IX. THRASYMACHUS (Cf. A V 1 sq. Vοrsokratiker 78. 855) 1. Sud. lex. s. v.: Θρασύμαχος· Χαλκηδόνιος σοφιστὴς τῆς ἐν Βιθυνίᾳ Χαλκηδόνος ... μαθητὴς (l. καθηγητὴς Bernhardy) Πλάτωνος τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος. ἔγραψε Συμβουλευτικούς, Τέχνην ῥητορικήν, Παίγνια, Ἀφορμὰς ῥητορικάς. Cf. Aristot. Soph. el. 33, 183 b 29 (supra A V 6) - ηὐξήκασι Τεισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τειμσίαν. - De singulorum librorum argumentis v. Schwartz p. 4 sq., Navarre 155, Maas, Hermae 22, 575 sq. (Plöbst 17 adn. 2).
2. Schol. Aristoph. Av. 880: τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς Θεοπόμπου (de Atheniensibus pro Chiorum salute precantibus) καὶ Θρασύμαχός φησιν ἐν τῇ Μεγάλη Τέχνη. Artem Plato quoque testari videtur Phaedri 261 C, 266 C. D.
3. Plato Phaedr. 271 A (Socrates, sua ipsius praecepta dans) δῆλον ἄρα, ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν.
4. Ibid. 269 D: εἰ μέν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῷ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην· ὅτου δʼ ἂν ἐλλίπῃς τούτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελὴς ἔσει. ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ, ᾗ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος. Thrasymachum σπουδῆς ἄξια invenisse ante Aristotelis ῥητορικὰ παραγγέλματα testatur Dionysius Hal. ad Amm. I p. 259, 1 sq.
5. Philod. rhet. p. I 86, 11 (laudans Metrodori verba ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ποιημάτων): καὶ ἄλλου[ς τοιούτους] εἰπ[εῖν] μὲν ἐν πλήθει περὶ τῶν πλήθει χρησίμων ἱκα[νούς, τ]ὴν {δὲ} Θρασυμά[χου τέ]χνην ἢ ἄλλου ὁτο[υδήποτʼ] αὐτῶν οὐ μ[αθό]ντ[ας παντε]λῶ[ς], ἐπι[στά]τας [δὲ ὄν]τας κατα[νοεῖν, ὃ δέον] ἑκάστοτʼ ἦν, τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνθρώ[πους. τοὐ]ναντίον [δʼ ἐπ]ά[γει π]αραδ[εικ]νύων, [Θ]ρα[σύ]μαχον καὶ ἄλλους οὐκ ὀλίγους τῶν δοκούντων τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν λόγων πολιτικῶν ἢ ῥητορικῶν τέχνας οὐθέν, ὧν φασιν ἔχειν τὰς τέχνα[ς, συντ]ε[λοῦ]ντας, [ἐπειδὰν νομο]θέται ὦσιν. Supplementa partim incerta; v. Sudhaus, Philodemi Supplementum p. 43.
6. Plato Phaedr. 267 C: τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη, διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα. Ἐλέους (v. i.) tangit, ἐλεεινολογίαν vocat Phaedri 272 A. Rei nihil addit Hermias ad locum (p. 239, p. 192 Ast, Οr. Att. fr. p. 164 Sauppii). Cf. Aristot. rhet. 1354 a 14 οἳ δὲ (sc. οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες) περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται. διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν. Thrasymachum idem respicit 1356 a 15, respicit fortasse Thucydides, cum Cleonem dicentem inducit (III 40, 2): ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνῶναι ὑμᾶς τὰ προδεδογμένα μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἔλεός τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι κτλ. Χenophon Cyrop. II 2, 13 ἐν λόγοις οἰκτρά τινα λογοποιοῦντες εἰς δάκρυα πειρῶνται ἄγειν (ἔνιοι). Quint. 3, 1, 12: adfectus (scil. primi tractasse dicuntur) Prodicus, Hippias et idem Protagoras et Thrasymachus. V. Drerup, Die Anfänge der rhetorischen Kunstprosa 226. Platonis Cicero memor est de orat. 1, 12, 53. Ceterum notabis puros numeros: τῶν γε μὴν – λόγων [metrical scheme] ex quo conicias in ἐλέων exemplis admodum numerosam fuisse sophistae orationem, cf. infra Ciceronis in Oratore testimonium (52, 175).
7. Lysias 24, 7: μὴ τοίνυν, ἐπειδή γε ἔστιν, ὦ βουλή, σῶσαί με δικαίως, ἀπολέσητε ἀδίκως· μηδὲ ἃ νεωτέρῳ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐρρμωμένῳ ὄντι ἔδοτε, πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀσθενέστερον γιγνόμενον ἀφέλησθε ... (8) καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὦ βουλή, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἁπλῆ μοι ἦν ἡ συμφορά, τότε μὲν φαινοίμην λαμβάνων τὸ ἀργύριον τοῦτο, νῦν δʼ ἐπειδὴ καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐνεχόμενα κακὰ προσγίγνεταί μοι, τότε ἀφαιρεθείην. δοκεῖ δέ μοι τῆς πενίας τῆς ἐμῆς τὸ μέγεθος ὁ κατήγορος ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαι σαφέστατα κτλ. 6 ἐχόμενα. Egregium τῶν ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων exemplum. Anaximenes 34 p. 77, 10 H.: εὐπορήσομεν δὲ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν, ἅπερ ἂν ἐθέλωμεν, ἐὰν συνειδῶμεν, ὅτι πάντες ἐλεοῦσι τούτους, οὕς ... οἴονται ἀναξίους εἶναι δυστυχεῖν, porro Aristot. rhet. 1386 a 4 sq. (9 γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια). Dinarchus 1, 108 οὐδὲ προετέον, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, τοῖς Δημοσθένους ἐλέοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ δικαίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀπολογίαν (cf. 1, 111). Thucyd. III 67, Christel in Opusculis philologicis I, Wien 1926, 33 sq. Lysiam vero ex Thrasymacho hausisse cave ne contendas, misericordiae enim movendae usum in iudiciis Atheniensium tritum fuisse loci docent, qualis est Aristoph. Vesp. 550 sq., Platonis Apol. 34 C. Artis exempla finxerat Thrasymachus.
8. Plut. quaest. conv. 616 C. D: ἀτοπώτερος δʼ ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀνθʼ ἑστιάτορος δικαστὴν καὶ κριτὴν τῶν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπόντων οὐδὲ κρινομένων, τίς ἐστι βελτίων τίνος ἢ χείρων. οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθείκασιν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἥκουσιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ εὐχερὴς ἡ διάκρισίς ἐστι ..., ἀλλὰ δεῖ, καθάπερ ὑπόθεσιν μελετῶντα συγκριτικήν, τοὺς Ἀριστοτέλους τόπους ἢ τοὺς Θρασυμάχου ὑπερβάλλοντας ἔχειν προχείρους, οὐδὲν τῶν χρησίμων διαπραττόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὴν κενὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῶν θεάτρων εἰς τὰ συμπόσια μετάγοντα. σύγκρισιν a Thrasymacho exercitatam esse e Plutarchi testimonio concluditur, ea vero opposita, quae in Lysiae verbis supra prolatis misericordiae movendae gratia proferuntur, ex comparatione temporum derivari in propatulo est. Item ἐκ συγκρίσεως sunt illa εἰκότα, quae Andocides 1, 3 et 1, 6 sq. ad iudicum animos movendos profert, quod prooemium universum ex technographo aliquo haustum esse inter omnes constat. Denique in Antiphontis or. 1, 21 sq. inesse σύγκρισιν misericordiae movendae gratia, quod ad Thrasymachi ἐλέους bene quadrat, recte monet W. Schmid, Gesch. d gr. Lit. III 1, p. 106, 4. V. etiam E. Schwartz l. l. p. 5.
9. Athenaeus X 416 a: Θρασύμαχος δʼ ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος ἔν τινι τῶν προοιμίων τὸν Τιμοκρέοντά φησιν ὡς μέγαν βασιλέα ἀφικόμενον καὶ ξενιζόμενον παρʼ αὐτῷ πολλὰ ἐμφορεῖσθαι. πυθομένου δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅ τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἐργάζοιτο, εἶπε Περσῶν 5 ἀναριθμήτους συγκόψειν. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ πολλοὺς καθʼ ἕνα νικήσας μετὰ τοῦτο ἐχειρονόμησε. πυνθανομένου δὲ τὴν πρόφασιν, ὑπολείπεσθαι ἔφη τοσαύτας, εἰ προσίοι τις, πληγάς. 6.7 ἀπολείπεσθαι. Aristoph. Vesp. 566 de causam dicentibus apud iudices οἳ δὲ λέγουσιν μύθους ἡμῖν, οἳ δʼ Αἰσώπου τι γέλοιον. Rei confirmandae gratia v. Aesopi fab. 117 (63 Hausrath). Scholion in Platonis Phaedri 260 C. Anonym. Segueri 99, p. 369, 21 H. ποιεῖ τε ἡδονὴν ἐνίοτε καὶ ἀρχαιολογία παραληφθεῖσα εὐκαίρως, ὡς παρʼ Ὑπερίδῃ ὁ τῆς Λητοῦς μῦθος. Igitur talia ad καιροῦ artem pertinent.
10. Diοnysius Hal. de Isaeo p. 122, 21 sq. U. R. Thrasymachum unum τῶν τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς προαιρουμένων λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐναγώνιον ἀσκούντων ῥητoρικήν fuisse iudicat, idem de eodem, de Lys. p. 13, 23: μετὰ ταύτας ἀρετὴν εὑρίσκω παρὰ Λυσίᾳ πάνυ 5 θαυμαστήν, ἧς Θεόφραστος μέν φησιν ἄρξαι Θρασύμαχον (π. λ. fr. III), ἐγὼ δʼ ἡγοῦμαι Λυσίαν. - (14, 9) τίς δʼ ἔστιν, ἥν φημι ἀρετήν; ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις, οἰκεία πάνυ καὶ ἀναγκαία τοῖς δικανικοῖς λόγοις καὶ παντὶ ἀληθεῖ ἀγῶνι. ταύτην ὀλίγοι μὲν ἐμιμήσαντο, Δημοσθένης δὲ καὶ 10 ὑπερεβάλετο. Idem de Isaeo p. 123, 10: Θρασύμαχος δὲ καθαρὸς μὲν καὶ λεπτὸς καὶ δεινὸς εὑρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν στρογγύλως καὶ περιττῶς, ὃ βούλεται, πᾶς δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τεχνογραφικοῖς καὶ ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, δικανικοὺς δὲ ἢ συμβουλευτικοὺς οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπε λόγους (ἢ συμβουλευτικοὺς del. E. Schwartz). Idem de Demosth. 15 p. 132, 3: τρίτη λέξεως <ἰδέα> ἦν ἡ μικτή τε καὶ σύνθετος ἐκ τούτων τῶν δυεῖν (ἰσχνῆς καὶ περιττῆς), ἣν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἁρμοσάμενος καὶ καταστήσας εἰς τὸν νῦν ὑπάρχοντα κόσμον εἴτε Θρασύμαχος ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ἦν, ὡς οἴεται Θεόφραστος (fr. IV), εἴτε ἄλλος τις, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. - (132, 13) ἡ μὲν οὖν Θρασυμάχου 20 λέξις, ἢ δὴ πηγή τις ἦν ὄντως τῆς μεσότητος, αὐτὴν τὴν προαίρεσιν ἔοικεν ἔχειν σπουδῆς ἀξίαν. κέκραται γὰρ εὖ πως καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χρήσιμον εἴληφεν ἑκατέρας. δυνάμει δʼ ὡς οὐκ ἴσῃ <τῇ> βουλήσει κέχρηται, παράδειγμα ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν δημηγορικῶν λόγων τόδε: ‘ἐβουλόμην μέν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μετασχεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παλαιοῦ 25 καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡνίκα σιωπᾶν ἀπέχρη τοῖς νεωτέροις, τῶν τε πραγμάτων oὐκ ἀναγκαζόντων ἀγορεύειν καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὀρθῶς τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτροπευόντων. ἐπειδὴ δʼ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἡμᾶς ἀνέθετο χρόνον ὁ δαίμων, ὥστε ... τῆς πόλεως ἀκούειν, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς <... ὁρᾶν> αὐτούς, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέγιστα μὴ θεῶν ἔργα 30 εἶναι μηδὲ τῆς τύχης ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων, ἀνάγκη {δὲ} λέγειν. ἢ γὰρ ἀναίσθητος ἢ καρτερώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἔτι παρέξει τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ τῆς ἑτέρων ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ κακίας αὐτὸς ὑποσχήσει τὰς αἰτίας. ἅλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν εἰρήνης ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι καὶ κινδύνῳ, εἰς 20 ἢ λοιπή τις ἦν 22 δυνάμεως ὡς δὲ οὐκ 28 desideratur fere τὰ μὲν εὐτυχήματα 34 χρόνος κα<κῶν ἔθηκεν, οἶς περιέστη> ἀντὶ H. Weil διὰ κινδύνων: cf. Rh. M. 50, 477 τόνδε τὸν χρόνον τὴν μὲν παρελθοῦσαν ἡμέραν ἀγαπῶσι, τὴν δʼ ἐπιοῦσαν δεδιόσιν, ἀντὶ δʼ ὁμονοίας εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ταραχὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφικέσθαι. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑβρίζειν τε ποιεῖ καὶ στασιάζειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ μὲν τῶν 5 ἀγαθῶν ἐσωφρονοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐμάνημεν, ἃ τοὺς ἄλλους σωφρονίζειν εἴωθεν. τί δῆτα μέλλοι τις ἄν γιγνώσκειν {εἰπεῖν}, ὅτῳ γε <λείπεται τὸ> λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ νομίζειν ἔχειν τι τοιοῦτον, ὡς μηδὲν ἔτι τοιοῦτον ἔσται; πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς διαφερομένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 10 ἀποδείξω γε παρὰ λόγον πεπονθότας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπερ ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄνευ γνώμης φιλονικοῦντας πάσχειν· οἰόμενοι γὰρ ἐναντία λέγειν ἀλλήλοις oὐκ αἰσθάνονται τὰ αὐτὰ πράττοντες οὐδὲ τὸν τῶν ἑτέρων λόγον ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ λόγῳ ἐνόντα. σκέψασθε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἃ ζητοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι. πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πάτριος πολιτεία ταραχὴν 15 αὐτοῖς παρέχει, ῥᾴστη γνωσθῆναι καὶ κοινοτάτη τοῖς πολίταις οὖσα πᾶσιν. ὁπόσα μὲν οὖν ἐπέκεινα τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης ἐστίν, ἀκοὴν ἀνάγκη λέγειν τῶν παλαιοτέρων, ὁπόσα δʼ αὐτοὶ ἐπεῖδον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων πυνθάνεσθαι.ʼ 6 γιγνώσκων εἰπεῖν Blass 10 γε προλέγων πεπονθότες 13 ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ 16 οὖν ἐκείνων 16.17 ἀκούειν ἀνάγκη: corrigenda ex Platonis verbis Phaedr. 274 C ἀκοήν γʼ ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων. Exemplum ψόγου commune ideo, quod paene ad unamquamque rei publicae occasionem adcommodari potest. Volgare antitheseon genus inter iuniores et seniores, fortunas secundas et adversas, tempora praeterita et praesentia, mores aliorum et ipsorum, communis rhetorum vituperatio, rei publlcae laus. Cf. Οppenheimer, RE. VI A 1, 586 sq. Attamen Thrasymachi verba ex prooemiis verae orationis sumpta esse (qualia sunt Demosthenis pr. 21. 23. 25. 53), idcirco adfirmari non potest, quia ψόγος alterum genus est epideicticorum, quo e genere sophistae alicuius in musicos invectiva ex parte servata primum in Hibeh Pap. I (1906) p. 45 n. 13, deinde saepius edita est.
11. Aristot. rhet. 1404 a 12: ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθη (sc. ἡ λέξις), ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασιν δὲ ἐπʼ ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινες, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς Ἑλέοις. Ceterum Aristoteles minus perspicue loquitur; cum autem incipiat ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ, Spengel ἐκείνη ad ὑπόκρισιν ῥητορικήν rettulit, quod vel ideo falsum est, quia A. paulo antea statuerat, de actione rhetorica nondum esse scriptum. neque pergere poterat A. ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ non addens τὴν τῆς τραγῳδίας intellegi actionem. At idem antea περὶ τῆς λέξεως locutus erat (l. 8).
12. Aristot. rhet. 1409 a 2: λείπεται δὲ παιάν, ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι, οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν.
13. Quint. inst. 9, 4, 87: licet igitur paeana sequatur Ephorus, inventum a Thrasymachο, probatum ab Aristotele.
14. Cic. orat. 12, 39 de figuris Gorgianis: haec tractasse Thrasymachum Calchedonium primum et Leontinum ferunt Gorgiam. Thrasymachum Gorgiamque τῶν παρίσων causa iungit etiam Athanasius in Hermogenem Prol. Syll. p. 180, 9 sq. R.
15. Cic. orat. 52, 175 (de numero oratoriο): neminem in eo genere scientius versatum Isocrate confitendum est, sed princeps inveniendi fuit Thrasymachus, cuius omnia nimis etiam exstant scripta numerose. Ciceronem laudat Rufinus rhetor p. 581, 15 H.
16. Cic. orat. 13, 40: nam cum concisus ei (Isocrati) Thrasymachus minutis numeris videretur et Gorgias, qui tamen primi traduntur arte quadam verba vinxisse …
17. Sud. s. v. Θ.: πρῶτος περίοδον καὶ κῶλον κατέδειξε καὶ νῦν τῆς ῥητορικῆς τρόπον εἰσηγήσατο. Vide inter alla Philologi 65, 149 sq.
18. Aristoph. Δαιταλῆς fr. XVI Mein. (ex Galenο), (pater et filius improbus certant): - ἦ μὴν ἴσως σὺ καταπλιγήσῃ τῷ χρόνῳ. - τὸ καταπλιγήσῃ τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ῥητόρων. - ἀποβήσεταί σοι ταῦτα ποῖ τὰ ῥήματα; - παρʼ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦτο τἀποβήσεται. - τί δʼ ὑποτεκμαίρῃ καὶ κακῶς ἄνδρας λέγεις καλοκἀγαθίαν ἀσκοῦντας; - οἴμʼ ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τίς τοῦτο τῶν ξυνηγόρων τερθρεύεται; Thrasymachum Calchedonium sophistam intellegi coniecerat Suevern, quam interpretationem nullo modo ferri posse Meineke enuntiavit, ipse de filii improbi patrem compellantis nomine cogitat, Fritzsche autem de filio altero probo adstante.
19. Quint. inst. 3, 3, 4: nec audiendi quidam, quorum est Albutius, qui tris modo primas esse partis volunt, quia memoria atque actio natura, non arte contingent … licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit. Cf. Aristot. rhet. 1404 a 15: καὶ ἔστιν φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀτεχνότερον.
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IX. Thrasymachus
1. Suda s.v. Thrasymachus: a sophist from Chalcedon, the one in Bithynia […]. He was a pupil of the philosopher Plato and the rhetorician Isocrates. He wrote On Advice, A Manual of Rhetoric, Plays, and Rhetorical Starters. Cf. Aristot. Soph. el. 33, 183 b 29 (above A V 6): ‘It has been improved by Tisias after the very first, by Thrasymachus after Tisias.’ – On the contents of the individual books see Schwartz p. 4 f., Navarre 155, Maas, Hermae 22, 575 f. (Plöbst 17 n. 2).
2. Scholion on Aristophanes, Birds 880: The same things that Theopompus says (about the Athenians begging for mercy on behalf of the Chians) Thrasymachus writes, too, in his Great Treatise. Plato too seems to bear witness to the art in Phaedrus 261C, 266 C-D.
3. Plato, Phaedrus 271a: It is clear, then, that Thrasymachus and all the others who seriously attempt to compose a treatise on rhetoric will first of all write with absolute precision and make the soul see. 4. Plato, Phaedrus 269d: If you happen to have a gift for rhetoric, you will be one of the illustrious orators, provided you add to your talent specific knowledge and practice; should you be deficient in any of these things, you will be unaccomplished in that respect. To the extent that it is a science, however, I do not think you will get there through the path that Lysias and Thrasymachus go. Dionysius Hal. ad Amm. I p. 259.1 f. reports that Thrasymachus came up with things ‘to be taken seriously’ before Aristotle’s ‘rhetorical precepts’. 5. Philodemus, On Rhetoric 1.86.11: [Praising what Metrodorus says in the first book of On Poems:] ‘… And many others were able to speak in front of the people about what was advantageous for them, and such men, without having ever in the least studied Thrasymachus’ treatise or those of others like him, knew as leaders which course of action was appropriate in each case.’ He also shows by way of example that, on the contrary, Thrasymachus and many others who were thought to possess similar expertise regarding political or rhetorical speeches got done none of the things of which they claimed to be experts once they were lawgivers. The reconstruction of this fragmentary text is often uncertain, see Sudhaus, Philodemi Supplementum p. 43.
6. Plato, Phaedrus 267 C-D: For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. But all seem to be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name. He touches on ‘pity-inducing speeches’ and calls them ‘pity-mongering’ in Phaedrus 272 A. Hermias ad loc. (p. 239, p. 192 Ast, Οr. Att. fr. p. 164 Sauppe) adds nothing to the explanation. Cf. Aristot. Rhet. 1354a14: ‘Those who compose treatises on rhetoric say nothing about enthymemes, which are the body of persuasion, while spending most of their time on what lies outside of the merit of the issue. For slander, pity, anger and all such feelings are not about the merit but are aimed at the judge.’ Aristotle also relates to Thrasymachus in 1356 a15, as does, perhaps, Thucydides when he portrays Cleon as saying the following (3.40.2): ‘I try to make sure – first back then and then now – that you people do not walk back on your earlier decisions and make mistakes due to the three causes most contrary to the interests of power: commiseration, pleasant words and fair-mindedness. For it is just to repay your equals with pity…’ Χenophon Cyrop. 2.2.13: ‘Some try to make the audience cry by inserting into their speeches some sob stories.’ Quint. 3.1.12: ‘The first to deal with the affects are allegedly Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras and Thrasymachus. See Drerup, Die Anfänge der rhetorischen Kunstprosa 226. Cicero, On the Orator 1.12.53 remembers Plato. Notice also the pure meter: from which one can surmise that in the examples of pity the speech of the sophist was exceedingly metrical, cf. below Cicero’s testimony (Orator 52.175).
7. Lysias 24.6-9: Do not, therefore, gentlemen, when you can save me justly, ruin me unjustly; what you granted me when I was younger and stronger, do not take from me when I am growing older and weaker; […] And indeed, how extraordinary the case would be, gentlemen! When my misfortune was but simple, I am found to have been receiving this pension; but now, when old age, diseases, and the ills that attend on them are added to my trouble, I am to be deprived of it! The depth of my poverty, I believe, can be revealed more clearly by my accuser than by anyone else on earth. An outstanding example of ‘tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty.’ Anaximenes 34 p. 77, 10 H.: ‘We shall have plenty of material to arouse pity in whatever circumstances we may want to, provided we are aware that everyone pities those he […] thinks do not deserve their misfortune,’ further Aristot. Rhet. 1386a4 f. (9: ‘old age, illnesses and lack of food’). Dinarchus 1.108: ‘Not should you people, if you are reasonable, leave the common and just defense speech on behalf of the city to Demosthenes’ enticements of pity’ (cf. 1.111). Thucyd. 3.67, Christel in Opusculis philologicis I, Vienna 1926, 33 f. You should however not maintain that Lysias drew on Thrasymachus, for the habit of arousing pity was common in Athenian trials, as shown by passages such as Aristoph. Wasps 550 f., Plato Apol. 34C. Thrasymachus had made up examples for the sake of the art. 8. Plutarch, Table-Talk 616C-D: It is exceedingly strange for somebody to make themselves judge instead of banqueter and evaluate people who and not asking for it and are not litigating over who is better or worse than whom. For they have not come to a competition but to a banquet. And the judgement is a tough one too […] But now that I am engaged in this evaluative exercise, I must keep handy Aristotle’s Topics and Thrasymachus’s Overpowering arguments. I am not doing anything useful but just transferring empty opinions from the market place to banquets. That the ‘comparison’ was exercised by Thrasymachus is to be gathered from the Plutarch passage; as for the opposites proffered in Lysias’ words that are reported above, it is clear that they are derived from a comparison of times. From a comparison likewise stem those ‘likelihoods’ that Andocides 1.3 and 1.6 f. cites in order to stir the emotions of the judges, a proem that all agree was lifted in its entirety from some treatise writer. Finally, as W. Schmid, Gesch. d gr. Lit. III 1, p. 106, 4 correctly points out, such a comparison is present in Antiphon 1.21 f. as a means to arouse pity, which fits well with Thrasymachus’ ‘pity-inductions’. See also E. Schwartz ibid. p. 5.
9. Athenaeus 10, 416A: Thrasymachus of Chalcedon writes in one of his proems that when Timocreon once came to the Persian king and was treated like a guest by him, he was carrying a great deal of weapons; ad when the king asked what he did with those, he answered that he would kill countless Persians. The next day he defeated many of them together and then started shadow-fighting. As the king asked why he did this, he answered that there were as many hits left for anyone who should still approach him.
Aristoph. Wasps 566, about those who argue their case in front of a court: ‘Some tell us stories, others some joke from Aesop.’ To find confirmation of this, see Aesopus’ fable 117 (63 Hausrath); scholium on Plato Phaedrus 260 C; Anonym. Segueri 99, p. 369, 21 H.: ‘Sometimes it gives the listener pleasure when an old tale is used at the right time, like the Leto myth in Hyperides.’ Thus, such things belong to the art of kairos. 10. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, (a) On Isaeus 122.21f.: Thrasymachus was one of those who made it their business to write precise speeches and practice rhetoric for litigation. (b) On Lysias: After these I discover excellence in Lysias, which Theophrastus says was begun by Thrasymachus, in my opinion, however, actually by Lysias. […] What is this excellence I am talking about? The phrasing that collects the thoughts and expresses them in a well-rounded manner, particular to and necessary for forensic speeches and any real competition. Few have attained it; Demosthenes however was superlative in it. (c) On Isaeus: Thrasymachus is clean and subtle and very good at finding the subject-matter he wants to address and expressing it roundly and abundantly; however, his activity is limited to theoretical manuals and declamatory rhetoric, whereas he has not left behind any forensic or deliberative speeches. (d) On Demosthenes: The third form of speaking is the one consisting in a mix of these two (the lean one and the pompous one). Whether the first to give it shape and put in into the present order was either Thrasymachus of Calchedon, as Theophrastus thinks, or somebody else, I cannot say. […] Thrasymachus’ way of speaking, which was really a major source of the middle range, seems to be worthwhile down to its very intention. For it is well mixed and draws on what is useful in either of the others. That the force it uses is not equal to its will is shown by the following example taken from one of his deliberative speeches: “I would like, Athenians, to be a part of that ancient time and those political circumstances when young people need not say anything, since the situation did not compel them to speak and the older citizens governed the city correctly. Now, however, that the gods have led us into such a time that [text corrupt] we see the disasters ourselves, and the greatest of these affairs are not the works of the gods or of destiny but of whoever happens to take care of them, it is necessary for me to speak. For it must be either an insensitive or an incredibly strong person who will still open himself up to suffering injustice at the hands of whoever so wishes and himself bear the guilt for other people’s schemes and wickedness. The time past has caused us to get into war and peril instead of peace, so that up to the present we have been happy for every day that would pass by and wary of the coming one, and into enmity and upheaval against one another instead of unity. And while a great deal of prosperity makes others become arrogant and start civil strife, we were wise when we had it good and got crazy when it went bad, which tends to make others become wise. How could anyone know, when he is left with sorrow about the present and the opinion that he has such a thing, that there will not be such a thing again? First of all I shall show that those among the politicians and the rest of the people who are in conflict with each other have unreasonable feelings about one another, which is bound to happen to those who are rivals without reason: while they believe they are saying opposite things they fail to see that they are doing the same things and that the other’s speech is contained in their own. Just look from the start what both are chasing after. First the constitution handed down by our forefathers is confounding them, although it is the easiest to know about and most common to the citizens. Whatever lays beyond our ken must be heard from the past generations, but what the older citizens saw themselves we must learn from those who know.
This is a common instance of ‘blame’ on the grounds that it can be accommodated to almost any occasion in political life. It is a commonplace kind of antithesis, between the young and the old, good and bad fortune, past and present times, the customs of others and one’s own, the common vituperation of orators and praise of the state. Cf. Οppenheimer, RE VI A 1, 586 f. Yet one cannot claim that Thrasymachus’ words are taken from the proems of an actual speech (as are those of Demosthenes 21, 23, 25, 53), since ‘blame’ is one of the two genres of epideictic speeches, a genre from which comes the invective of some sophist against musicians that is partially conserved, to start with, in Pap. Hibeh 1 (1906) p. 45 n. 13 and has then been published several times. 11. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.1.7 1404a12: Now, when (style) comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasymachus, in his Eleoi. Aristotle is not expressing himself clearly; however, it is wrong to refer, as Spengel does, the clause ‘when… comes into fashion’ to ‘rhetorical delivery’ since Aristotle says not long before that nothing has yet been written about the latter; nor could he in this case continue the sentence as “will have the same effect as delivery” without specifying that he means the acting of tragedy. And he has also just talked about ‘phrasing’ (l. 8).
12. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.8.4 1409a2: There remains the Paean, used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasymachus, although they could not define it.
13. Quintilian, 9.4.87: Ephorus follows the Paean, which was invented by Thrasymachus and approved by Aristotle.
14. Cicero, Orator 12.39 (on Gorgias’ figures of speech): They say the first orators to deal with them were Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Gorgias of Leontinoi. Athanasius on Hermogenes Prol. Syll. p. 180, 9 f. R., too, names Gorgias and Thrasymachus together on account of the same-length clauses.
15. Cicero, Orator 52.175 (on metre in oratory): One must admit that nobody surpasses Isocrates’ expertise in that field; the first to come up with it, however, was Thrasymachus, all of whose extant writings are metrical to a fault. Cicero is cited by the rhetorician Rufinus p. 581, 15 H.
16. Cicero, Orator 13.40: Thrasymachus was judged by Isocrates to be too concise due to his small metric units, and so was Gorgias, although they are reported to have been the first to put the art of speaking on a theoretical basis.
17. Suda s.v. Thrasymachus: He was the first to define a period and a clause and introduced the present form of rhetoric. See, among other things, Philologus 65, 149 f.
18. Aristophanes, Daitaleis frag. 16 Mein. (from Galen; a father arguing with his dishonest son): You will be crushed sooner or later. – This word “crushed” comes from the orators. – And where will the words you’re speaking end up? – “End up” comes from Alcibiades. – Why do you keep second-guessing things and talk bad of people who practice being good? – Woe is me, Thrasymachus, which one of the public speakers uses such subtleties?
Sueveren surmised that this passage refers to the sophist Thrasymachus of Chalcedon; Meineke claims that this interpretation is untenable, while he himself thinks it is the name of the dishonest son who harasses his father; Fritzsche, on the other hand, thinks it refers to another son, the honest one, who is present.
19. Quintilian 3.3.4: We need not even listen to some, Albutius among them, who claim that there are only three primary parts on the grounds that memory and delivery come from nature and not nurture […], even though Thrasymachus too believed the same thing about delivery. Cf. Aristoteles Rhetoric 1404 a15: ‘Delivery comes from nature, and is somewhat lacking in techne.’ |