XXIX. CALLIPPUS (Pamphilus) 1. Isocr. 15, 93: ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν ἐν πρώτοις Εὔνομός μοι καὶ Λυσιθείδης καὶ Κάλλιππος πλησιάζειν. Idem Callippus nominari videtur Demosth. 7, 42, cf. Schol. ῥήτωρ ἦν Ἀθηναῖος. 2. Aristot. rhet. 1399 a 10: ἄλλος (sc. τόπος τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων), ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥστε ἕπεσθαί τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν, 5 οἷον τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ. δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ, ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη, προσλαβοῦσα τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τἆλλα, ὡς εἰρήσεται. 8. 9 ὡς εἴρηται ll. cf. infra 4.
3. Aristot. rhet. 1399 a 18: ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἢ προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέη, {καὶ} τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τόπῳ ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τἀναντία. οἷον ἱέρεια οὐκ εἴα τὸν 5 υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ ἄνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί. δεῖ μὲν οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ θεοί σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸ ἕλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἅλας. καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅταν δυοῖν 10 ἐναντίοιν ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἕπηται, ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις. 3 τρόπῳ codd. Hic locus cum antecedente tam arcte cohaeret, ut ab eodem Callippo elaboratus videatur.
4. Aristot. rhet. 1399 b 31: ἄλλος κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καί ἀποτρέποντα καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν, ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ, δεῖ πράττειν, <ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν,> οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς, κἂν ἐπιζήμιον ᾖ, <εἰ> ἐλάττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ προτρέπουσι δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν 10 προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἥ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου. 1 καὶ ἐπιζήμιον ἢ 2 προτρέπονται – ἀποτρέπονται Alius est Pamphilus quem laudat Quint. inst. 3, 6, 34, de Ciceronis Pamphilo rhetore (de orat. 3, 21, 81) non constat. Callippi non artem scriptam intellegi, sed ea artificia, quae in orationibus adhibuerat, Spengel ad Ar. rhet. p. 317 iudicavit, argumentis futilibus usus. Quis credat illas τέχνας, quales singuli sophistae edebant, semper totam artem rhetoricam exhausisse? Immo Callippi exemplum docet singula inventa interdum ese arte elaborata, illustrata. Ceterum vide, qua ratione auctor ad Her. 2, 2, 3 τὸ εἰκός interpretetur: ‘probabile est, per quod probatur expedisse peccare et ab simili turpitudine hominem numquam afuisse. Id dividitur in causam et in vitam. Causa est ea, quae induxit ad maleficium commodorum <spe aut incommodorum> vitatione, cum quaeritur, num quod commodum maleficio appetierit, num honorem, num pecuniam, num dominationem.ʼ Quibus in verbis tota τοῦ εἰκότος doctrina Callippi praecepto tamquam altero pede videtur niti. Neque vero discipulum non agnosces Isocratis 15, 217 docentis: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁρίσασθαι δεῖ, τίνων ἀρεγόμενοι... τολμῶσί τινες ἀδικεῖν... ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡδονῆς ἢ κέρδους ἢ τιμῆς ἕνεκα φημὶ πάντας πάντα πράττειν. ἔξω γὰρ τούτων οὐδεμίαν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁρῶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνομένην.
5. Philod. rhet. I p. 196. Cοl. XV a 3 S.: νὴ Δι’ ἀλλὰ Δημοσθένης καὶ πρῶτον ἔλεγε καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον εἶναι τὴν ὑπόκρίσιν ἐν τ[ῇ ῥητο]ρικῇ, Καλλιππί[δης δ]ὲ καὶ Νεικόστρατος – ἐγὼ φήσω – τὸ πᾶν ἐν τραγωδίᾳ…
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XXIX. Callippus (Pamphilus) 1. Isocrates 15.93: Among the first to begin studying with me were Eunomus, Lysitheides, and Callippus. The same Callippus seems to be named in Demosth. 7.42, cf. Schol.: ‘He was an Athenian orator.’ 2. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399a11-18: Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the “Art” of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others that have been mentioned. Cf. below, 4.
3. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399a18-29: Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; “For if,” said she, “you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will.” On the other hand, “you should speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will.” This is the same as the proverb, “To buy the swamp with the salt”3; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves. This passage is so closely connected with the preceding one that it seems to have been composed by the same Callippus.
4. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399b31–1400a4: Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence, what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole “Art” of Pamphilus and Callippus. The Pamphilus cited in Quint. 3.6.34 is a different one. It is not clear who is the orator Pamphilus mentioned by Cicero (de orat. 3.21.81). Spengel on Aristotle Rhetoric p. 317 argues that this passage refers not to a written treatise by Callippus but to the tricks he employed in his speeches; his arguments for this conclusion are however extremely weak. Who would believe that such ‘treatises’ as the individual sophists published always exhausted the entire art of rhetoric? On the contrary, Callippus’ example teaches that individual inventions were often expanded upon and illustrated by a treatise. See, besides, in which way the anonymous Ad Herennium explains ‘the plausible’ (2.2.3): ‘The plausible is that through which it is demonstrated that it was advantageous to commit a crime and that the defendant has never refrained from such shameful acts. Here there is a distinction between cause and lifestyle. The cause is what led to the misdeed through hope for advantages or avoidance of disadvantages, and in this case one asks which advantage the defendant was seeking through the misdeed, whether honor, money, or power.’ In these words the entire doctrine of ‘the plausible’ seems to stand on Callippus’ teaching as though on one of the feet. You will also recognize the student of Callippus speaking when Isocrates teaches (15.217): ‘First, one must define which goals people desire to obtain when they dare to commit evil. […] I for my part say that they all commit all of their crimes either for pleasure or for gain or for honor. I do not see in people any desires other than these ones.’
5. Philodemus, On Rhetoric: By Zeus, Demosthenes said that the first, second and third thing in rhetoric is acting. Callippides and Nicostratus – I shall say – [claim that it is?] all in tragedy…
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