CRITICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND MEDIA REFORM
By Robert A.
Hackett (Simon Fraser University) and William K. Carroll (University of
Victoria).
A version of this
article was published in Media Development, January 2004 (www.wacc.org.uk).
Democracy
has never been a gift handed down from elites.
It is a hard-won prize, perennially threatened by attempts at economic,
cultural and political enclosure, as in the commodification of biogenetic
knowledge, the concentration of media ownership and control and the securitization
of the state (McNally 2002). Whether
defined around gendered, ethnic, national, class, environmental or other
interests, social movements have long been the carriers of liberatory social
change. Critical social movements (CSMs) – movements committed to
empowerment of the marginalized, movements that challenge the hegemonies of
dominant groups and institutions – are key to revitalizing democracy
today. The work of CSMs benefits millions
of citizens, who are not members and may not even be aware of the work of the
labor movement or of various NGOs active on human rights issues. Without doubt, the struggle for
communication rights is one of the most important democratizing struggles of
the current era. Given the pivotal role
mass media play in shaping public issues and consciousness, the struggle to
democratize communication influences the outcome of a wide range of political,
social and economic issues – from local urban development to war.
Indeed,
the fate of CSMs is intertwined with, and partly determined by, the
institutions and practices of public communication that constitute so much of
our cultural environment. As Gamson and
Wolfsfeld (1993) point out, CSMs need access to public communication for at
least three reasons:
·
To mobilize politically – to attract wide
support – CSMs must gain standing -- visibility – in the public domain. They must define issues, name problems, and
offer solutions in ways that connect personal experience and public discourse. "Media discourse remains indispensable
for most movements because most of the people they wish to reach are part of
the mass media gallery, while many are missed by movement-oriented
outlets" (Gamson and Wolfsfeld
1993: 116).
·
Beyond getting coverage, CSMs need to achieve
some measure of validation within mainstream news discourse. This means establishing that the movement is
a relevant and influential actor, and implies that the content of coverage is
not so negative as to trivialize or otherwise torpedo the movement’s political
project. With validation, a movement’s
framing of political reality gains credibility; the movement comes to influence
public consciousness.
·
Finally, CSMs need mainstream media as a vehicle
for broadening the scope of conflict, in their efforts to alter the
balance of power by bringing in sympathetic third parties. Such potential allies are often accessed
through the increasingly global communicative networks that mass media subtend. For example, in the 1990s Greenpeace waged a
struggle against forest practices in British Columbia, largely through
attracting sympathetic coverage in European media, which helped build a
consumer boycott in Europe that pressured for change in the far west reaches of
Canada.
Media,
of course, are more than conduits for the messages of movements. They are major
forces in constituting the broad contours of political culture (e.g.
consumerism, spectatorship and celebrity vs. civic engagement) which is the
context for the democratizing efforts of CSMs
(Hackett, 1991). Media and movements enter into a relationship which
influences the trajectory of CSMs at every stage, from emergence through
maintenance (or dissipation), to possible success or failure (however that is
defined). But the relationship is
asymmetrical. Because CSMs greatly need media to help them mobilize, and to
validate their standing, while news organizations are less dependent on
movements for the stories they feature, media have the upper hand (Gamson and
Wolfsfeld, 1993). CSMs may make good
copy; but media have a choice of many alternative story providers. Few media beats focus on social movement
organizations (SMOs), and the gap is widened by subcultural differences:
journalists are not infrequently politically cynical, activists are often righteous. The fall of the righteous is a favorite
media story.
Although
the term “information society” is by now several decades old, in the last 10-15
years media ecology has shifted in ways that are transforming the relationship
between media and movements, giving CSMs new resources and incentives to engage
in media democratization. By
media democratization we mean media-oriented activism that expands the range of
voices accessed through the media, builds an egalitarian and participatory
public sphere, promotes the values and practices of sustainable democracy
outside the media, and/or within the media, and offsets the political and
economic inequalities found elsewhere in the social system.
The
rise of the Internet has been a boon to CSM mobilizing, enabling movements to
reach existing constituencies, and perhaps to reach out to new potential
supporters, without having to depend on corporate mass media. The Net has also made more activists in
various CSMs media-savvy, at least in terms of technological skills. There is now less of a gap than in the
1970s, between alternative media producers, and (other) political activists
(Downing et al., 2002, p. 206).
However, while the digital revolution makes it easier and cheaper for
CSMs to produce their own media, it is doubtful that the Net has shifted the
balance of power between the forces of neo-liberal globalization and the
popular resistance offered by CSMs.
Communications infrastructure, after all, has helped make the current
drive of corporate globalization possible.
Today the dominant media corporations are arguably more cohesive, as
influential over public agendas, and more resistant to progressive social
movements that challenge core corporate interests, than they were during the
1960s era . Media institutions have
become bulwarks of global capitalism not only ideologically, but also
economically. The growth of
transnational multi-media conglomerates through mergers and global joint
ventures, the technological convergence between once-separate media sectors,
the development of global markets in most media industries, the spread and
intensification of commercialization and the decline of public broadcasting,
the erosion of the ‘public service’ ethos in journalism, the growth and
consolidation of the advertising industry, the development of communication
technology spurred by business demand for the best global communications
networks possible all confirm a consolidation of corporate power in the field
of mass communication (Herman and McChesney, 1997, chap. 1).
In
short, CSMs challenging the environmental, military, social or economic
consequences of global corporatization have a dual reason for taking on the
project of media democratization. For
each movement, democratization of mass media is a means of getting the message
out, a way of improving standing while enabling the movement to have its own
definition of the situation featured rather than marginalized. But beyond this immediately pragmatic
impact, media democratization must be seen as integral to any radically
democratic politics. This is so because media corporations are part of the
system that CSMs are challenging.
In
our research on activism around media democratization in North America and
Britain, we have found it useful to distinguish four major strands of praxis,
each with distinct forms of action, organization, and sites of intervention
(Hackett, 2000, pp. 70-71).
·
influencing
content and practices of mainstream media -- e.g., finding openings for oppositional voices, media monitoring,
campaigns to change specific aspects of representation;
·
advocating for
reform of government policy/regulation of media in order to change the very
structure of media institutions -- e.g., media reform coalitions;
·
building
independent, democratic and participatory media -- alternative media and
support services to give voice to the marginalized, thereby opening new
channels of communication independent of state and corporate control;
·
changing the
relationship between audiences and media, chiefly by empowering audiences
to be more critical of hegemonic media -- e.g., media education and culture
jamming.
The
first two approaches are broadly directed at existing hegemonic institutions;
the latter two seek to build or nurture counter-hegemonic media practices and
sensibilities. It has been striking how
many of our respondents seem to priorize either the first two or last
two of these. This suggests a certain
division of labor, and perhaps of political style, within the field of media
activism (See Carroll and Hackett, 2003).
Although
the Left has engaged in several of these forms of media democratization as a
by-product of its politics, unlike the neoliberal Right it has not identified
the media as such as a site of political struggle. The situation appears to be changing, but to date the North
American Left has not taken the question of structural media reform
seriously. In our estimation, there are
several reasons for this blind spot.
Since the 1970s some on the Left have accepted a naive McLuhanism: a reduction
of media to the communications technologies that are supposedly creating an
electronic global village. In this
perspective, media automatically carry positive transformative potential, and
their nondemocratic institutional structuring is not considered. At the other end of the spectrum has been a
revolutionary rejectionism, grounded in the notion that media (or any other)
reform implies some inherently cooptative engagement with the existing
political system. There have also been
the strength of the libertarian and do-it-yourself traditions (and a near total
absence of social democratic currents) in US Left politics, and in Canada a
complacency about the need for structural reform – so long as the CBC remained
a viable state-funded public broadcaster, cultural producers received
meaningful public subsidies, and some degree of diversity“competition”
could be said to exist among the corporate media. Finally, some organizations on the Left have been able, by
narrowing their focus and focusing on specific reforms, to do well for
themselves in existing media, gaining an advantageous profile for
themselves. As one media activist
pointed out to us, relatively well-resourced groups such as labor unions pour
millions of dollars into their advertising campaigns, and thus into the coffers
of the corporate media, while projects for media democracy remain chronically
under-financed and barely visible in the public eye.
To
be sure, CSMs have engaged with media as a by-product of their political
activity, typically in one of two ways:
a) by
reducing the asymmetry of their relationship with dominant media – by
developing the organization, professionalism and strategic communication
planning that increases the chances of favorable media coverage; and
b) by
reducing the dependency on dominant media, by creating their own alternative
media. Both of these approaches take considerable resources, and may divert
SMOs from their original primary objectives.
More generally, as Gitlin has noted,
an oppositional
movement is caught in a fundamental and inescapable dilemma. If it stands outside the dominant realm of
discourse, it is liable to be consigned to marginality and political
irrelevance; its issues are domesticated, its deeper challenge to the social
order sealed off, trivialized and contained.
If, on the other hand, it plays by conventional political rules in order
to acquire...credibility...it is liable to be assimilated into the hegemonic
political world view (1980, pp. 290-1).
But
in posing the dilemma this way, Gitlin, and CSMMSs up to
now, have simply accepted the structure of media as an obdurate part of the
environment of social activism.
Democratic media activism raises another possibility – the
transformation of media themselves as an alternative to each CSM’s lonely
struggle to adapt itself to an inherently unfavorable media terrain. To realize this possibility, democratic
media reform needs to be recast as an end in itself –a public good – not simply
a means by which each movement can get its message out. We can distinguish three basic layers of a
constituency for such a movement:
1. Specialized
groups working with media technologies and/or within media industries - e.g.
journalists, producers of alternative media, librarians. Their work may lead to experiences of
alienation or exploitation as they live the contradiction between profit and
creativity, and/or
to resentment against their marginal status and the devaluation of their claims
to professionalism.
2. Subordinate
social groups outside media, whose lack of economic or cultural capital is
paralleled in the media's 'machinery of representation', media representations
which excludes their issues, identities and
standpoints.
3. More
diffuse social interests that may mobilize around media sporadically, when
hyper-commercialized or centralized communications processes poset
a threat to humane
and democratic values - e.g. parents concerned about media's impact on
socialization of the young; progressive religious groups concerned with media
undermining values of solidarity, respect for the Other, and inclusion of the
poor and disenfranchised.
Although
at a given time the second and third layers of the constituency may have
grievances more pressing than those having to do with media per se, Robert
McChesney’s strategic advice is in our view worth heeding: "regardless of
what a progressive group's first issue of importance is, its second issue
should be media and communication, because so long as the media are in
corporate hands, the task of social change will be vastly more difficult, if
not impossible, across the board"
(1997, p. 71).
There
are definite signs that since 1996 the momentum for democratic media reform has
been picking up. In the U.S., that year marked the launching
of the Cultural Environment Movement (CEM) by communications scholar George
Gerbner and his associates, and the first of two national Media & Democracy
Congresses. [[ M&D Congresses convention. NEED A SENTENCE HERE ]] These groupings did not endure as
organizations, but they graphically demonstrated the wide potential
constituency for media reform - independent media producers, media workers,
unions, parents, educators and researchers, environmentalists, feminists and
gay rights activists, faith communities, ethnic minorities. More recent evidence of qualitative upturn
in momentum in the US can be seen in the grassroots campaign by a coalition of
left and right to reverse the FCC's liberalization of media ownership
ceilings. In September 2003, hundreds
of thousands of people from across the political spectrum flooded the FCC and
Congress with phone calls and petitions, making media concentration reportedly
the second most active issue on Capitol Hill, behind only the Iraq war
(Beckerman 2003).
Behind
this upsurge are several factors –amongst millions of progressively-minded
Americans, outrage at the perceived collusion of corporate media with the Bush
administration's propaganda campaign leading up to the Iraq invasion; and
across the political spectrum, dismay at the loss of local programming in radio
particularly, as a result of the rapid expansion of chain ownership since the
1996 Communications Act. The national
Media Reform conference held in Madison, Wisconsin on Nov. 7-9, 2003 /03
offers a window on what seems to be happening on the ground. Organized by Free Press (whose founders
include McChesney and journalist John Nichols), the conference far exceeded its
predecessors (CEM, Media
and DemocracyD Congress) in terms of numbers and positive, if angry, energy. Based on Hackett’s attendance, hHere
are some observations on what went on:
As
we emphasized above, constructing a collective action frame, and a collective
identity, has proven to be a more difficult challenge for media reformers,
compared to other CSMs. This may be
because 'media reformer' does not itself constitute a deeply held or resonant
identity (by contrast with, say, environmentalism, which for many exudes a
philosophical outlook and way of life).
Backed apparently by strategic, focus-group research, which showed that
concepts focusing on media accountability (e.g. "taking back the
airwaves") had little resonance with the broad public, organizers of the
Media Reform
evidently conference recognized the need for collective-action frames
that connect with deeply held values and identities in American political
culture. Three such frames seemed in
play at the conference:
1. a
mainstream frame, apparently intended to appeal to Americans in general,
linking media reform to the foundational American value of freedom – the First
Amendment; the founding fathers; suspicion of government, and the need for an
independent, diverse press to act as a watchdog on the abuse of government
power. This frame frame was articulated by some of the 'star'
speakers such as Bill Moyers of PBS.
2. a
progressive frame connecting media reform to progressive social issues
such as the failures of media coverage of the health care crisis, the perceived
domination of media punditry by right-wingers, and the collusion of corporate
media with Bush administration propaganda about Iraq. This frame would resonate most strongly with liberal Americans,
who have become "mad as hell" at the Right’s longstanding domination
of the political agenda, and who are learning that the route to power passes
through the media.
3. an
alternative frame articulated at the 'fringes' of the
conference's official program, especially by young media and community
activists of color from the San Francisco Bay area. At their panel and the wrap-up plenary, they
offered an impassioned plea which cast the whole project in a different
light. For them, media reform is not
some progressive issue which can be picked up by middle-class liberals
motivated by abstract commitments to democracy or diversity. Rather, it's about power, and about cultural
and physical survival. For instance,
media stereotypes of black criminality can literally have life-and-death
consequences, if they make police more likely to kill black people and get away
with it. Indeed, this group challenged
the very term 'media reform' in favor of 'media justice', re-positioning the
problem as one of social justice in a world organized around globalized
capitalism, racism and patriarchy. Even
'democracy' was questioned as irretrievable, insofar as, for non-white
minorities in the US, ‘democracy’ has meant conquest, genocide, slavery.
The
emergence of these strategic frames occurred along with another strategic
tactical
innovation, as conference organizers recognized the value of celebrity
power as a movement-building tool. Moyers, McChesney, Nichols, Jesse
Jackson Sr., authors
Studs Terkel
and, Naomi Klein, broadcaster Amy
Goodman, writer/comedian Al Frankel, rock musician Billy Bragg, Ralph
Nader, and other 'alternative all-stars' were highlighted in the plenary
presentations, many of them in Madison's historic Orpheum Theatre, historic
site of Progressive rallies a century earlier with featuring
Senator "Fighting Bob" LaFollette.
These events achieved very high professional entertainment value and, by
contrast with some preceding conferences, there appeared to be no grumbling
about this progressive use of celebrity to move beyond 'preaching to the
choir'.
Another
contrast from forerunners was the emphasis on building a ‘real movement’
rather than writing a manifesto. Preceding conferences put great effort into
the spade-work of preparing and endorsing statements like the People's
Communication Charter at CEM, and the Information Bill of Rights at the
Media (CEM, 1996) and Declaration of Independents (Media
Democracy Congress. , 1996). At Madison there was relatively little
discussion of basic values or principles.
Notwithstanding the plurality of collective-action frames noted above,
discussions took place on the basis of a normative consensus around shared
principles and goals and a shared critique of corporate media. The focus was on campaigns actions
and networking, and out of the conversation several political action goals
emerged: the continued struggle against
FCC media rules, the drive to legalize low power FM radio and more broadly, the
need to defeat the Bush administration at the next election (ten or so senior
Democratic Party politicians were in attendance).
Finally,
the conference went some distance in connecting the dots between
different sites of struggle in the movement to democratize communication.
Workshops and discussions showed real effort to link community, national and
international levels of networking, and to call attention to the relevance of
global governance instruments (WTO, FTAA, World Summit on the Information
Society) for local and national media and movements.
In
the Madison conference and related developments such as the campaign against
further neoliberalization of the FCC we can find some of the key ingredients –
the collective-action frames, the normative consensus and the strategic
analysis – for an emerging movement, a movement for which FCC Chair Michael
Powell can claim some inspirational credit (Beckerman 2003, p. 19). The style and substance of Powell’s recent
initiative presented an affront to both democratic and communitarian
values. But the arrogance of
unyielding, market-driven state power, as personified by Powell, was only a
trigger for a process of political mobilization that has been building since
the mid-1990s, and that has every possibility of gathering more momentum in
years ahead. For this to occur, the
tentative cross-fertilization between media reform activists and CSMs needs to
take root. Their political projects
need to be informed by the dual recognition that media democratization is a
requisite for any significant system transformation, but that media
corporations are only a part of that system.
As carriers of social change, media reform and critical social movements
require each other.
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