Simon Fraser University
Engaging the World

(1) Περὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ   

  (1) Δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τᾶι Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ τῶ κακῶ. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι, ὡς ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δέ, ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἴη, τοῖς δὲ κακόν, καὶ τῶι αὐτῶι ἀνθρώπωι τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν.

(2) ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖσδε ποτιτίθεμαι· σκέψομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶ ἀνθρωπίνω βίω, ὧι ἐπιμελὲς βρώσιός τε καὶ πόσιος καὶ ἀφροδισίων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσθενοῦντι μὲν κακόν, ὑγιαίνοντι δὲ καὶ δεομένωι ἀγαθόν.

(3) καὶ ἀκρασία τοίνυν τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατέσι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ πωλεῦντι ταῦτα καὶ μισθαρνέοντι ἀγαθόν. νόσος τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῦντι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ἰατροῖς ἀγαθόν. ὁ τοίνυν θάνατος τοῖς μὲν ἀποθανοῦσι κακόν, τοῖς δ’ ἐνταφιοπώλαις καὶ τυμβοποιοῖς ἀγαθόν.

(4) γεωργία τε καλῶς ἐξενείκασα τὼς καρπὼς τοῖς μὲν γεωργοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἐμπόροις κακόν. τὰς τοίνυν ὁλκάδας συντρίβεσθαι καὶ παραθραύεσθαι τῶι μὲν ναυκλήρωι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ναυπαγοῖς ἀγαθόν.

(5) ἔτι δὲ τὸν σίδαρον κατέσθεσθαι καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι καὶ συντρίβεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῶι δὲ χαλκῆι ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὰν τὸν κέραμον παραθραύεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τοῖς δὲ κεραμεῦσιν ἀγαθόν. τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα κατατρίβεσθαι καὶ διαρρήγνυσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῶι δὲ σκυτῆι ἀγαθόν.

(6) ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς γυμνικοῖς καὶ τοῖς μωσικοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς· αὐτίκα ἐν τῶι γυμνικῶι τῶι σταδιοδρόμωι ἁ νίκα τῶι μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσσα-μένοις κακόν.

(7) καττωὐτὸ δὲ καὶ τοὶ παλαισταὶ καὶ πύκται καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες μωσικοί· αὐτίκα ἁ νίκα ἁ κιθαρωιδίας τῶι μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσσαμένοις κακόν.

(8) ἔν τε τῶι πολέμωι (καὶ τὰ νεώτατα πρῶτον ἐρῶ) ἁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων νίκα, ἃν ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίως καὶ τὼς συμμάχως, Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις κακόν· ἅ τε νίκα, ἃν τοὶ Ἕλλανες τὸν Πέρσαν ἐνίκασαν, τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλασιν ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις κακόν.

(9) ἁ τοίνυν τοῦ Ἰλίου αἵρεσις τοῖς μὲν Ἀχαιοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Τρωσὶ κακόν. καδδὲ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀργείων πάθη.

(10) καὶ ἁ τῶν Κενταύρων καὶ Λαπιθᾶν μάχα τοῖς μὲν Λαπίθαις ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Κενταύροις κακόν. καὶ μὰν καὶ ἁ τῶν θεῶν καὶ Γιγάντων λεγομένα μάχα καὶ νίκα τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Γίγασι κακόν.

(11) ἄλλος δὲ λόγος λέγεται, ὡς ἄλλο μὲν τἀγαθὸν εἴη, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα.   ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαιρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον· δοκῶ γὰρ οὐδὲ διάδαλόν <κ’> ἦμεν, ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν, αἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον εἴη· καὶ γὰρ θαυμαστόν κ’ εἴη.

(12) οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ’ αὐτὸν ἔχεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἴ τις [αὐτὸν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· ‘εἶπον δή μοι, ἤδη τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν;’ φαίη κα· “καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα.” ‘τὺ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἴπερ τωὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶι κακῶι.

(13) τί δέ, τὼς συγγενέας ἤδη τι ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας; τὼς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίεις. τί δέ, τὼς ἐχθρὼς ἤδη κακὸν ἐποίησας;’ “καὶ πολλὰ καὶ <μεγάλα>.” ‘μέγιστα ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας.

(14) ἄγε δή μοι καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι. ἄλλο τι ἢ τὼς πτωχὼς οἰκτίρεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις,  ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράσσοντι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν;’

(15) τὸν δὲ βασιλῆ τὸν μέγαν οὐδὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τοῖς πτωχοῖς. τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶι πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστίν, αἴ γα τωὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶ παντὸς εἰρήσθω.

(16) εἶμι δὲ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶ ἐσθίεν καὶ πῖνεν καὶ ἀφροδισιάζεν. ταῦτα γὰρ τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι <ποιὲν κακόν, καὶ πάλιν> ταῦτα ποιὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, αἴπερ τωὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν· καὶ τοῖς νοσέοντι κακόν ἐστι τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν, αἴπερ τωὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶι κακῶι.

(17) καδδὲ τόδε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὰ ἐν τῶι ἔμπροσθεν λόγωι εἴρηται. καὶ οὐ λέγω, τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρῶμαι διδάσκειν, ὡς οὐ τωὐτὸν εἴη τὸ κακὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ <ἄλλο> ἑκάτερον.   

1. On good and bad

(1) On the matter of what is good and what is bad dissoi logoi are put forward in Greece by the philosophical: some say that what is good is one thing and what is bad is another, others that they are the same, for some good and for others bad, and for the same person at one time good, at another bad.

(2) I myself side with the latter, and I shall examine (the logos) by reference to human life, with its concern for food and drink and sex. For these things are bad for the weak, but good for the healthy and in need.

(3) And again, lack of control over these is bad for the uncontrolled, but good for those who sell these things and make money. And again illness is bad for the sick but good for doctors. And again death is bad for those who die, but good for undertakers and the grave-diggers.

(4) Farming also, when it produces fine crops, is good for the farmers, but bad for the merchants. And it is bad for the shipper if his ships are wrecked and smashed, but good for shipbuilders.

(5) Moreover, it is bad for others, but good for the blacksmith if iron is dulled and wrecked. And certainly it is bad for others, but good for the potters if pottery is smashed. And it is bad for others, but good for the cobbler if shoes wear out and are torn apart.

(6) Again, in contests, gymnastic, artistic, and military; for example, in gymnastic for the runner, victory is good for the winner, but bad for the losers.

(7) And it is the same for wrestlers and boxers and all the artists; for example, lyre-playing is good for the winner, but bad for the losers.

(8) And in war (I shall speak first of the most recent events) the Spartan victory which they won over the Athenians and their allies was good for the Spartans, but bad for the Athenians and their allies; and the victory which the Greeks won over the Persians was good for the Greeks, but bad for the non-Greeks.

(9) Again, the capture of Troy was good for the Achaeans, but bad for the Trojans. And it is the same with the experiences of the Thebans and the Argives.

(10) And the battle between the Centaurs and Lapiths was good for the Lapiths, but bad for the Centaurs. And it certainly the fabled battle of the gods and Giants and victory was for the gods good, but bad for the Giants.

(11) The other logos is that what is good is one thing and what is bad another; just as the name differs, so also does the matter. I myself also distinguish them in this manner. For I think it is not clear what sort of thing would be good and what bad if each were the same thing and not different; it would be astonishing indeed.

(12) And I think that even the man who says these things could not answer if someone asked: "Tell me now, did you ever before now do your parents some good?" He might say, "A great many good things." "So you ought to do them a great many bad things, if good is the same as bad.

(13) What then, did you ever before now do your relatives any good? So you did your relatives bad. What then, did you ever do your enemies bad?” “A great many bad things.” “So you did them great good.”

(14) “And please answer me this as well: Don’t you pity the poor because they have it very bad and again congratulate them for being well off, if the same thing is good and bad?"

(15) And nothing prevents the Great King from being in the same condition as beggars. For the many great things for him are also many great evils, if the same thing is good and bad. And let this be said for every case.

(16) But I shall also go through individually, beginning with eating and drinking and sex. For, these things do bad for the sick, and again they do good for them, if good and bad are the same. For the sick person it is bad to be sick as well as good, if good is the same as bad.

(17) Everything else has been mentioned in the above logos this holds good. I am not saying what the good is; I am trying rather to teach that bad and good are not the same thing, but that each is different.

2. Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ  

  (1) λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ καλῶ καὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ δισσοὶ λόγοι. τοὶ μὲν γάρ φαντι, ἄλλο μὲν ἦμεν τὸ καλόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, διαφέρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τοὶ δὲ τωὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.

(2) κἀγὼ πειρασεῦμαι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐξαγεύμενος. αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδὶ ὡραίωι ἐραστᾶι μὲν [χρηστῶι] χαρίζεσθαι καλόν, μὴ ἐραστᾶι δὲ [καλῶι] αἰσχρόν.

(3) καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας λοῦσθαι ἔνδοι καλόν, ἐν παλαίστραι δὲ αἰσχρόν (ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν παλαίστραι καὶ ἐν γυμνασίωι καλόν).

(4) καὶ συνίμεν τῶι ἀνδρὶ ἐν ἁσυχίαι μὲν καλόν, ὅπου τοίχοις κρυφθήσεται· ἔξω δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὅπου τις ὄψεται.

(5) καὶ τῶι μὲν αὐτᾶς συνίμεν ἀνδρὶ καλόν, ἀλλοτρίωι δὲ αἴσχιστον. καὶ τῶι γ’ ἀνδρὶ τᾶι μὲν ἑαυτῶ γυναικὶ συνίμεν καλόν, ἀλλοτρίαι δὲ αἰσχρόν.

(6) καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι καὶ ψιμυθίωι χρίεσθαι καὶ χρυσία περιάπτεσθαι, τῶι μὲν ἀνδρὶ αἰσχρόν, τᾶι δὲ γυναικὶ καλόν.

(7) καὶ τὼς μὲν φίλως εὖ ποιὲν καλόν, τὼς δὲ ἐχθρὼς αἰσχρόν. καὶ τὼς μὲν πολεμίως φεύγεν αἰσχρόν, τὼς δὲ ἐν σταδίωι ἀνταγωνιστὰς καλόν.

(8) καὶ τὼς μὲν φίλως καὶ τὼς πολίτας φονεύεν αἰσχρόν, τὼς δὲ πολεμίως καλόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ πάντων.

(9) εἶμι δ’ <ἐφ’> ἃ ταὶ πόλιές τε αἰσχρὰ ἅγηνται καὶ τὰ ἔθνεα. αὐτίκα Λακεδαιμονίοις τὰς κόρας γυμνάζεσθαι <καὶ> ἀχειριδώτως καὶ ἀχίτωνας παρέρπεν καλόν· Ἴωσι δὲ αἰσχρόν.

(10) καὶ τοῖς μὲν τὼς παῖδας μὴ μανθάνειν μωσικὰ καὶ γράμματα καλόν. Ἴωσι δ’ αἰσχρὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα πάντα.

(11) Θεσσαλοῖσι δὲ καλὸν τὼς ἵππως ἐκ τᾶς ἀγέλας λαβόντι αὐτῶι δαμάσαι καὶ τὼς ὀρέας· βῶν τε λαβόντι αὐτῶι σφάξαι καὶ ἐκδεῖραι καὶ κατακόψαι, ἐν Σικελίαι δὲ αἰσχρὸν καὶ δώλων ἔργα.

(12) Μακεδόσι δὲ καλὸν δοκεῖ ἦμεν τὰς κόρας, πρὶν ἀνδρὶ γάμασθαι, ἐρᾶσθαι καὶ ἀνδρὶ συγγίνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ δέ κα γάμηται, αἰσχρόν· Ἕλλασι δ’ ἄμφω αἰσχρόν.

(13) τοῖς δὲ Θραιξὶ κόσμος τὰς κόρας στίζεσθαι· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις τιμωρία τὰ στίγματα τοῖς ἀδικέοντι. τοὶ δὲ Σκύθαι καλὸν νομίζοντι, ὅς κ’ ἄνδρα κατακανὼν ἐκδείρας τὰν κεφαλὰν τὸ μὲν κόμιον πρὸ τοῦ ἵππου φορῆι, τὸ δ’ ὀστέον χρυσώσας <ἢ> καὶ ἀργυρώσας πίνηι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σπένδηι τοῖς θεοῖς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλασιν οὐδέ κ’ ἐς τὰν αὐτὰν οἰκίαν συνεισελθεῖν βούλοιτό τις τῶι ταῦτα ποιήσαντι.

(14) Μασσαγέται δὲ τὼς γονέας κατακόψαντες κατέσθοντι, καὶ τάφος κάλλιστος δοκεῖ ἦμεν ἐν τοῖς τέκνοις τεθάφθαι· ἐν δὲ τᾶι Ἑλλάδι αἴ τις ταῦτα ποιήσαι, ἐξελαθεὶς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κακῶς κα ἀποθάνοι ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ δεινὰ ποιέων.

(15) τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι κοσμεῖσθαι τε ὥσπερ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας καλὸν νομίζοντι, καὶ τᾶι θυγατρὶ καὶ τᾶι ματρὶ καὶ τᾶι ἀδελφᾶι συνίμεν· τοὶ δὲ Ἕλλανες καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ παράνομα.

(16) Λυδοῖς τοίνυν τὰς κόρας πορνευθείσας καὶ ἀργύριον ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ οὕτως γάμασθαι καλὸν δοκεῖ ἦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλασιν οὐδείς κα θέλοι γᾶμαι.

(17) Αἰγύπτιοί τε οὐ ταὐτὰ νομίζοντι καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις· τῆιδε μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκας ὑφαίνειν καὶ ἔρια ἐργάζεσθαι καλόν, ἀλλὰ τηνεῖ τὼς ἄνδρας, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας πράσσεν, ἅπερ τῆιδε τοὶ ἄνδρες. τὸν παλὸν δεύειν ταῖς χερσί, τὸν δὲ σῖτον τοῖς ποσί, τήνοις καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἁμὶν τὸ ἐναντίον.

(18) οἶμαι δ’, αἴ τις τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐς ἓν κελεύοι συνενεῖκαι πάντας ἀνθρώπως, ἃ ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀθρόων τούτων τὰ καλὰ λαβέν, ἃ ἕκαστοι ἅγηνται, οὐδὲ ἕν <κα> καλλειφθῆμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντας πάντα διαλαβέν. οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταὐτὰ νομίζοντι.

(19) παρεξοῦμαι δὲ καὶ ποίημά τι· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὧδε θνητοῖσιν νόμον ὄψηι διαιρῶν· οὐδὲν ἦν πάντηι καλόν, οὐδ’ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταὔτ’ ἐποίησεν λαβών ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά.

(20) ὡς δὲ τὸ σύνολον εἶπαι, πάντα καιρῶι μὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίαι δ’ αἰσχρά. τί ὦν διεπραξάμην; ἔφαν ἀποδείξειν ταὐτὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐόντα, καὶ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι.

(21) λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ καὶ <τῶ> καλῶ, ὡς ἄλλο ἑκάτερον εἴη. ἐπεὶ αἴ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν, αἴ ποκά τι αὐτοῖς καλὸν ἔργασται, καὶ αἰσχρὸν ὁμολογησοῦντι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν.

(22) καὶ αἴ τινά γα καλὸν οἴδαντι ἄνδρα, τοῦτον καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸν αὐτόν· καὶ αἴ τινά γα λευκόν, καὶ μέλανα τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ καλόν γ’ ἐστὶ τὼς θεὼς σέβεσθαι, καὶ αἰσχρὸν αὖ τὼς θεὼς σέβεσθαι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστι.

(23) καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ ἁπάντων εἰρήσθω μοι· τρέψομαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν, ὃν λέγοντι.

(24) αἰ γὰρ τὰν γυναῖκα καλόν ἐστι κοσμεῖσθαι, τὰν γυναῖκα καὶ αἰσχρὸν κοσμεῖσθαι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν· καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τωὐτόν.

(25) ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστι καλὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.

(26) λέγοντι δέ, ὡς αἴ τινες τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐθνέων πάντοθεν συνενείκαιεν, ἔπειτα συγκαλέσαντες κελεύοιεν, ἅ τις καλὰ νομίζοι, λαμβάνεν, πάντα κα ἐν καλῶι ἀπενειχθῆμεν. ἐγὼ θαυμάζω, αἰ τὰ αἰσχρὰ συνενεχθέντα καλὰ ἐσεῖται, καὶ οὐχ οἷάπερ ἦνθεν.

(27) αἰ γοῦν ἵππως ἢ βῶς ἢ ὄϊς ἢ ἀνθρώπως ἄγαγον, οὐκ ἄλλο τί κα ἀπᾶγον· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αἰ χρυσὸν ἤνεικαν, χαλκόν [ἀπτήνεικαν], οὐδ’ αἰ ἄργυρον ἤνεικαν, μόλιβδόν κα ἀπέφερον.

(28) ἀντὶ δ’ ἄρα τῶν αἰσχρῶν καλὰ ἀπάγοντι; φέρε δή, αἰ ἄρα τις αἰσχρὸν <ἄνδρα> ἄγαγε, τοῦτον δ’ αὖ κα καλὸν ἀπᾶγε; ποιητὰς δὲ μάρτυρας ἐπάγονται, <οἳ> ποτὶ ἁδονάν, οὐ ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν ποιεῦντι.

2. On fine and shameful

(1) Contrasting logoi are also put forward on what is fine and shameful. For some say that what is fine is one thing and what is shameful another; as the name differs, so also the body. Others, however, say that the same thing is both fine and shameful.
(2) I shall attempt an exposition in this manner: for example, it is fine for a boy in the flower of his growth to gratify a fine lover, but it is shameful for a handsome boy to gratify a non-fine lover.
(3) And it is fine for women to wash indoors, but shameful in a wrestling school; but for men it is fine to wash in a palaistra or gymnasium.
(4) And to have intercourse with one's husband in private, where it will be hidden by walls, is fine: but outside, where someone will see, is shameful.
(5) And it is fine to have intercourse with one's own husband, but very shameful with another’s. And for the husband too it is fine to have intercourse with his wife, but shameful with another’s.
(6) And for the husband it is shameful to adorn himself and anoint himself with white lead and to put on gold ornaments, but for the wife it is fine.
(7) And it is fine to treat one's friends well, but shameful one's enemies. And it is shameful to flee one's enemies, but fine to flee one's competitors in a stadium.
(8) And it is shameful to murder friends and fellow-citizens, but fine to murder one's enemies. And this applies to every case.

(9) However, I shall go on to what cities and nations consider shameful. To Spartans, for example, it is fine that girls exercise naked or walk around bare-armed or without a tunic, but to Ionians it is shameful.

(10) And [in Sparta] it is fine that boys not learn arts and letters, but to Ionians it is shameful not to know all these things.
(11) Among Thessalians it is fine for a man first to select the horses from the herd himself and then train them and the mules, and for a man to select a steer and slaughter, skin, and cut it up himself; but in Sicily it is shameful, and the work of slaves.
(12) To Macedonians it seems fine that girls, before marrying a man, love and have intercourse with a man, but shameful once they are married. To Greeks both are shameful.

(13) For the Thracians it is an adornment that their girls are tattooed, but to others tattoo-marks are a punishment for wrongdoers. And the Scythians think it fine that, whoever kills a man, scalps his head and carries the hair in front of the horse, and gilds and silvers the bone and drinks from it and does libations to the gods; among the Greeks no one would want to enter the same house as someone who had done this.

 
(14) Massagetai cut up their parents and eat them, and it seems to them an especially fine tomb to be entombed inside one's children; if a person did this in Greece he would be driven out of Greece in disgrace and be killed for doing  things that are shameful and terrible.

(15) The Persians think it fine for men, like women, to adorn themselves, and to have intercourse with their daughter, mother, and sister; the Greeks think it shameful and unlawful.

(16) Again, to Lydians it appears fine for girls to be prostituted to earn money, and in that way get married; among the Greeks no one would be willing to marry any such girl.
(17) And Egyptians differ from others in their views on what is fine. For here it appears fine that women should weave and work wool, but there it appears fine that men do such things and that women do what men do here. Kneading clay by hand, or dough with the feet, is fine for them, but for us just the opposite.
(18) I think that if one were to order all humans to bring together into one place all that each considered shameful, and again removed from this collection what each thought fine, nothing would be left, but they would all take away everything. For not everyone thinks the same things.

(19) I shall bring forward as additional evidence some poetry: For if you make this distinction you will see  the other law for mortals: nothing is always fine or shameful, but the kairos makes the same things shameful and then substitues the fine.

(20) To speak generally, all things are fine when done at a kairos, but shameful in the wrong moment. What then have I accomplished? I said I would demonstrate that the same things are shameful and fine, and I demonstrated it in all these things.

(21) It is said also about the shameful and the fine, that each differs from the other. If one were to ask those who say that the same thing is shameful and fine whether any fine thing has ever been done by them, they will agree that it is also shameful, if the shameful and the fine are the same.
(22) And if they know that a particular man is fine, they know that this same man is also shameful; and if white, he is also dark. And if it is fine to treat the gods with respect, it is also shameful to treat the gods with respect, if the same thing is shameful and fine.

(23) And let this be said about everything.  I shall turn to the logos that they say.

(24) If it is fine for a woman to adorn herself, it is also shameful for a woman to adorn herself, if the same thing is shameful and fine. And this applies to other cases:
(25) In Sparta it is fine for girls to exercise naked, in Sparta it is shameful for girls to exercise naked, and similarly in other instances.

(26) They say that if some people were to bring together shameful things from everywhere, and were then to call people together and command them to take what each considered fine, everything would be taken away as fine. I am amazed if shameful things that were collected will be fine, and not the sort of things they were when they came.
(27) Certainly if they led horses or cattle or sheep or people together, they would not have led something else. For they would not even have taken brass away if they had brought gold, nor lead if they had brought silver coin.
(28) Do they really then take away things that are fine in place of the shameful that they brought? Come now, if someone brought along a shameful man, would he have led him away fine instead? They also adduce as witnesses poets, who write their poetry to give pleasure, not to propound truth.

(3) Περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου   

  (1) δισσοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῶ δικαίω καὶ τῶ ἀδίκω. καὶ τοὶ μὲν ἄλλο ἦμεν τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἄδικον· τοὶ δὲ τωὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον· καὶ ἐγὼ τούτωι πειρασοῦμαι τιμωρέν.

(2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ψεύδεσθαι ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι λεξῶ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν. τὼς μὲν πολεμίως ταῦτα ποιὲν <καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, τὼς δὲ φίλως> αἰσχρὸν καὶ πονηρὸν ἂν ἐξείποιεν· <πῶς δὲ τὼς πολεμίως,> τὼς δὲ  φιλτάτως οὔ; αὐτίκα τὼς γονέας· αἰ γὰρ δέοι τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὰν ματέρα φάρμακον πιὲν ἢ φαγέν, καὶ μὴ θέλοι, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῶι ῥοφήματι καὶ ἐν τῶι ποτῶι δόμεν καὶ μὴ φάμεν ἐνῆμεν;

(3) οὐκῶν <δίκαιον> ἤδη ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν τὼς γονέας. καὶ κλέπτεν μὰν τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ βιῆσθαι τὼς φιλτάτως δίκαιον.

(4) αὐτίκα αἴ τις λυπηθείς τι τῶν οἰκηΐων καὶ ἀχθεσθεὶς μέλλοι αὑτὸν διαφθείρεν ἢ ξίφει ἢ σχοινίωι ἢ ἄλλωι τινί, δίκαιόν ἐστι ταῦτα κλέψαι, αἰ δύναιτο,αἰ δὲ ὑστερίξαι καὶ ἔχοντα καταλάβοι, ἀφελέσθαι βίαι;

(5) ἀνδραποδίξασθαι δὲ πῶς οὐ δίκαιον τὼς πολεμίως <καὶ> αἴ τις δύναιτο ἑλὼν πόλιν ὅλαν ἀποδόσθαι; τοιχωρυχὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα δίκαιον φαίνεται. αἰ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ θανάτωι, κατεστασιασμένος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δεδεμένος εἴη, ἆρα οὐ δίκαιον διορύξαντα κλέψαι καὶ σῶσαι τὸν πατέρα;

(6) ἐπιορκὲν δέ· αἴ τις ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων λαφθεὶς ὑποδέξαιτο ὀμνύων ἦ μὰν ἀφεθεὶς τὰν πόλιν προδώσεν, ἆρα οὗτος δίκαιά <κα> ποιήσαι εὐορκήσας;

(7) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δοκῶ· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὼς φίλως καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ σώσαι <κα τὰ> πατρώϊα ἐπιορκήσας. ἤδη ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλέν·

(8) τὰ μὲν ἴδια τῶν πόλεων ἐῶ· τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τᾶς Ἑλλάδος, τὰ ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ τὰ ἐξ Ὀλυμπίας, μέλλοντος τῶ βαρβάρω τὰν Ἑλλάδα λαβεῖν καὶ τᾶς σωτηρίας ἐν χρήμασιν ἐούσας, οὐ δίκαιον λαβὲν καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον;

(9) φονεύεν δὲ τὼς φιλτάτως δίκαιον· ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀρέστας καὶ Ἀλκμαίων· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε δίκαια αὐτὼς ποιῆσαι.

(10) ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας τρέψομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν. ἐν γὰρ τραγωιδοποιίαι καὶ ζωγραφίαι ὅστις <κα> πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῆι ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος.

(11) θέλω δὲ καὶ ποιημάτων παλαιοτέρων μαρτύριον ἐπαγαγέσθαι. Κλεοβουλίνης· ἄνδρ’ εἶδον κλέπτοντα καὶ ἐξαπατῶντα βιαίως, καὶ τὸ βίαι ῥέξαι τοῦτο δικαιότατον.

(12) ἦν πάλαι ταῦτα· Αἰσχύλου δὲ ταῦτα [fr. 301. 302]· ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός,

<καί·>

  ψευδῶν δὲ καιρὸν ἔσθ’ ὅπου τιμᾶι θεός.

(13) λέγεται δὲ καὶ τῶιδε ἀντίος λόγος, ὡς ἄλλο τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικόν ἐστιν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐπεὶ αἴ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας, ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον, αἰ ἤδη τι δίκαιον περὶ τὼς γονέας ἔπραξαν, ὁμολογησοῦντι. καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον ὁμολογέοντι ἦμεν.

(14) φέρε ἄλλο δή· αἴ τινα γινώσκεις δίκαιον ἄνδρα, καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ μέγαν τοίνυν καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τωὐτόν. καὶ <αἰ> λέγοιτο ‘πολλὰ ἀδικήσας ἀποθανέτω’, ἀποθανέτω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος.

(15) καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις. εἶμι δὲ ἐφ’ ἃ λέγοντες ἀξιόοντι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν.

(16) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν τοῦτο αὐτό, αἴ κ’ ἀληθὴς ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό.

(17) τέχνας δὲ ἐπάγονται, ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ οὐ [το] ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν, ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἁδονὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ποιήματα ποιέοντι.

3. On just and unjust
(1) Dissoi logoi are also spoken on the just and unjust. Some say that what is just and what is unjust are different things, others that the same thing is just and unjust. And I shall attempt to support this view.

(2) And I shall say first of all that it is just to lie and deceive. They might declare that that doing these things to one's enemies is fine and just; but to one’s friends would be shameful and base.  How about the enemies, and those who are not the closest friends?  Parents, for example. For if one's father or mother has to drink or eat medicine, but is unwilling, is it not just to give it in their stew and in their drink and not say that it is in it?

(3) So it is just now to lie and deceive one's parents. Is it also just to steal what belongs to one's friends and use violence on one’s dearest.

 (4) For example, if some member of one's household, in pain and aggrieved, is going to do away with himself with a sword or rope or something else, it is just to steal them, if one can, or, if one comes too late and comes upon him holding it, (is it just) to take it away by force?
(5) And how is it not just to enslave the enemy, if one can capture a city and sell it? And to break and enter the public buildings of fellow-citizens appears just. For if one's father, at pain of death, has been overpowered by enemies and jailed, is it not just to break in, steal away, and save one's father?

(6) And perjury. If someone is captured by the enemy and submits to an oath to betray his city if set free, would this man be acting justly if he honoured his oath?
(7) I do not think so, but rather he would save his city, his friends, and the ancestral temples by committing perjury. So it is now clear that perjury isalso just. And temple-robbery as well.
(8) Leave aside the temples of individual cities; is it not just to take and use for war those that are the shared temples of Greece–those of Delphi and Olympia–if the foreign invader is about to capture Greece, and safety depends on money?

(9) And it is just to slaughter those who are dearest, since both Orestes and Alcmaeon did — and the god revealed that they had acted justly.
(10) I shall turn to the technai and the work of poets. For in writing tragedies and in painting whoever deceives most is makes things like the real is best.

(11) And I want to adduce testimony from older poetry, like that of Cleobuline:

I saw a man stealing and deceiving by force, And accomplishing this by force was very just.

(12) These lines were very old. These are from Aeschylus:
     God does not desert just deception.

And

God honours when there is a kairos for lies.

(13) There is an opposing logos to this also, that what is just and what is unjust are different; as the name differs, so likewise does the reality. For if one were to ask those who say that the same thing is just and unjust whether they had ever up to then performed any just action towards their parents, they will say Yes. But in that case it was also an unjust action; for they concede that the same thing is just and unjust.

(14) Or take another point. If somebody knows that some man is just, he in that case knows that the same man is unjust and by the same token big and small. But if a man has been very unjust in his actions he ought to be executed! — For he has brought about [a situation that warrants death?].
(15) Let that suffice for these points. I shall turn to they say when they claim to demonstrate that the same thing is both just and unjust.
(16) For, if what they say is true, [the fact? to demonstrate?] that stealing the enemy's possessions is just is to demonstrate that this very action is unjust; and likewise for the other cases.
(17) They adduce as evidence arts in which what is just and what is unjust have no place. And poets never write their poems to propound truth but to give pleasure.

 (4) Περὶ ἀλαθέος καὶ ψεύδεος  

  (1) λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ ψεύδεος καὶ τῶ ἀλαθέος δισσοὶ λόγοι, ὧν ὁ μέν φατι, ἄλλον μὲν τὸν ψεύσταν ἦμεν λόγον, ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ἀλαθῆ· τοὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν αὖ.

(2) κἀγὼ τόνδε λέγω· πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγονται· ἔπειτα δέ, ὅταν λόγος ῥηθῆι, αἰ μὲν ὥς <κα> λέγηται ὁ λόγος, οὕτω γεγένηται, ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος, αἰ δὲ μὴ γεγένηται, ψευδὴς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.

(3) αὐτίκα κατηγορεῖ ἱεροσυλίαν τω· αἴ γ’ ἐγένετο τὦργον, ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος· αἰ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο, ψεύστας. καὶ τῶ ἀπολογουμένω ὡυτὸς λόγος. καὶ τά γε δικαστήρια τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ψεύσταν καὶ ἀλαθῆ κρίνοντι.

(4) ἔπειτα τοὶ ἑξῆς καθήμενοι αἰ λέγοιμεν ‘μύστας εἰμί’, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν πάντες ἐροῦμεν, ἀλαθὴς δὲ μόνος ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί.

(5) δᾶλον ὦν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῶι παρῆι τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας (10)

ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθής (ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ παῖς καὶ νεανίσκος καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων, ἐστίν).

(6) λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς ἄλλος εἴη ὁ ψεύστας λόγος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἀλαθής, διαφέρων τὤνυμα <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>· αἰ γάρ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος εἴη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθής, ὃν αὐτοὶ λέγοντι, πότερός ἐστιν· αἰ μὲν ψεύστας, δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἴη· αἰ δ’ ἀλαθής [ἀποκρίναιτο], καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος. καὶ ἀλαθῆ τίς ποκα εἶπεν ἢ ἐξεμαρτύρησε, καὶ ψευδῆ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. καὶ αἴ τινα ἄνδρα ἀλαθῆ οἶδε, καὶ ψεύσταν τὸν αὐτόν.

(7) ἐκ δὲ τῶ λόγω λέγοντι ταῦτα, ὅτι γενομένω μὲν τῶ πράγματος ἀλαθῆ τὸν λόγον <λέγοντι>, ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν. οὔκων διαφέρει <αὐτῶν τὤνυμα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

(8) ἐρωτάσαι δὲ κά τις> αὖθις τὼς δικαστάς, ὅ τι κρίνοντι (οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πράγμασιν)·

(9) ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, ὧι μὲν τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναμέμεικται, ψεύσταν ἦμεν, ὧι δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθῆ. τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον διαφέρει ...

5. (1) ‘ταὐτὰ τοὶ μαινόμενοι καὶ τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι.

(2) καὶ πρᾶτον μὲν ὀνομάζοντι ταὐτά, γᾶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον καὶ πῦρ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα. καὶ ποιέοντι ταὐτά, κάθηνται καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατάκεινται, καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό.

(3) καὶ μὰν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μέζον καὶ μῆιόν ἐστι καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον καὶ βαρύτερον καὶ κουφότερον. οὕτω γάρ ἐντι ταὐτὰ πάντα·

(4) τὸ τάλαντόν ἐστι βαρύτεροντῆς μνᾶς, καὶ κουφότερον τῶν δύο ταλάντων· τωὐτὸν ἄρα καὶ κουφότερον καὶ βαρύτερον.

(5) καὶ ζώει ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ ζώει, καὶ ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὰ γὰρ τῆιδ’ ἐόντα ἐν τᾶι Λιβύαι οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ καὶ ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὰ γὰρ τῆιδ’ ἐόντα ἐν τᾶι Λιβύαι οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν Λιβύαι ἐν Κύπρωι. καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. οὐκῶν καὶ ἐντὶ  τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί.’

(6) τοὶ τῆνα λέγοντες, τὼς μαινομένως καὶ <τὼςσωφρονοῦντας καὶ> τὼς σοφὼς καὶ τὼς ἀμαθεῖς τωὐτὰ διαπράσσεσθαι καὶ λέγεν, καὶ τἆλλα <τὰ> ἑπόμενα τῶι λόγωι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι.

(7) αἰ γάρ τις αὐτὼς ἐρωτάσαι, αἰ διαφέρει μανία σωφροσύνης καὶ σοφία ἀμαθίης, φαντί· ‘ναί’.

(8) εὖ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν πράσσοντι ἑκάτεροι δᾶλοί ἐντι, ὡς ὁμολογησοῦντι. οὐκῶν αἰ ταὐτὰ   πράσσοντι, καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ μαίνονται, καὶ τοὶ μαινόμενοι σοφοί, καὶ πάντα συνταράσσονται.

(9) καὶ ἐπακτέος ὁ λόγος, πότερον ὦν ἐν δέοντι τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες λέγοντι ἢ τοὶ μαινόμενοι. ἀλλὰ γάρ φαντι, ὡς ταὐτὰ μὲν λέγοντι, ὅταν τις αὐτὼς ἐρωτῆι· ἀλλὰ τοὶ μὲν σοφοὶ ἐν τῶι δέοντι, τοὶ δὲ μαινόμενοι ἇι οὐ δεῖ.

(10) καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες δοκοῦντι μικρὸν ποτιθῆναι <τὸ> ἇι δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, ὥστε   μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦμεν.

(11) ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ πράγματος τοσοῦτον ποτιτεθέντος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δοκῶ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ’ ἁρμονίας διαλλαγείσας· ὥσπερ ‘Γλαῦκος’ καὶ ‘γλαυκός’ καὶ ‘Ξάνθος’ καὶ ‘ξανθός’ καὶ ‘Ξοῦθος’ καὶ ‘ξουθός’.

(12) ταῦτα μὲν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀλλάξαντα διήνεικαν, τὰ δὲ μακρῶς καὶ βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα. ‘Τύρος’ καὶ ‘τυρός’ ‘σάκος’ καὶ ‘σακός’, ἅτερα δὲ γράμματα διαλλάξαντα· ‘κάρτος’ καὶ ‘κρατός’, ‘ὄνος’ καὶ ‘νόος’.

(13) ἐπεὶ ὦν οὐκ ἀφαιρεθέντος οὐδενὸς τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, τί δή, αἴ τίς τι ποτιτίθητι ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ; καὶ τοῦτο δείξω οἷόν ἐστιν.

(14) αἴ τις ἀπὸ τῶν δέκα ἓν ἀφέλοι <ἢ τοῖς δέκα ἓν ποτθείη>, οὔ κ’ ἔτι δέκα οὐδὲ ἓν εἴη, καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό.

(15) τὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἦμεν καὶ μὴ ἦμεν, ἐρωτῶ· ‘τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;’ οὐκῶν αἴ τις μὴ φαίη ἦμεν, ψεύδεται, <τὸ τὶ καὶ> τὰ πάντα εἰπὼν ταὐτά. πάντα ὦν πήι ἐστι.

4. On truth and falsehood
(1) Dissoi logoi are also put forward on what is true and what is false. The one view affirms that the true logosand the false logosare different things; the other group affirms that the two statements are on the contrary the same.

(2) I for my part also hold the latter view: first, because the two statements are expressed in the same words; and next, because whenever a logosis made, if the event has taken place in the way indicated by the statement, the logosis true; but if the event has not taken place in the way indicated, the same logosis false.
(3) For example, suppose a logosconsists of an accusation against somebody of temple-robbery. If the act took place, the logos is true; if not, it is false. And likewise with the logos of the man defending himself against the charge. And lawcourts in fact judge the same logosto be both true and false.
(4) For the fact is, even if, sitting next to one another in a row, we were [as a group] to say, "I am an initiate", we shall all say the same thing, but only I shall be telling the truth, since only I am an initiate.
(5) It is clear, then, that the same logosis false when the false is present to it, and true when the true is present to it (just as a person is the same person, though at one time a child, at another a youth, at another an adult, and at another an old man).
(6) It is also said that the false logos is different from the true logos; as the name differs, so likewise does the reality. For if anyone were to ask those who say that the same logos is false and true which of the two their own logos is, if the reply were "false", it is clear that a true logos and a false logos are two different things, but if he were to reply "true" then this same logos is also false. And if at any time he said something true or testified that something was true, then he also testified that the same things were false. And if he knows that a certain man is an honest man, he knows the same man is a liar.

(7) And in accord with their thesis they say that a logosis true if the event to which it refers took place, but false if it did not. It is therefore important to ask jurymen in their turn what their judgment is (jurymen, of course, not being personally present at the events).
(8) Even they themselves agree that that with which the false is intermingled is false, and that that with which the true is intermingled is true. But this view is totally different [from their original thesis].

5. "(1) The demented, the sane, the wise and the ignorant both say and do the same things.
(2) First of all they call things by the same name: 'earth', 'man', 'horse', 'fire', and everything else. And they do the same things: they sit, eat, drink, lie down, and so on, in the same way.

(3) What is more, the same thing is also both bigger and smaller, and more and less, and heavier and lighter. For in those respects all objects are the same.

(4) The talent is heavier than the mina and lighter than two talents; the same thing then is both lighter and heavier.

(5) And the same man is alive and is not alive; and the same things exist (are the case) and do not exist (are not the case). For what exists (is the case) here does not exist (is not the case) in Libya; nor does what exists (is what is the case) in Libya exist (turn out to be the case) in Cyprus. And so on in all other instances, using the same logos. Consequently, things both exist (are the case) and do not exist (are not the case)".
(6) Those who say this — that the demented and the wise and the ignorant do and say the same things, and all the other things that follow from the logos — are in error.
(7) For if one were to ask them if dementedness differs from sanity or wisdom from ignorance, they say "Yes".
(8) For it is quite obvious, even from the actions of each group, that they will grant this point. So even if they do the same things (as the demented do) the wise are not demented, nor the demented wise, nor is everything turned into confusion.
(9) And one ought to bring up the question whether it is those who are sane or those who are demented who speak at the right moment. For whenever one asks them they say that the two groups say the same things, only the wise say them at the right moment and the demented at moments when it is not proper.
(10) And in saying this they seem to me to have added the small phrases "when it is proper" and "when it is not proper", with the result that it is no longer the same thing.
(11) I do not think that things are altered by adding of such a thing, but when an accent is changed. For example: "Γλαύκος" (Glaucus) and "γλαυκός " (green), or "Ξάνθος" (Xanthus) and "ξάνθος" (blonde), or "Ξούθος" (Xuthus) and "ξουθος" (nimble).
(12) These differed by a difference by changing the pitch: the following by being spoken with longer or shorter vowels: "Τύρος" (Tyre) and "τυρός" (cheese), "σάκος" (shield) and "σακός" (enclosure), and yet others by changing the ordering of their letters: "κάρτος" (strength) and "κρατος" (of a head), "όνος" (ass) and "νόος" (mind).
(13) Since, then, there is such a difference when nothing is taken away, what if in that case somebody does either add something or take something away? I shall show the sort of thing I mean.
(14) If a man were to take away one from ten, there would no longer be ten or even one, and so on in the same way in all other instances.
(15) As for the affirmation that the same man exists and does not exist I ask, "Does he exist in some particular respect or in every respect?"Thus, if anyone denies that the man in question exists, he is making the mistake of asserting "in every respect". The conclusion is that all these things exist in some way.

(6) Περὶ τᾶς σοφίας καὶ τᾶς ἀρετᾶς, αἰ διδακτόν   

(1) λέγεται δέ τις λόγος οὔτ’ ἀλαθὴς οὔτε καινός· ὅτι ἄρα σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ οὔτε διδακτὸν εἴη οὔτε μαθητόν. τοὶ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες ταῖσδε ἀποδείξεσι χρῶνται·

(2) ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε εἴη, αἴ τι ἄλλωι παραδοίης, τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἔτι ἔχειν. μία μὲν δὴ αὕτα.

(3) ἄλλα δέ, ὡς, αἰ διδακτὸν ἦν, διδάσκαλοί κα ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν, ὡς τᾶς μωσικᾶς.

(4) τρίτα δέ, ὡς τοὶ ἐν τᾶι Ἑλλάδι γενόμενοι σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τὰν αὐτῶν τέχναν ἐδίδαξάν κα τὼς φίλως.

(5) τετάρτα δέ, ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς παρὰ σοφιστὰς ἐλθόντες οὐδὲν ὠφέληθεν.

(6) πέμπτα δέ, ὅτι πολλοὶ οὐ συγγενόμενοι σοφισταῖς ἄξιοι λόγω γεγένηνται.

(7) ἐγὼ δὲ κάρτα εὐήθη νομίζω τόνδε τὸν λόγον· γινώσκω γὰρ τὼς διδασκάλως γράμματα διδάσκεν, τά κα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιστάμενος τυγχάνηι, καὶ κιθαριστὰς κιθαρίζεν. πρὸς δὲ τὰν δευτέραν ἀπόδειξιν,    ὡς ἄρα οὐκ ἐντὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεδεγμένοι, τί μὰν τοὶ σοφισταὶ διδάσκοντι ἄλλ’ ἢ σοφίαν καὶ ἀρετάν;

(8) [ἢ] τί δὲ Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι ἦεν; τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἐδίδαξε Πολύκλειτος τὸν υἱὸν ἀνδριάντας ποιέν. (9) καὶ αἰ μέν τις μὴ ἐδίδαξε, οὐ σαμῆιον· αἰ δ’ εἷς τις ἐδίδαξε, τεκμάριον ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστι διδάξαι.

(10) τέταρτον δέ, αἰ μή τοι παρὰ [σοφῶν] σοφιστῶν σοφοὶ γίνονται· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον μαθόντες.

(11) ἔστι δέ τι καὶ φύσις, ἇι δή τις μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ σοφιστᾶν ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο, εὐφυής γα γενόμενος, ῥαιδίως συναρ μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ σοφιστᾶν ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο, εὐφυής γα γενόμενος, ῥαιδίως συναρπάξαι τὰ πολλά, ὀλίγα μαθὼν παρ’ ὧνπερ καὶ τὠνύματα μανθάνομεν· καὶ τούτων τι ἤτοι πλέον, ἤτοι ἔλασσον, ὁ μὲν παρὰ πατρός, ὁ δὲ παρὰ ματρός.

(12) αἰ δέ τωι μὴ πιστόν ἐστι τὰ ὀνύματα μανθάνειν ἁμέ, ἀλλ’ ἐπισταμένως ἅμα γίνεσθαι, γνώτω ἐκ τῶνδε· αἴ τις εὐθὺς γενόμενον παιδίον ἐς Πέρσας ἀποπέμψαι καὶ τηνεῖ τράφοι, κωφὸν Ἑλλάδος φωνᾶς, περσίζοι κα· αἴ τις τηνόθεν τῆιδε κομίξαι, ἑλλανίζοι κα. οὕτω μανθάνομεν τὰ ὀνύματα, καὶ τὼς διδασκάλως οὐκ ἴσαμες.

(13) οὕτω λέλεκταί μοι ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἔχεις ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσαν· καὶ οὐ λέγω, ὡς διδακτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆναι αἱ ἀποδείξεις.

6. On whether wisdom and moral excellence are teachable
(1) There is a certain logos put forward which is neither true nor new, to the effect that wisdom and moral excellence can be neither taught nor learned. Those who say this use the following proofs:
(2) That it is impossible, if you hand over something to another, for you to retain it. This is one proof.
(3) Another is that, if they could be taught, there would have existed recognized teachers of them — as there are of the arts.
(4) A third proof is that those men in Greece who became wise would have taught this wisdom to their own children and their friends.
(5) A fourth proof is that before now there have been people who have gone to sophists and gained no benefit.
(6) A fifth proof is that many people who did not associate with sophists have become eminent.
(7) I consider this logos exceedingly simple-minded. For I know that teachers do teach those letters which each one happens to possess himself, and that harp-players do teach people how to play the harp. As for the second proof — that there do not in fact exist acknowledged teachers, what in that case do the sophists teach, if not wisdom and virtue?
(8) And what were the followers of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras? As for the third proof, Polyclitus did teach his son how to make statues.
(9) Even if someone does not teach, that is no proof; but if he has taught it, there is proof that it is possible to teach it.
(10) The fourth point [is valid only] if they do become wise, but not after associating with skilled sophists. Many have learned their letters, even though they have not been instructed.

(11) There is also an important natural talent whereby a person becomes capable, without having learned his competence from sophists, of comprehending the greater part [of a subject] with ease (provided he is also naturally well-endowed), after learning [only?] a small part [of it] from those from whom we also learn words. And some of these latter things (be it a greater or smaller number) one person learns from his father and another from his mother.
(12) And if it is not credible that we learn our words, but that we are born knowing them, let him ascertain the truth from the following: should a person send a child to Persia as soon as it was born and have it brought up there without ever hearing the speech of Greece, the child would speak Persian; should one bring the child from Persia to Greece, the child would speak Greek. That is how we learn words, even though we do not know the teachers.
(13) With that my logos is completed, and you have its beginning, end, and middle. I am not saying that wisdom and moral excellence are teachable, but that the above-mentioned proofs do not satisfy me.

7. (1) λέγοντι δέ τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων, ὡς χρὴ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ κλάρω γίνεσθαι, οὐ βέλτιστα ταῦτα νομίζοντες.

(2) εἰ γάρ τις αὐτὸν ἐρωτώιη τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα, τί δὴ σὺ τοῖς οἰκέταις οὐκ ἀπὸ κλήρω τὰ ἔργα προστάσσεις, ὅπως ὁ μὲν ζευγηλάτας, αἴ κ’ ὀψοποιὸς λάχηι, ὀψοποιῆι, ὁ δὲ ὀψοποιὸς ζευγηλατῆι, καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό;

(3) καὶ πῶς οὐ καὶ τὼς χαλκῆας καὶ τὼς σκυτῆας συναγαγόντες καὶ τέκτονας καὶ χρυσοχόας διεκλαρώσαμεν καὶ ἠναγκάσαμεν, ἅν χ’ ἕκαστος λάχηι τέχναν ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἃν ἐπίσταται;

(4) τωὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀγῶσι τᾶς μωσικᾶς διακλαρῶσαι τὼς ἀγωνιστὰς καὶ ὅ τι χ’ ἕκαστος [κα] λάχηι, ἀγωνίζεσθαι· αὐλητὰς κιθαριξεῖ τυχὸν καὶ κιθαρωιδὸς αὐλήσει· καὶ ἐν τῶι πολέμωι [τὼς] τοξότας καὶ [τὼς] ὁπλίτας ἱππασεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἱππεὺς τοξεύσει,    ὥστε πάντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ δύνανται, [οὐδὲ] πραξοῦντι.

(5) λέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἦμεν καὶ δαμοτικὸν κάρτα· ἐγὼ ἥκιστα νομίζω δαμοτικόν. ἐντὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι μισόδαμοι ἄνθρωποι, ὧν αἴ κα τύχηι ὁ κύαμος, ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον.

(6) ἀλλὰ χρὴ τὸν δᾶμον αὐτὸν ὁρῶντα αἱρεῖσθαι πάντας τὼς εὔνως αὐτῶι, καὶ τὼς ἐπιταδείως στραταγέν, ἁτέρως δὲ νομοφυλακὲν καὶ τἆλλα.

7. (1) Some public speakers say that offices should be assigned by lot; but this thought of theirs is not very good.

(2) If only somebody would ask him (i.e., the man who says this), "Why in that case don't you assign your household slaves their jobs by lot, so that the ox-driver, if he draws the job of cook as his lot, will cook, while the cook will drive oxen, and so on in all other instances?
(3) And why don't we bring together smiths and cobblers, carpenters and goldsmiths, and assign them jobs by lot, forcing them to perform whatever craft each one draws by lot, not the craft of which each has expert knowledge?
(4) Likewise in the case of artistic contests: one could make the contestants draw lots, and each compete in whatever contest he draws. A flute-player will perhaps be playing the harp, or a harpist the flute. And in war an archer or hoplite will be a cavalryman, and a cavalryman will be an archer; with the result that everyone will be doing things of which they have neither the knowledge nor the capability.
(5) And they say that this is a good method, and exceedingly democratic. I personally consider it the least democratic of all methods. For there are in cities men who hate the people (demos), and if ever the lot falls to them they will destroy the people (demos).
(6) But the people itself ought to keep watch and elect all those who are well-disposed towards itself, and ought to choose as its army-commanders those who are suitable for the job, and to choose others to serve as guardians of the law, and so on.

8.  (1) <τῶ αὐτῶ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχύ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ <τὰν> ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάζεν ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ’ ἦμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἁπάντων ὥς τε ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο, διδάσκεν.

(2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἁπάντων εἰδώς, πῶς οὐ δυνασεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ <τὰν πόλιν διδάσκεν> πράσσεν;

(3) ἔτι δὲ ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων εἰδὼς ἐπιστασεῖται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγεν.

(4) δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν, περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται, περὶ τούτων λέγεν. πάντ’ ὦν [γὰρ] ἐπιστασεῖται.

(5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας ἐπίσταται, τοὶ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐ<όντων ἐντί>.

(6) δεῖ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγεν, περὶ ὅτων κα λέγηι, <τὰ πράγματα>, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκεν τὴν πόλιν πράσσεν, τὰ δὲ κακά τως κωλύειν.

(7) εἰδὼς δὲ ταῦτα εἰδήσει καὶ τὰ ἅτερα τούτων· πάντα γὰρ ἐπιστασεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ ταὐτὰ τῶν πάντων τῆνα, <ὁ> δὲ ποτὶ τωὐτὸν τὰ δέοντα πράξει, αἰ χρή.

(8) καὶ μὲν ἐπίσταται αὐλέν, ἀὶ δυνασεῖται αὐλέν, αἴ κα δέηι τοῦτο πράσσεν.

(9) τὸν δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς· περὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ταὶ δίκαι. εἰδὼς δὲ τοῦτο, εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῶι καὶ τὰ <τούτων> ἅτερα.

(10) δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τὼς νόμως ἐπίστασθαι πάντας· αἰ τοίνυν τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπιστασεῖται, οὐδὲ τὼς νόμως.

(11) τὸν γὰρ ἐν μωσικᾶι νόμον ὡυτὸς ἐπίσταται, ὅσπερ καὶ μωσικάν, ὃς δὲ μὴ μωσικάν, οὐδὲ τὸν νόμον.

(12) ὅς γα <μὰν> τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται, εὐπετὴς ὁ λόγος, ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται·

(13) ὣς δὲ <καὶ κατὰ> βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται, αἴ κα> δέηι νιν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, περὶ πάντων· οὐκῶν δεῖ νιν πάντ’ ἐπίστασθαι.

8. (1) I consider it a characteristic of the same man and of the same techne to be able to dialogue briefly and to know the truth of matters, to know how to judge correctly, to be able to speak publically, to know the technai of logoi,  and to teach people about the nature of all things, how they are and how they came to be.

(2) First of all, will not the man who knows about the nature of everything also be able to act rightly in regard to everything?

(3) Furthermore, the man who knows the technai of logoi will also know how to speak correctly about all things.
(4) For the man who is going to speak correctly must speak about what he knows; so he will  know everything.
(5) For he knows the technai of all logoi, and all logoi are about everything that is.

(6) And the man who is going to speak correctly about whatever he speaks about must know how to teach the city to do good things and prevent bad things.

(7) In knowing these things he will also know things other than these, since he will know everything. For these are some of all the things that he will do, if necessary, in response to requirements.
(8) Even if he does not know how to pipe, he will be able to pipe if it is required to do this.

(9) And the man who knows how to plead in court know justice correctly; for legal suits are about this. And by knowing this he will also know its opposite, etc.
(10) He must also know all the laws. If, however, he does not know the facts, he will also not know the laws.
(11) For the same man knows the law in music, the man who knows music. But the man who does not know music also does not know its law.
(12) At any rate, the man who knows the truth of matters–the logos is easy–that knows everything.

 
(13) And the man who can dialogue briefly, if he is required to answer questioning on every subject he must know every subject.

 9.  (1) μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὕρηται μνάμα καὶ ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς τὰν σοφίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὸν βίον.

(2) ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο <πρᾶτον>· ἐὰν προσέχηις τὸν νοῦν, διὰ τούτων παρελθοῦσα ἁ γνώμα μᾶλλον αἰσθησεῖται.

(3) δεύτερον δὲ μελετᾶν, αἴ κα ἀκούσηις· τῶι γὰρ πολλάκις ταὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἶπαι ἐς μνάμαν παρεγένετο σύνολον ὃ ἔμαθες.

(4) τρίτον, αἴ κα ἀκούσηις, ἐπὶ τὰ οἶδας καταθέσθαι, οἷον τόδε· δεῖ μεμνᾶσθαι Χρύσιππον, κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ τὸν ἵππον.

(5) ἄλλο· Πυριλάμπη κατθέμεν ἐπὶ <τὸ> πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν. τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶν ὀνυμάτων·

(6) τὰ δὲ πράγματα οὕτως· περὶ ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρη καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλῆα, περὶ χαλκείας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, περὶ δειλίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐπειόν ...    (10)

9. (1) A very great and fine discovery has been made, memory; it is useful for all purposes; for wisdom and for life.

(2) This is the case, first, if you pay attention, that judgement will, by passing through these things, perceive more.

(3) Second, you must be diligent, whenever you hear something. For by frequently hearing and speaking the same things everything you learn has been committed to memory.

(4) Third, you must, whenever you hear something, relate it to what you know: for example, (if) you need to remember Chrysippus,  relate him to gold (chrysos) and horse (hippos).
(5) Another example: relate Pyrilampes to fire (pyr) and to shine (lampein). These are about words.
(6) In the case of actions, (remember) this way: if it is about courage, (relate) to Ares and Achilles; if metal-working Hephaestus, and if cowardice Epeius.1

1 Il. 23 sees Epeius box, Od. 8 as constructing the Trojan Horse, but he is not portrayed fighting in any battles.