II. CORAX AND TISIAS (Vide A V 1 sq.)
1. Himerius or. 26 p. 2 cod., p. 97a, 36 D.: … ἀμφὶ Τισίαν καὶ Κόρακα, οἳ (οἱ cod.) κατὰ Γοργίαν καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀνθήσαντες … Verba lacera, sensus obscurus.
2. Paus. 6.17.8: καίτοι ἄλλα τε Τισίας ἐς λόγους ἐσηνέγκατο καὶ πιθανώτατα τῶν καθʼ αὑτὸν γυναικὶ Συρακουσίᾳ χρημάτων ἔγραψεν ἀμφισβήτησιν.
3. [Plut.] Vitae X οr. 835C-D de Lysia: ἐπεὶ δε τὴν εἰς Σύβαριν ἀποικίαν τὴν ὕστερον Θουρίους μετονομασθεῖσαν ἔστελλεν ἡ πόλις, ᾤχετo … ὡς κοινωνήσων τοῦ κλήρου, ἔτη γεγονὼς πεντεκαίδεκα, ἐπὶ Πραξιτέλους ἄρχοντος (444/3), κἀκεῖ διέμεινε παιδευόμενος παρὰ Τισίᾳ καὶ Νικίᾳ τοῖς Συρακουσίοις.
Ex Pseudoplutarcho hausit Phot. Bihl 489 B. Indidem Suda: Λυσίας Κεφάλου Συρακούσιος, ῥήτωρ, μαθητὴς Τισίου καὶ Νικίου.
4. Dionys. de Isocrate p. 535 R (I 54, 10 U. R.): γενόμενος δʼ ἀκουστὴς Προδίκου τε τοῦ Κείου καὶ Γοργίου τοῦ Λεοντίνου καὶ Τισίου τοῦ Συρακουσίου τῶν τότε μέγιστον ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐχόντων ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ …
5. [Plut.] Vitae X οr. 836 F de Isocrate: ἀκροώμενος Προδίκου τε τοῦ Κείου καὶ Γοργίου τοῦ Λεοντίνου καὶ Τισίου τοῦ Συρακουσίου καὶ Θηραμένους τοῦ ῥήτορος. Sud. s. v. Isocrates: διδάσκαλος δέ Γοργίας, οἳ δὲ Τισίαν φασίν, οἳ δὲ Ἐργῖνον, οἳ δὲ Πρόδικον ἔφασαν, οἰ δὲ Θηραμένην.
6. Cic. de orat. 3.21 (81): quare Coracem istum vestrum patiamur nos quidem pullos suos excludere (i. e. ausbrüten) in nido, qui evolent clamatores odiosi ac molesti. Ad proverbium κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ᾠόν adludere Ciceronem Spengelius coniecit Art. Scr. p. 27. Inde non sequitur de Coracis et Tisiae lite fabellam iam Ciceroni fuisse notam (λέγουσι δέ τινες, ὅτι προὑπῆρχεν αὕτη ἡ παροιμία Prol. in Hermogenis περὶ στάσεων W IV p. 14 = Prol. Syll. p. 272, 27 R.). Zenobius autem Paroem. Gr. I p. 107 L. Schn., idem narrans de lite fabellam: τὴν παροιμίαν ταύτην οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πτηνοῦ ζᾠου φασὶν εἰρῆσθαι, ὅτι οὔτε αὐτὸς βρωτός ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ ᾠόν, ὃ ἔχει, οἱ δὲ κτλ. Certe ἡ περὶ Κόρακος φερομένη παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἱστορία, ut ait Sextus Emp. adv. math. II 96, dudum nota fuit.
7. Anaximenes artis rhet. (in epistula falsarii, quae praemissa est operi) p. 12, 7H.: περιτεύξῃ δὲ δυσὶ τούτοις βιβλίοις, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐμὸν ἐν ταῖς ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ τέχναις Θεoδέκτῃ γραφείσαις, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον Κόρακος.
8. Prol. in Hermogenem W VII 6 = P. S. p. 189, 13 et Maximi Planudis Prol. W V 215 = P. S. p. 67, 3 R.: Κόραξ οὖν τις, συνετὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ χρῆσθαι πράγμασιν ἱκανός … συνέθηκε τέχνην περὶ προοιμίων καὶ διηγήσεων καὶ ἀγώνων καὶ ἐπιλόγων (διʼ ὧν τὸν δῆμον ἔπειθεν add. Planudes). Apud reliquos prolegomenon auctores Coracem scripsisse aliquid non fertur.
9. Excerpta Cοrporis P., P. S. p. 60, 3 R.: εἶτα Κόραξ καὶ Τισίας ὁ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ, εἶτα Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος εἰς Ἀθήνας (i. e. Athenis) καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψαν τέχνας.
10. Cic. Brut. 12.46: itaque ait Aristoteles … artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse.
11. Cic. inv. 2.2,.6: ac veteres quidem scriptores artis usque a principe illo atque inventore Tisia repetitos unum in locum conduxit Aristoteles. Cf. de orat. 1. 20. 91: a Corace nescio quo (sic) et Tisia, quos artis illius inventores et principes fuisse constaret. V. etiam Aristotelis rhet. 1409 a 17 (ubi Corax) et Top. 183 b 31 (ubi Tisias). L. Victorinus ad Ciceronis l. l. (Rhet. Lat. min. 258. 37 H.): Corax et Tisias artes primi oratorias apud Graecos scripsisse dicuntur.
12. Quint. inst. 3.1.8: artium autem scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi. Conferas, quaeso, historiolam a Martiano Capella p. 140.17 sq. E. relatam (V 432). Artem a Corace inventam, a Tisia scriptam esse recte iam Susemihl putavit. Unde Plato, more suo rem tangens magis quam significans Phaedri 273 C: δεινῶς γʼ ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτʼ ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος. Ubi Hermias in commentario: τοῦτο εἶπεν ἴσως διὰ τὸν Κόρακα, ἐπειδὴ ἐλέγετο ὁ Κόραξ Τισίου καθηγητὴς (μαθητὴς trad. corr. Spengel) εἶναι.
13. (Marcellini?) Prol. W IV 19, P S. p. 277.16 R.: ἀλλʼ ἔλθωμεν καὶ εἴπωμεν, τί ἐστι ῥητορική. οἱ περὶ Γισίαν καὶ Κόρακα ὁρίζονται αὐτὴν οὕτως ‘ῥχτορική ἐστι πειθοῦς δημιουργόςʼ. Sic etiam Prol. anοnyma P. S. p. 26.20 R. (W VI 14.1), Excerpta cod. Parisini P. S. p. 296.26 R. Solus nominatur Corax Exc. cod. Marc. 430 st Vaticani 900 P. S. p. 349.7 R. Anοnym. W III 611.9. Gorgiae hanc definitionem tribuit Plato Gorgiae 453 A, cf. Amm. Marc. 30.4.3: Τεισίας (ΚΟΙCΙΑC vel ΚΤΗCΙΑC ll.) suasionis opificem esse memorat, adsentiente Leontino Gorgia. Isocrateae artis est finitio secundum Quint. 2.15.4, Χenocratis secundum Sextum Empiricum adv. math. II 61. Denique Themistius or. XXVI 328 d: καὶ ταῦτα λέγουσα Κόρακος μὲν καὶ Τισίου καταγελᾷς καὶ Θεόδωρον σκώπτεις τὸν Βυζάντιον ὡς μικρὰ ἄττα καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια εἰς τὴν τέγνην πορισαμένους, αὑτὴ δὲ ἄνωθεν διδάσκεις, ὅπως ἄν τις πειθὼ δημιουργοίη. At si Demosthenes Aeschini δεινὸς δημιουργὸς λόγων audit (III 215), num nostra illa definitio spectetur, admodum dubium (Wendland, Hermae 39, 509.2).
14. Athanasii Prol. P. S. p. 171.19 R.: ὅτι τοῦ λέγειν ἡ φύσις αἰτία, τοῦ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἡ ῥητορική, ἣν ἐξεῦρε Κόραξ ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἥν καὶ ὡρίσαντο δύναμιν πειθοῦς (ὡρίσατo Rabe). Cf. Philod. II p. 191: τὸ λέγειν ἡ φ[ύσ]ις ἔδωκεν, τὸ δὲ καλῶς [λ]εγειν ἡ τέχνη κτλ. et auctores ob eandem sententiam a Rabeo l. l. laudati.
15. Plato Phaedr. 267 A: Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὕδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τʼ ἐναντία καινῶς συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεῦρον.
Vide Epicharmi ad Χenophanem apud Aristot. metaph. 1010 a 5: διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγουσιν. οὕτω γὰρ ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην (Kaibel, Com. Gr. fr. I, Epicharmi 252). Antiphon Tetral. I β 8: εἰ δέ τις τὰ εἰκότα ἀληθέσιν ἴσα ἡγεῖται … cf. δ 8. - Quae secuntur apud Platonem, in nuce continent αὔξησιν et μείωσιν posteriorum. Cf. etiam Demetrius de eloc. § 120: καίτοι τινές φασι δεῖν τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλως λέγειν καὶ σημεῖον τοῦτο ἡγοῦνται ὐπερβαλλούσης δυνάμεως. Ceterum v. infra Isocratis 4.8. μακρολογία et βραχυλογία Protagorae quoque et Gorgiae tribuitur, atque cf. Phaedri 268 C, 269 A, 272 A, Theaet. 172 D, Polit. 286 C, Gorg. 461 D (de Pοlo), Thucydidis IV 17.2.
16. Plato Phaedr. 272 C: Σω. βούλει οὖν ἐγώ τινʼ εἴπω λόγον, ὃν τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἀκήκοα; - Φαι. τί μήν; - Σω. λέγεται γοῦν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν. - Φαι. καὶ σύ γε οὕτω ποίει. - Σω. φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω 5 ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδʼ ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους. παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῇ τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς 10 δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ. τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ᾧ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνῃ ἐρεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὖ τὰ πραχθέντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα ἔν τε κατηγορίᾳ καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ· καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκὸς διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν 15 τῷ ἀληθεῖ. τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην πορίζειν. 10 μέλει 12 αὐτὰ B αὐτὰ τὰ Heindorf.
Haec ex arte antiqua sumpta esse iam Usener (Quaest. Anaxim. p. 36737, Kl. Schr. I 28.sq.) concluserat, quia ad genus iudiciale solum pertinerent. Esse in proverbio ait Socrates ne lupi quidem partes esse deserendas. Quidni igitur corvi (κόρακος) quoque, bestiae item rapacis? Pergit autem Plato, suo modo σχηματίζων: Φαι. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας, ἅ λέγουσιν οἳ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἰναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα. - Σω. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε Τεισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς.
17. Plato Phaedr. 259 E: ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντʼ ἂν πλήθει, οἵπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλά, ἀλλʼ ὅσα δόξει. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας. Tangitur haec doctrina etiam in rei publ. VI 193 A-C. Talia respicere possis credere Sophoclem in Antigona 620 sq.: σοφίᾳ γὰρ ἔκ του κλεινὸν ἔπος πέφανται, τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτʼ ἐσθλὸν τῷδʼ ἔμμεν, ὅτῳ φρένας θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν, videas modo Phaedr. 260 C. Ceterum adeundus Philodem. rhet. I p. 209.5 S.: εἰ δʼ ἐροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ δυνατ[ὰ] καὶ ἀναγκαῖα μόνον ἐξε[υρ]ίσκειν καὶ {τὰ} πιθανότητʼ ἔχον[τ]α, χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲν ἕτ[ερον] λέγειν ἢ τὸ το[ὺ]ς ἐνόντας πολειτικοὺς λόγο[υς] ἐξευρίσκειν τὸν πολε[ιτικ]ὸν οὐδʼ ἕστηκεν τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς.
18. Plato Phaedr. 273 A: εἰπέτω τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τεισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν; - τί γὰρ ἄλλo; - τοῦτο δὴ ὡς ἔοικε σοφὸν εὑρὼν ἅμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν, ὡς ἐάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν 5 συγκόψας ἱμάτιον ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω ἤστην, ἐκείνῳ δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ· πῶς δʼ ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῷδε ἐπεχείρησα; ὃ δʼ οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, 10 ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν τάχʼ ἂν ἔλεγχόν πῃ παραδοίη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ἐστὶ τὰ τέχνῃ λεγόμενα. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε; - τί μήν; - φεῦ, δεινῶς γʼ ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος, ὅστις δή ποτʼ ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος.
Ars est argumenta in utramque partem adhibendi, Spengel ad Ar. rh. p. 344. Isocrates adv. Callim. 13 sq. Antiphontis tetralogiae.
19. Plato Gorg. 460 E. ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου (Gorgias) τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γʼ ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον (cf. 457 A) ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοῦς λόγους.
Cf. Phaedr. 273 B de Tisia: δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν. Quint. inst. 2.15.31, ‘doctores quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni videbantur, qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et veris credibilia praeferrent.ʼ Gorgias quidem rhetoricen solum ἐπὶ δικαίου χρείᾳ adhiberi vult (Plato Gorg. 457 B).
20. Aristot. rhet. 1402a 3: ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τί γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ὄν, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, ἔστιν 5 γὰρ ἐπιστητόν, τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἔστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει· τάχʼ ἄν τις εἶκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ εἶναι λέγοι, 10 βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα. γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἶκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι 15 μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστι δʼ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη. ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγῃ· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός· κἂν ἔνοχος ὤν, οἷον ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὢν· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ. Φαίνεται 20 μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτʼ ἐστί. 15 δʼ ἐκ τούτου Schol. translatio lat. δὲ τοῦτο Ac δὲ τούτου ΘΠ 17 αἰκίαν QDE φεύγει ΘΠ 18 ὁμοίως καὶ ΘΠ
Ecce artificium a dilemmate, quod vocant, derivatum, cuius apud eristicos qui fuerit usus, prae ceteris Plato demonstrat in Euthydemo (275 , 2/6 D, 283 E). Dilemmata amat Andocides (I 51, II 2, II 3, II 16). Cognatus est is τόπος, qui est e divisione (cf. ad B VII 39). Ad rem vide etiam Hermogenis π. στ. p. 147.29 Sp. οἷς γὰρ ὁ ἕτερος χρήσεται ὡς σημείοις τοῦ εἶναί τι, τούτοις ὁ ἕτερος ὡς σημείοις χρήσεται τοῦ μὴ εἶναί τι κτλ.
Locum uberrime illustravit G. Kowalski, De arte rhetorica 1 (Lemberg 1937) 3 sq.
21. Aristot. rhet. 1372a 21: λαθητικοὶ δʼ εἰσὶν οἵ τʼ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενεῖς περὶ αἰκίας καὶ ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας κτλ. 2 ἀσθενὴς libri praeter Ac
22. Anaxim. p. 86.16 H: ἀπρεπὴς μὲν οὖν γένοιτʼ ἄν, ἐὰν ἀγωνίζηται νεώτερος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ὑπὲρ ἄλλου, ὑπεναντίος δέ, ἐάν τις ἰσχυρὸς ὢν ἀσθενεῖ δικάζηται αἰκίας ἢ ἐάν τις ὑβριστὴς ὢν ὕβριν ἐγκαλῇ σώφρονι ἢ ἐάν τις πάνυ πλουσίῳ δικάζηται πάνυ πένης χρημάτων ἐγκαλῶν.
Notabis, cum Aristoteles addat ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, divitis pauperisque rixae exemplum ab Anaximene tertio loco poni, quod in ipsa Tisiae arte inventum esse fortasse confirmatur a Luciano Pseudol. 29 (186 sq.), cum narrat sophistam quendam pauperis partes contra divitem egisse eundemque seni diviti Tisiae artibus multum pecuniae eripuisse. (Ibid. ultima verba ὁ δὲ ... κατασοφισθεὶς ad historiam c. 5. narratam pertinere videntur.) Cf. etiam Lysiae 24.16 οὐ γὰρ <τοὺς> πενομένους καὶ λίαν ἀπόρως διακειμένους ὑβρίζειν εἰκός, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πολλῷ πλείω τῶν ἀναγκαίων κεκτημένους, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους τοῖς σώμασιν ὄντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μάλιστα πιστεύοντας ταῖς αὑτῶν ῥώμαις, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἤδη προβεβηκότας τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἔτι νέους καὶ νέαις ταῖς διανοίαις χρωμένους. Inversum habes Anaximenis ordinem. Conicias certos τοῦ εἰκότος locos iam a Tisia fuisse elaboratos, ac recte huc traxit Kowalski p. 50 Xen. Cyrop. I 3.17: ἦν δὲ ἡ δίκη τοιαύτη. παῖς μέγας (i. e. ἰσχυρός) μικρὸν ἔχων χιτῶνα παῖδα μικρὸν (i. e. ἀσθενῆ) μέγαν ἔχοντα χιτῶνα ἐκδύσας αὐτὸν (cf. supra Plat. Phaedr. 273 A) τὸν μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἐκεῖνον ἡμφίεσε, τὸν δʼ ἐκείνου αὐτὸς ἐνέδυ. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτοις δικάζων ἔγνων … ἐν δὲ τούτῳ με ἔπαισεν ὁ διδάσκαλος λέξας ...
23. Doxopater in Aphthon. W II p. 119.16: τούτων δέ (scil. τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν) φασιν εὑρετὴν πρῶτον γενέσθαι τὸν Κόρακα, ἄρτι τὸν δῆμον ἐκ τῆς ἀγρίου τυραννίδος ἐκείνης παραλαβόντα καὶ συγκεχυμένον εὑρόντα καί, ἵνα μὲν τὸ θορυβοῦν παύσῃ καὶ πείσῃ προσέχειν, τοὺς τῶν προοιμίων τόπους ἐπινοήσαντα, ἵνα δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος σαφῶς διδάξῃ καὶ πιθανῶς καὶ συντόμως, τὴν διήγησιν ἐπικατανοήσαντα, ἵνα δὲ καί, περὶ ὧν βούλεται, πείσῃ <καὶ προτρέψῃ> καὶ ἀποτρέψῃ, τοῖς ἀγῶσι χρησάμενον· ἵνα δὲ καὶ τῶν καιριωτάτων (l. κυριωτάτων) ἀναμνήσῃ, πληρώσῃ δὲ καὶ πάθους τοὺς δικαστὰς ἢ τοὺς βουλευτάς, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλόγους καταστησάμενον. Cf. quae de Coracis dispositione supra A V 16 collecta exstant. Ipse quidem Doxopater, cum quattuor partes describit, quod probatur iam a Ioanne Sardiano p. 50, 12 sq. R., tamen de genere demonstrativo loquitur, in quo narratio non habet locum, de narrationis virtutibus profert praecepta, quae Isocrati eiusque disciplinae ab aliis tribuuntur. Troilus denique, in genere iudiciali Coracem versatum esse adfirmans, septem partes enumerat: προοίμια, προκατασκευήν, προκατάστασιν, κατάστασιν, ἀγῶνας, παρέκβασιν, ἐπιλόγους (v. supra p. 17), eaque fortasse ex Aristotele provenit memoria, scimus autem in terminis technicis inveniendis primos auctores quasi delirasse. Ceterum adeas Hambergeri libellum 25 sq. (34).
24. Syrianus in Hermogenem II p. 127, 4 R: γνωστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ Κόραξ ὁ τεχνογράφος τῷ τῆς καταστάσεως ὀνόματι κέχρηται.προοίμια τοῦ λόγου τὴν κατάστασιν καλῶν. Anaximenes 29 p. 71.5 H. de prooemio agens: τοῦτον μὲν οὖν τον τρόπον τὰς καταστάσεις τῶν δημηγοριῶν ποιητέον. De καταστάσεως vocabuli notione v. Wendland 30 sq., Hamberger 34 sq., 39 sq. (Usener, Kl. Schriften I 32).
25. Plato Phaedr. 267 D: τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δʼ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα. Φαι. τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνῆσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;
26. Plato Phaedr. 274 A ad praecedentia verba respiciens: ὥστʼ εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· μεγάλων γὰρ ἕνεκα περιιτέον, οὐχ ὡς σὺ (i. e. Tisias) δοκεῖς. περιιτέον: „ambitum“ Cicero vocat τὴν περίοδον, Pollux II 125 περιλέγειν explicat περιέρχεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ. At Aristoph. Ran. 953 περίπατος est quasi μακρολογία, quod explicatur verbis Maccab. β 2, 30 τὸ μὲν ἐμβατεύειν καὶ περίπατον ποιεῖσθαι λόγων καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀρχηγέτῃ καθήκει, τὸ δὲ σύντομον κτλ. Ipsius περιόδου nomen Platoni inde ductum videri satis clare ex verbis eius apparet. Tisias igitur semper διὰ περιόδων dicendum esse docuerat.
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II. CORAX AND TISIAS (see also A V 1ff.)
1. Himerius, 2nd speech: Tisias and Corax, who blossomed in the way that Gorgias and Protagoras did. The words are fragmentary and the meaning unclear.
2. Pausanias 6.17.8: Yet Tisias expanded the art of rhetoric, in particular he wrote the most persuasive speech of his time to support the claim of a Syracusan woman to a property.
3. Pseudo-Plutarch, Lives of the Ten Orators, on Lysias: But when the city sent a colony to Sybaris, which was afterwards called Thurii, he went there… that he might receive his portion of his father's estate. This was done in the fifteenth year of his age, when Praxiteles was chief magistrate [444/3 BC]. There then he stayed, and was brought up under Nicias and Tisias, both Syracusans. Phot. Bibl. 489 B draws on Pseudoplutarch, as does the Suda: ‘Lysias son of Cephalus, Syracusan, orator, student of Tisias and Nicias.
4. Dionysius of Halikarnassos, On Isocrates: He became a student of Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontinoi and Tisias of Syracuse, who at that time were the most famous among the Greeks for their knowledge…
5. Pseudo-Plutarch, Lives 10 or. 836f.: He listened to Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontinoi and the rhetor Theramenes. – Sud. s.v. Isocrates: His teacher was Gorgias; others say it was Tisias, others Erginus, others Prodicus, others Theramenes.
6. Cicero, On the Orator 3.21 (81): Therefore, let us tolerate that Corax of yours hatching his fledglings in his nest, who will fly out as unlikeable and obnoxious bawlers. Spengel Art. Scr. p. 27 surmises that Cicero is playing on the saying, ‘bad crow, bad egg’. From this it does not follow that Cicero already knew the story of the quarrel between Corax and Tisias (‘some say that this saying is older’: Prol. on Hermogenes On Civil Strifes W IV p. 14 = Prol. Syll. p. 272, 27 R.). See also Zenobius, who tells the same story about the quarrel (Paroem. Gr. I p. 107 L. Schn.): ‘Some claim this saying originates from the bird, since neither it itself nor its egg is edible; others…’ It is certain, however, that the ‘story about Corax reported by many’, as Sextus Emp. Against the Mathematicians 2.96 puts it, was known fairly early.
7. Anaximenes, On Rhetoric: … You will then come across these two books, of which one is mine, among the treatises I wrote for Theodektes, the other by Corax.
8. Prologue to Hermogenes 7.6 and Maximus Palnudes Prol. 5.215: One Corax, who was intelligent and full of practical wisdom, […] composed a treatise about prooemia, narratives, contests and epilogues. In all the other authors of prolegomena there is no indication that Corax wrote anything.
9. Excerpts (?): And then Corax and his pupil Tisias (wrote technai), then in Athens Gorgias of Leontinoi and Isocrates did.
10. Cicero, Brutus 12.46: Thus, Aristotle writes that […] the Sicilians Corax and Tisias wrote down the art and its precepts.
11. Cicero, On Invention 2.2.6: Aristotle brought together the older writers of the ars, all the way down from its famous beginner and inventor Tisias. Cf. On the Orator. 1.20.91: ‘… one Corax (sic) and Tisias, who we know were the inventors and first practitioners of that art.’ See also Aristotle Rhet. 1409a17 (on Corax) and Top. 183b31 (on Tisias). L. Victorinus writes on Cicero ad loc. (Rhet. Lat. min. 258. 37 H.): ‘Corax and Tisias are said to be the first to have written treatises on rhetoric among the Greeks.’
12. Quintilian 3.1.8: The oldest authors of treatises were the Sicilians Corax and Tisias. Please compare a little story reported by Martianus Capella p. 140, 17f. E. (V 432). That the art was invented by Corax and written down by Tisias was correctly surmised by Susemihl. Hence Plato, more touching on the subject than explaining it, as is his habit, Phaedr. 273C: ‘A wonderfully hidden art it is that Tisias discovered or whoever else that person happens to be and whatever country he hails from!’ On this passage Hermias’s commentary: ‘He probably writes this because of Corax, since the latter was said to be Tisias’s teacher.’
13. (Marcellinus’s?) Prologue: But let’s go and define what rhetoric is. Tisias and Corax define it like this: “Rhetoric is the craftswoman of persuasion.” So also Prol. anοnyma P. S. p. 26.20 R. (W VI 14.1), Excerpta cod. Parisinus P. S. p. 296.26 R. Only Corax is named in Exc. cod. Marc. 430 and Vaticanus 900 P. S. p. 349.7 R. Anοnym. W III 611.9. Plato attributes this definition to Gorgias in Gorg. 453A, cf. Amm. Marc. 30.4.3: ‘Tisias (“Koisias” or “Ctesias” in the manuscripts) says that (this art) is the manufacturer of persuasion, and Gorgias of Leontini agrees.’ The full maturity is attained in the art of Isocrates, according to Quint. 2.15.4, of Χenocrates according to Sextus Empir. Against the Mathematicians 2.61. Finally Themistius or. 26.328 d: ‘And as you say this you laugh at Tisias and mock Theodorus of Byzantion, claiming they made but small and worthless contributions to the art, while you yourself lecture from above, in the same way that someone would manufacture persuasion.’ If, however, in Aeschines (3.215) Demosthenes is called ‘a very able manufacturer of speeches’, it is very dubious that there our definition of the word applies (Weidland, Hermes 39.509.2). 14. Athanasius’s Prologue: Nature causes us to speak, but rhetoric is what causes us to speak well. Corax of Syracuse invented it; they also defined it as the capacity for persuasion. Cf. Philod. II p. 191: ‘Nature enables us to speak, but art is what makes us speak well’. See also the authors Rabe cites regarding the same idea.
15. Plato, Phaedrus 267 A-B: And shall we leave Gorgias and Tisias undisturbed, who saw that probabilities are more to be esteemed than truths, who make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their words, and new things old and old things the reverse, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless length on all subjects? See Epicharmus on Xenophanes in Arist. Metaph. 1010a5: ‘Therefore they speak with plausibility, but they don’t speak the truth. For to speak in this way fits better than how Epicharmus says on Xenophanes (Kaibel, Com. Gr. fr. I, Epicharmi 252). Antiphon Tetral. 1.2.8: ‘But if someone holds the plausible equal to the true… cf. 1.4.8. – The words that follow in Plato contain, in a nutshell, augmentation and diminution in later authors. Cf. also Demetrius On Eloquence 120: ‘Yet some claim that one ought to speak of little things in a grand way and think it a sign of exceptional ability’. Also consider below Isocrates 4.8. Both length and brevity of speech are also attributed to Protagoras and Gorgias, and cf. Phaedr. 268C, 269A, 272A, Theaet. 172 D, Polit. 286C, Gorg. 461D (on Pοlus), Thucydides 4.17.2. 16. Plato, Phaedrus 272C–273A: (Socr.) Then shall I tell something that I have heard some of those say who make these matters their business? (Phaedr.) Pray do. (Socr.) Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus, has a right to an advocate, as they say. (Phaedr.) Do you be his advocate. (Socr.) Very well. They say that there is no need of treating these matters with such gravity and carrying them back so far to first principles with many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defense; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art. Usener already concluded that these words must stem from some early treatise, for they relate exclusively to the forensic genre. Socrates says that according to one proverb not even the parts of the wolf should be abandoned; so why not the crow’s (korax), too, an animal just as predatory? Plato then continues, using figures in his characteristic manner: ‘(Phaedr.) You have expounded on the very things that are said by those who lay claim to being professional rhetors. For I just remembered that we briefly touched on such subject matter a moment ago. Such things seem to be of major import to those who are about that art. – (Socr.) You obviously have studied Tisias himself carefully.’ 17. Plato, Phaedrus 259E-260A: I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth. This doctrine is touched on in in Rep. 6 193A-C as well. One may think Sophocles is referring to something like that in Antigone 620-1: ‘Though wisdom has appeared a famous word by someone, that appearing to be bad seems good to the man whose mind god is leading to blindness/ruin’, if only you consider Phaedr. 260C. We should also have a look at Philodem. Rhet. I p. 209.5 S.: ‘If they say that what appears to the masses is actually so and true and can and must only be discovered and possess plausibility, apart from the fact that it does not refer to anything beyond the politician having to find out the political arguments inherent in every situation, the appearances do not even stay still for the masses.’ 18. Plato, Phaedrus 273 A-C: now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think. (Phaedr.:) That is just what he says. (Socr.:) Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present and should use the well-known argument, “How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is?” The coward will not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try to invent some other lie, and thus give his opponent a chance to confute him. And in other cases there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so, Phaedrus? (Phaedrus:) Certainly. (Socrates:) Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some other, whoever he may be and whatever country he is proud to call his own! There is an art of employing arguments for both views: Spengel on Ar. rh. p. 344; Isocrates Against Callimachus 13-14; Antiphon’s Tetralogies.
19. Plato, Gorgias 460E-461A: Well then, I supposed at the time when you were saying this that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since the speeches it made were always about justice but when a little later you told us that the orator might make even an unjust use of his rhetoric, that indeed surprised me, and thinking the two statements were not in accord I made those proposals. Cf. Phaedr. 273B on Tisias: ‘Neither party must speak the truth’. Quint. 2.15.31, ‘Even the teachers of that art seemed to Plato to be rather unsuitable, as they separated rhetoric from justice and preferred the plausible to the truth.ʼ Gorgias wants rhetoric to be used only on behalf of what is just (Pl., Gorg. 457B).
20. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1402a3: Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which is not is that which is not1; also, that the unknown can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, in rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood absolutely, as Agathon says: “One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many things happen to men that are not probable;” for that which is contrary to probability still does happen, so that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely; but as, in the case of sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases. [11] The Art of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his defense will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what “making the worse appear the better argument” means. Here we have an artifice from what they call a 'dilemma', whose use by the eristics is illustrated nowhere better than Plato, Euthyd. (275D, 276D, 283E). Andocides loves dilemmas (1.51, 2.2-3, 2.16). A related topos is the one from division (cf. n. on B VII 39). On this topic see also Hermogenes On Civil Strife 147.29 Sp.: ‘What one person will use as evidence of something being the case, the other will use as evidence of it not being the case,’ etc. This passage is fulsomely explained by G. Kowalski, De arte rhetorica 1 (1937) 3-4.
21. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1372a21: Those are likely to remain undetected whose qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a weak person were accused of assault and battery, or a poor or ugly man of adultery.
22. Anaximenes, p. 86.16: It would be inappropriate if someone younger or older litigated on behalf of another; it would be incongruous if a strong person prosecuted a weak one for battery, or an insolent person accused a self-controlled one of wantonness, or someone very poor sued another who was very rich on the grounds that the defendant owed him money.[3] You will note that as Aristotle adds ‘likewise with the others’, Anaximenes puts the example of the quarrel between the rich man and the poor man in the third place – an example that may have been found in Tisias’ treatise itself as seems to be confirmed in Luc. Pseudol. 29, where he recounts that some sophist took on the part of the poor man against a rich one and then ripped off plenty of money from a rich old man thanks to the art of Tisias. (Ibid. the last words ‘the other… defeated by sophistry’ seem to point to the story told in Ch. 5.) Cf. also Lys. 24.16: ‘It is not likely that the poor and very destitute would commit hubris, but those who own far more than they need; nor that those without bodily prowess would, but those who most trust their own strength, nor those of advanced age, but those who are young and have young-people attitudes.’ You have the reverse order to Anaximenes. One may hypothesize that certain topoi around likelihood had already been elaborated by Tisias; Kowalski p. 50 rightly compared hereto Xen. Cyr. 1.3.17: ‘The case was as follows. A big [that is, strong] boy with a small tunic had stripped a small [that is, weak] boy with a big tunic (cf. above, Plat. Phaedr. 273A) and put his own tunic on him and the other’s on himself. I as the judge decided… At that point the teacher hit me and said…’ 23. Doxopater, Against Aphthonos: The different parts of a speech were allegedly first invented by Corax, who had just taken over the people from that famous cruel tyranny and found them troubled: in order to stop the unrest in the crowd and make them listen, he came up with the tropes used in the exordium; to expound the facts clearly, persuasively and concisely, he invented the exposition; to be persuasive on the matters that he wanted to be, either encouraging or dissuading, he used the argumentative part; and in order to remind the listeners of the salient points and also to evoke emotions in the judges or councilors, he instituted the epilogue. Cf. the extant sources on Corax’s disposition gathered above (A V 16). Doxopater himself, when he describes the four parts, which is approved already by John of Sardis p. 50.12f. R., is nonetheless speaking about the demonstrative genre, in which narration plays no role, and proffers teachings regarding the virtues of narrations that others attribute to Isocrates and his art. Finally, Troilus, claiming that Corax was experienced in the forensic genre, lists seven parts: paroimia, prokataskeue, prokatastasis, katastasis, agonas, parekbasis, epilogos (above p. 17). These may actually stem from memorization of Aristotle; but we know that, in inventing technical terms, the early authors went insane, so to speak. Also see Hamberger’s little book 25-6. (34). 24. Syrianus, Commentary on Hermogenes 2, p. 127.4: One must know that Corax too, the writer of treatises, uses the word katastasis to refer to the exordium. Anaximenes 29 p. 71.5 H. on proems: ‘In this way one ought to do the katastaseis of public speeches.’ On the content of the word katastasis see Wendland 30f., Hamberger 34 f., 39f. (Usener, Kl. Schriften 1.32).
25. Plato, Phaedrus 247 D: But all seem to be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call 'retracing' (epanodos), while others give it some other name. (Phaedr.:) You mean recalling the points of the speech at the end, to remind the audience what has been said? 26. Plato, Phaedrus 274A (looking back to what preceded) Therefore, if the path is long, do not be astonished; for it must be trodden for the sake of great ends, not for those you (Tisias) have in mind. This ‘going around’ (periodos) is called by Cicero ‘ambitus’. Pollux 2.125 explains perilegein as ‘walking around with the speech’. But in Arist. Frogs 953 peripatos means something like a ‘long speech’, which is explained in the words of Maccab. 2 2.30: ‘To thread around and go for a long walk with words and be overzealous in the divided elements is appropriate to him who leads the narration, whereas brevity…’. From Plato’s words it is clear that he regarded the very word periodos as so derived. It follows that Tisias always taught to speak through periodoi. |
[1] The meaning of this fragment is unclear.
[2] M. Planudes also contains this passage, to which he adds: “through which he persuaded the people.”
[3] That this example goes back to Tisias is suggested by a passage in Lucian’s Pseudologista (29). Cf. Lysias 24.16.