

Heterogeneous Congestion Control Protocols

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Outline

- Review: homogeneous case
- Motivating experiments
- Model
- Equilibrium
 - Existence, uniqueness, local stability
 - Efficiency, fairness
- Slow timescale control

Tang, Wang, Low, Chiang. ToN, 2007

Tang, Wang, Hegde, Low. Telecommunications Systems, Dec 2005

Tang, Wei, Low, Chiang. ICNP, 2006




Bibliography!!!

■ Bibliography!!!



Network model



$R_{li} = 1$ if source i uses link l

← IP routing

$x(t+1) = F(R^T p(t), x(t))$

← Reno, Vegas

$p(t+1) = G(p(t), Rx(t))$

← DT, RED, ...



Network model: example

Reno:
Jacobson
1989

for every RTT (AI)
{ W += 1 }
for every loss (MD)
{ W := W/2 }

$$x_i(t+1) = \frac{1}{T_i^2} - \frac{x_i^2}{2} \sum_l R_{li} p_l(t) \quad \leftarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{AI} \\ \text{MD} \end{array}$$
$$p_l(t+1) = G_l \left(\sum_i R_{li} x_i(t), p_l(t) \right) \quad \leftarrow \text{TailDrop}$$



Network model: example

FAST:

Jin, Wei, Low
2004

periodically

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} W := \frac{\text{baseRTT}}{\text{RTT}} W + \alpha \end{array} \right.$$

$$x_i(t+1) = x_i(t) + \frac{\gamma_i}{T_i} \left(\alpha_i - x_i(t) \sum_l R_{li} p_l(t) \right)$$

$$p_l(t+1) = p_l(t) + \frac{1}{c_l} \left(\sum_i R_{li} x_i(t) - c_l \right)$$



Duality model of TCP/AQM

□ TCP/AQM $x^* = F(R^T p^*, x^*)$

$$p^* = G(p^*, Rx^*)$$

□ Equilibrium (x^*, p^*) primal-dual optimal:

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \sum U_i(x_i) \quad \text{subject to} \quad Rx \leq c$$

- F determines utility function U
- G guarantees complementary slackness
- p^* are Lagrange multipliers

Kelly, Maloo, Tan 1998
Low, Lapsley 1999

Uniqueness of equilibrium

- x^* is unique when U is strictly concave
- p^* is unique when R has full row rank



Duality model of TCP/AQM

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$$p^* = G(p^*, Rx^*)$$

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■ F determines utility function U

■ G guarantees complementary slackness

■ p^* are Lagrange multipliers

Kelly, Maloo, Tan 1998
Low, Lapsley 1999

The underlying concave program also
leads to simple dynamic behavior



Duality model of TCP/AQM

□ Equilibrium (x^*, p^*) primal-dual optimal:

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \sum U_i(x_i) \quad \text{subject to } Rx \leq c$$

Mo & Walrand 2000:

$$U_i(x_i) = \begin{cases} \log x_i & \text{if } \alpha = 1 \\ (1 - \alpha)^{-1} x_i^{1 - \alpha} & \text{if } \alpha \neq 1 \end{cases}$$

- $\alpha = 1$: Vegas, FAST, STCP
- $\alpha = 1.2$: HSTCP
- $\alpha = 2$: Reno
- $\alpha = \infty$: XCP (single link only)



Duality model of TCP/AQM

□ Equilibrium (x^*, p^*) primal-dual optimal:

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \sum U_i(x_i) \quad \text{subject to } Rx \leq c$$

Mo & Walrand 2000:

$$U_i(x_i) = \begin{cases} \log x_i & \text{if } \alpha = 1 \\ (1 - \alpha)^{-1} x_i^{1 - \alpha} & \text{if } \alpha \neq 1 \end{cases}$$

- $\alpha = 0$: maximum throughput
- $\alpha = 1$: proportional fairness
- $\alpha = 2$: min delay fairness
- $\alpha = \infty$: maxmin fairness



Some implications

□ Equilibrium

- Always exists, unique if R is full rank
- Bandwidth allocation independent of AQM or arrival
- Can predict macroscopic behavior of large scale networks

□ Counter-intuitive throughput behavior

- Fair allocation is not always inefficient
- Increasing link capacities do not always raise aggregate throughput

[Tang, Wang, Low, ToN 2006]

□ FAST TCP

- Design, analysis, experiments

[Jin, Wei, Low, ToN 2007]



Some implications

□ Equilibrium

- Always exists, unique if R is full rank
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□ Counter-intuitive throughput behavior

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[Tang, Wang, Low, ToN 2006]

□ FAST TCP

- Design, analysis, experiments

[Jin, Wei, Low, ToN 2007]



Duality model

- Global stability in absence of feedback delay
 - Lyapunov function
 - Kelly, Maulloo & Tan (1988)
 - Gradient projection
 - Low & Lapsley (1999)
 - Singular perturbations
 - Kunniyur & Srikant (2002)
 - Passivity approach
 - Wen & Arcat (2004)
- Linear stability in presence of feedback delay
 - Nyquist criteria
 - Paganini, Doyle, Low (2001), Vinnicombe (2002), Kunniyur & Srikant (2003)
- Global stability in presence of feedback delay
 - Lyapunov-Krasovskii, SoSTool
 - Papachristodoulou (2005)
 - Global nonlinear invariance theory
 - Ranjan, La & Abed (2004, delay-independent)



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


The world is heterogeneous...


- Linux 2.6.13 allows users to choose congestion control algorithms
- Many protocol proposals
 - Loss based: Reno and a large number of variants
 - Delay based: CARD (1989), DUAL (1992), Vegas (1995), FAST (2004), ...
 - ECN: RED (1993), REM (2001), PI (2002), AVQ (2003), ...
 - Explicit feedback: MaxNet (2002), XCP (2002), RCP (2005), ...



Throughputs depend on AQM



buffer size = 80 pkts






buffer size = 400 pkts

FAST throughput


- FAST and Reno share a single bottleneck router
- NS2 simulation
- Router: DropTail with variable buffer size
- With 10% heavy-tailed noise traffic



Multiple equilibria: throughput depends on arrival






Dummysnet experiment




	eq 1	eq 2
Path 1	52M	13M
path 2	61M	13M
path 3	27M	93M



Multiple equilibria: throughput depends on arrival




Dummysnet experiment



	eq 1	eq 2
Path 1	52M	13M
path 2	61M	13M
path 3	27M	93M



Multiple equilibria: single constraint sets



- Smallest example for multiple equilibria
- Single constraint set but infinitely many equilibria
- $J=1$: prices are non-unique but rates are unique
- $J>1$: prices and rates are both non-unique



Some implications

	homogeneous	heterogeneous
equilibrium	unique	non unique
bandwidth allocation on AQM	independent	dependent
bandwidth allocation on arrival	independent	dependent



□ Duality model:

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \sum U_i(x_i) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Rx \leq c \quad x_i^* = F_i \left(\sum_l R_{li} p_l^*, x_i^* \right)$$

□ Why can't use F_i 's of FAST and Reno in duality model?

They use different prices!

$$F_i = x_i + \frac{\gamma_i}{T_i} \left(\alpha_i - x_i \sum_l R_{li} p_l \right) \leftarrow \text{delay for FAST}$$

$$F_i = \frac{1}{T_i^2} - \frac{x_i^2}{2} \sum_l R_{li} p_l \leftarrow \text{loss for Reno}$$



□ Duality model:

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \sum U_i(x_i) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Rx \leq c \quad x_i^* = F_i \left(\sum_l R_{li} p_l^*, x_i^* \right)$$

□ Why can't use F_i 's of FAST and Reno in duality model?


They use different prices!

$$F_i = x_i + \frac{\gamma_i}{T_i} \left(\alpha_i - x_i \sum_l R_{li} p_l \right) \quad \dot{p}_l = \frac{1}{c_l} \left(\sum_i R_{li} x_i(t) - c_l \right)$$

$$F_i = \frac{1}{T_i^2} - \frac{x_i^2}{2} \sum_l R_{li} p_l \quad \dot{p}_l = g_l \left(p_l(t), \sum_i R_{li} x_i(t) \right)$$



Homogeneous protocol




same price
for all sources

$$x_i(t+1) = F_i\left(\sum_l R_{li} p_l(t), x_i(t)\right)$$



Heterogeneous protocol



$$x_i(t+1) = F_i \left(\sum_l R_{li} p_l(t), x_i(t) \right)$$

$$x_i^j(t+1) = F_i^j \left(\sum_l R_{li} m_l^j(p_l(t)), x_i^j(t) \right)$$

heterogeneous
prices for
type j sources



Heterogeneous protocols

□ Equilibrium: p that satisfies

$$x_i^j(p) = f_i^j \left(\sum_l R_{li} m_l^j(p_l) \right)$$

$$y_l(p) := \sum_{i,j} R_{li}^j x_i^j(p) \begin{cases} \leq c_l \\ = c_l \end{cases} \quad \text{if } p_l > 0$$

Duality model no longer applies !

■ p_l can no longer serve as Lagrange multiplier



Heterogeneous protocols

□ Equilibrium: p that satisfies

$$x_i^j(p) = f_i^j \left(\sum_l R_{li} m_l^j(p_l) \right)$$

$$y_l(p) := \sum_{i,j} R_{li}^j x_i^j(p) \begin{cases} \leq c_l \\ = c_l \end{cases} \quad \text{if } p_l > 0$$

Need to re-examine all issues

■ Equilibrium: exists? unique? efficient? fair?

■ Dynamics: stable? limit cycle? chaotic?

■ Practical networks: typical behavior? design guidelines?



Heterogeneous protocols

- Equilibrium: p that satisfies

$$x_i^j(p) = f_i^j \left(\sum_l R_{li} m_l^j(p_l) \right)$$

$$y_l(p) := \sum_{i,j} R_{li}^j x_i^j(p) \begin{cases} \leq c_l \\ = c_l \end{cases} \quad \text{if } p_l > 0$$

- Dynamic: dual algorithm

$$x_i^j(p(t)) = f_i^j \left(\sum_l R_{li} m_l^j(p_l(t)) \right)$$

$$\dot{p}_l = \gamma_l (y_l(p(t)) - c_l)$$



Notation

- Simpler notation: p is *equilibrium* if
$$y(p) = c \quad \text{on bottleneck links}$$

- Jacobian: $\mathbf{J}(p) := \frac{\partial y}{\partial p}(p)$

- Linearized dual algorithm:

$$\partial \dot{p} = \gamma \mathbf{J}(p^*) \partial p(t)$$

See Simsek, Ozdaglar, Acemoglu 2005
for generalization



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Existence

Theorem

Equilibrium p exists, despite lack of underlying utility maximization

- Generally non-unique
 - There are networks with unique bottleneck set but infinitely many equilibria
 - There are networks with multiple bottleneck set each with a unique (but distinct) equilibrium



Regular networks

Definition

A *regular network* is a tuple (R, c, m, U) for which all equilibria p are locally unique,

i.e.,
$$\det \mathbf{J}(p) := \det \frac{\partial y}{\partial p}(p) \neq 0$$

Theorem

- Almost all networks are regular
- A regular network has finitely many and odd number of equilibria (e.g. 1)



Regular networks

Proof idea:

- Sard's Theorem: critical value of a continuously differentiable function over open set has measure zero
- Apply to $y(p) = c$ on each bottleneck set
→ regularity
- Compact equilibrium set → finiteness




Regular networks

$$\text{index } I(p) := \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } \det \mathbf{J}(p) < 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } \det \mathbf{J}(p) > 0 \end{cases}$$

Proof idea:

- Poincare Hopf index theorem: if there exists a vector field with non-singular dv/dp at every equilibrium and all trajectories move inward, then

$$\sum_{\text{eq } p} I(p) = (-1)^L$$



- Dual algorithm defines such a vector field
- Index theorem implies odd #equilibria



Global uniqueness

$$\dot{m}_l^j \in [a_l, 2^{1/L} a_l] \text{ for any } a_l > 0$$
$$\dot{m}_l^j \in [a^j, 2^{1/L} a^j] \text{ for any } a^j > 0$$

Theorem

- If *price heterogeneity* is **small**, then equilibrium is globally unique

Corollary

- If price mapping functions m_l^j are linear and link independent, then equilibrium is globally unique

e.g. a network of RED routers with slope inversely proportional to link capacity almost always has globally unique equilibrium



Global uniqueness

$$\dot{m}_l^j \in [a_l, 2^{1/L} a_l] \text{ for any } a_l > 0$$
$$\dot{m}_l^j \in [a^j, 2^{1/L} a^j] \text{ for any } a^j > 0$$

Theorem

- If *price heterogeneity* is **small**, then equilibrium is globally unique

Remarks:

- Condition independent of U, R, c
- Depends on m and size L of network
- "Tight" from Index Theorem



Local stability: 'uniqueness' \rightarrow stability

$$\dot{m}_l^j \in [a_l, 2^{1/L} a_l] \text{ for any } a_l > 0$$

$$\dot{m}_l^j \in [a^j, 2^{1/L} a^j] \text{ for any } a^j > 0$$

Theorem

- If *price heterogeneity* is **small**, then the unique equilibrium p is locally stable

Linearized dual algorithm: $\delta \dot{p} = \gamma \mathbf{J}(p^*) \delta p(t)$

Equilibrium p is *locally stable* if

$$\text{Re } \lambda(\mathbf{J}(p)) < 0$$



Local stability: 'converse'

Theorem

- If all equilibria p are locally stable, then it is globally unique

Proof idea:

- For all equilibrium p : $I(p) = (-1)^L$
- Index theorem:

$$\sum_{\text{eq } p} I(p) = (-1)^L$$



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Efficiency

Theorem

- Every equilibrium p^* is Pareto efficient

Proof:

- Every equilibrium p^* yields a (unique) rate $x(p^*)$ that solves

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \sum_j \sum_i \lambda_i^j(p^*) U_i^j(x_i^j) \quad \text{s. t.} \quad Rx \leq c$$



Efficiency

Theorem

□ Every equilibrium p^* is Pareto efficient

□ Measure of optimality

$$V^* := \max_{x \geq 0} \sum_j \sum_i U_i^j(x_i^j) \quad \text{s. t. } Rx \leq c$$

□ Achieved: $V(p^*) := \sum_j \sum_i U_i^j(x_i^j(p^*))$



Efficiency

Theorem

- Every equilibrium p^* is Pareto efficient
- Loss of optimality:

$$\frac{V(p^*)}{V^*} \geq \frac{\min \dot{m}_l^j}{\max \dot{m}_l^j}$$

- Measure of optimality

$$V^* := \max_{x \geq 0} \sum_j \sum_i U_i^j(x_i^j) \quad \text{s. t. } Rx \leq c$$

- Achieved: $V(p^*) := \sum_j \sum_i U_i^j(x_i^j(p^*))$



Efficiency

Theorem

- Every equilibrium p^* is Pareto efficient
- Loss of optimality:

$$\frac{V(p^*)}{V^*} \geq \frac{\min \dot{m}_l^j}{\max \dot{m}_l^j}$$

e.g. A network of RED routers with default parameters suffers no loss of optimality



Intra-protocol fairness

Theorem

- Fairness among flows within each type is unaffected, i.e., still determined by their utility functions and Kelly's problem with reduced link capacities

Proof idea:

- Each equilibrium p chooses a partition of link capacities among types, $c^j := c^j(p)$
- Rates $x^j(p)$ then solve

$$\max_{x^j \geq 0} \sum_i U_i^j(x_i^j) \quad \text{s. t.} \quad R^j x^j \leq c^j$$



Inter-protocol fairness

Theorem

- Any fairness is achievable with a linear scaling of utility functions

$$\bar{x}^j := \arg \max_{x^j \geq 0} \sum_i U_i^j(x_i^j) \quad \text{s. t.} \quad R^j x^j \leq c$$

$$\text{all achievable rates } X := \left\{ x = \sum_j a^j \bar{x}^j \right\}$$



Inter-protocol fairness

Theorem

- Any fairness is achievable with a linear scaling of utility functions
- i.e. given any x in X , there exists μ s.t. an equilibrium p has $x(p) = x$

$$x_i^j(p(t)) = f_i^j \left(\frac{1}{\mu_i^j} \sum_l R_{li} m_l^j(p_l(t)) \right)$$
$$\dot{p}_l = \gamma_l (y_l(p(t)) - c_l)$$



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Slow timescale control

Slow timescale scaling of utility function

$$x_i^j(t) = f_i^j \left(\frac{q_i^j(t)}{\mu_i^j(t)} \right)$$


scaling of end-to-end price

$$\mu_i^j(t+1) = \kappa_i^j \mu_i^j(t) + (1 - \kappa_i^j) \frac{\sum_l m_l^j(p_l(t))}{\sum_l p_l(t)}$$


slow timescale update of scaling factor



ns2 simulation: buffer=80pks




without slow timescale control




with slow timescale control



ns2 simulation: buffer=400pks



without slow timescale control



with slow timescale control




Summary: equilibrium structure

Uni-protocol

- Unique bottleneck set
- Unique rates & prices

Multi-protocol



- Non-unique bottleneck sets
- Non-unique rates & prices for each B.S.



- always odd
- not all stable
- uniqueness conditions





Reno First





FAST First





Alpha trajectory

