6-12: (Metaphors should also be derived from) things that are beautiful. The beauty of a word is on the one hand, as Licymnius says, in the sounds or the meaning, and its ugliness in the same way. But there is also a third condition, which refutes the sophistic argument; for it is not the case, as Bryson (25.2) said, that no one speaks in an ugly way if saying this instead of that indicates the same thing; this is false; for one word is more proper than another, more of a likeness, and better suited to putting the matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that does not signify a thing under the same conditions; thus for this reason also it must be admitted that one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair or foul; or if they do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says “rosy-fingered morn,” rather than “purple-fingered,” or, what is still worse, “red-fingered.”
4. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.13.4 1414b15- But one must only apply a word to describe a certain species or a difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms Licymnius creates in his Techne, where he speaks of “wafting,” “wandering”, and “ramifications.” “Wafting” is supposed to be derived from the verb “to waft” (epouroo), which means “to be carried by a favoring wind (ouros).” So it seems to be understood as a narration that flows well. Plato, Statesman 263a-c We have already strayed away from our subject more than we ought, and you wish us to go still further afield. So for the present let us return to our subject, as is proper; then we will go on the trail of this other matter by and by, when we have time. (c) That from which our present digression started.
5. Cratinus the Younger, Tarentinians, fr. Com III, p. 376 There is a custom among them, if they receive some private person entering from somewhere, one who is experienced with the strength of words, cleverly to upset and stir him up with contradictions, conclusions, parallelisms, wanderings, and magnitudes. Perantikos ("conclusive") is said of Pheaex, see above, B XIII 1.
6. Anonymous, On Aristotle’s Rhetoric p. 227.34 Rabe Licymnius was a rhetorician. He used to call resumptions “waftings”. This term, “wafting”, is unclear and does not signify or clarify what is meant. And it remains, if it does not clarify what is meant, it remains that this area is empty, since it is unknown to us. Wafting is mainly added enthymemes that waft together and support the enthymemes. Basically, what they say that supports the demonstration of the subject, if it is outside the subject, they are speaking waftings. Some people call supplementary narration “wandering”, others call it what is said outside the subject but contributes to the demonstrations and supports them. He calls them the ends of a branch, that is, the prooimia and the epilogues.
7. Scholion B Iliad 2.106 Licymnius says that hostility is being implicitly intimated, so that he does not insult the clan. For “gave” is a sign of friendship, but “left to” is a sign of necessity. Therefore in some circumstances he used “gave” and in other “left." An especially thorough analysis of this passage in W. O. Friedel, Diss. Halle I 185 f. |