

# Feminisms and Critical Pedagogy ed. by Carmen Luke + Jennifer Gore

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I want to argue, on the basis of my interpretation of C&I 607, that key assumptions, goals, and pedagogical practices fundamental to the literature on critical pedagogy—namely, “empowerment,” “student voice,” “dialogue,” and even the term “critical”—are repressive myths that perpetuate relations of domination. By this I mean that when participants in our class attempted to put into practice prescriptions offered in the literature concerning empowerment, student voice, and dialogue, we produced results that were not only unhelpful, but actually exacerbated the very conditions we were trying to work against, including Eurocentrism, racism, sexism, classism, and “banking education.” To the extent that our efforts to put discourses of critical pedagogy into practice led us to reproduce relations of domination in our classroom, these discourses were “working through” us in repressive ways, and had themselves become vehicles of repression. To the extent that we disengaged ourselves from those aspects and moved in another direction, we “worked through” and out of the literature’s highly abstract language (“myths”) of who we “should” be and what “should” be happening in our classroom; we moved into classroom practices that were context-specific and seemed to be much more responsive to our own understandings of our social identities and situations.

This chapter concludes by addressing the implications of the classroom practices we constructed in response to racism in the university’s curriculum, pedagogy, and everyday life. Specifically, it challenges educational scholars who situate themselves within the field of critical pedagogy to come to grips with the fundamental issues this work has raised—especially the question, “What diversity do we silence in the name of ‘liberatory’ pedagogy?”

### Pedagogy and political interventions on campus

The nation-wide eruption in 1987–1988 of racist violence in communities and on campuses, including the University of Wisconsin-Madison, pervaded the context in which Curriculum and Instruction 607, “Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogies” was planned and facilitated. The increased visibility of racism in Madison was also partly due to the UW Minority Student Coalition’s successful documentation of the UW system’s resistance to and its failure to address monoculturalism in the curriculum, to recruit and retain students and professors of color, and to alleviate the campus culture’s insensitivity or hostility to cultural and racial diversity.

At the time that I began to construct a description of C&I 607, students of color had documented the extent of their racial harassment and alienation on campus. Donna Shalala, the newly appointed, feminist chancellor of UW-Madison, had invited faculty and campus groups to take their initiatives against racism on campus. I had just served on a university committee investigating an incident of racial harassment against one of my students. I wanted to design a course in media and pedagogy that would not only work to clarify the structures of institutional racism underlying university practices and its culture in spring

## Why Doesn't this Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy

*Elizabeth Ellsworth*

In the spring of 1988, the University of Wisconsin-Madison was the focal point of a community-wide crisis provoked by the increased visibility of racist acts and structures on campus and within the Madison community. During the preceding year, the FIJI fraternity had been suspended for portraying racially demeaning stereotypes at a “Fiji Island party,” including a 15-foot high cutout of a “Fiji native,” a dark-skinned caricature with a bone through its nose. On December 1, 1987, the Minority Affairs Steering Committee released a report, initiated and researched by students, documenting the university’s failure to address institutional racism and the experiences of marginalization of students of color on campus. The report called for the appointment of a person of color to the position of vice-chancellor of ethnic minority affairs/affirmative action; effective strategies to recruit and retain students of color, faculty, and staff; establishment of a multicultural center; implementation of a mandatory six-credit ethnic studies requirement; revamping racial and sexual harassment grievance procedures; and initiation of a cultural and racial orientation program for all students. The release of the report, and the university’s response to it and to additional incidents such as the FIJI fraternity party, have become the focus of ongoing campus and community-wide debates, demonstrations, and organizing efforts.

In January, 1988, partly in response to this situation, I facilitated a special topics course at UW-Madison called “Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogies,” Curriculum and Instruction 607, known as C&I 607. In this chapter, I will offer an interpretation of C&I 607’s interventions against campus racism and traditional educational forms at the university. I will then use that interpretation to support a critique of current discourses on critical pedagogy.<sup>1</sup> The literature on critical pedagogy represents attempts by educational researchers to theorize and operationalize pedagogical challenges to oppressive social formations. While the attempts I am concerned with here share fundamental assumptions and goals, their different emphases are reflected in the variety of labels given to them, such as “critical pedagogy,” “pedagogy of critique and possibility,” “pedagogy of student voice,” “pedagogy of empowerment,” “radical pedagogy,” “pedagogy for radical democracy,” and “pedagogy of possibility.”<sup>2</sup>

1988, but that would also use that understanding to plan and carry out a political intervention within that formation. This class would not debate whether or not racist structures and practices were operating at the university; rather, it would investigate *how* they operated, with what effects and contradictions—and where they were vulnerable to political opposition. The course concluded with public interventions on campus, which I will describe later. For my purposes here, the most important interruption of existing power relations within the university consisted of transforming business-as-usual—that is, prevailing social relations—in a university classroom.

Before the spring of 1988, I had used the language of critical pedagogy in course descriptions and with students. For example, syllabi in the video production for education courses stated that goals of the courses included the production of “socially responsible” videotapes, the fostering of “critical production” practices and “critical reception and analysis” of educational videotapes. Syllabi in the media criticism courses stated that we would focus on “critical media use and analysis in the classroom” and the potential of media in “critical education.” Students often asked what was meant by “critical”—critical of what, from what position, to what end?—and I referred them to answers provided in the literature. For example, “critical pedagogy” supported classroom analysis and rejection of oppression, injustice, inequality, silencing of marginalized voices, and authoritarian social structures.<sup>3</sup> Its critique was launched from the position of the “radical” educator who recognizes and helps students to recognize and name injustices, who empowers students to act against their own and others’ oppressions (including oppressive school structures), and who criticizes and transforms her or his own understanding in response to the understandings of students.<sup>4</sup> The goal of critical pedagogy was a critical democracy, individual freedom, social justice, and social change—a revitalized public sphere characterized by citizens capable of confronting public issues critically through ongoing forms of public debate and social action.<sup>5</sup> Students would be empowered by social identities that affirmed their race, class, and gender positions, and provided the basis for moral deliberation and social action.<sup>6</sup>

The classroom practices of critical educators may in fact engage with actual, historically specific struggles, such as those between students of color and university administrators. But the overwhelming majority of academic articles appearing in major educational journals, although apparently based on actual practices, rarely locate theoretical constructs within them. In my review of the literature I found, instead, that educational researchers who invoke concepts of critical pedagogy consistently strip discussions of classroom practices of historical context and political position. What remains are the definitions cited above, which operate at a high level of abstraction. I found this language more appropriate (yet hardly more helpful) for philosophical debates about the highly problematic concepts of freedom, justice, democracy and “universal” values than for thinking through and planning classroom practices to support the political agenda of C&I 607.

Given the explicit antiracist agenda of the course, I realized that even naming C&I 607 raised complex issues. To describe the course as “Media and Critical Pedagogy,” or “Media, Racism, and Critical Pedagogy,” for example, would be to hide the politics of the course, making them invisible to the very students I was trying to attract and work with—namely, students committed or open to working against racism. I wanted to avoid colluding with many academic writers in the widespread use of code words such as “critical,” which hide the actual political agendas I assume such writers share with me—namely antiracism, antixenophobia, anti-elitism, anti-heterosexism, anti-ableism, anticlassism, and anti-neoconservatism.

I say “assume” because, while the literature on critical pedagogy charges the teacher with helping students to “identify and choose between sufficiently articulated and reasonably distinct moral positions,”<sup>7</sup> it offers only the most abstract, decontextualized criteria for choosing one position over others, criteria such as “reconstructive action”<sup>8</sup> or “radical democracy and social justice.”<sup>9</sup> To reject the term “critical pedagogy” and name the course “Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogies” was to assert that students and faculty at UW-Madison in the spring of 1988 were faced with ethical dilemmas that called for political action. While a variety of “moral assessments” and political positions existed about the situation on campus, this course would attempt to construct a classroom practice that would act on *the situation*: antiracism. I wanted to be accountable for naming the political agenda behind this particular course’s critical pedagogy.

Thinking through the ways in which our class’s activities could be understood as political was important, because while the literature states implicitly or explicitly that critical pedagogy is political, there have been no sustained research attempts to explore whether or how the practices it prescribes actually alter specific power relations outside or inside schools. Further, when educational researchers advocating critical pedagogy fail to provide a clear statement of their political agendas, the effect is to hide the fact that as critical pedagogues, they are in fact seeking to appropriate public resources (classrooms, school supplies, teacher/professor salaries, academic requirements and degrees) to further various “progressive” political agendas that they believe to be for the public good—and therefore deserving of public resources. But however good the reasons are for choosing the strategy of subverting repressive school structures from within, it has necessitated the use of code words such as “critical,” “social change,” “revitalized public sphere,” and a posture of invisibility. As a result, the critical education “movement” has failed to develop a clear articulation of the need for its existence, its goals, priorities, risks, or potentials. As Liston and Zeichner argue, debate within the critical education movement itself over what constitutes a radical or critical pedagogy is sorely needed.<sup>10</sup>

By prescribing moral deliberation, engagement in the full range of views present, and critical reflection, the literature on critical pedagogy implies that students and teachers can and should engage each other in the classroom as fully rational subjects. According to Valerie Walkerdine, schools have participated in

producing "self-regulating" individuals by developing in students the capacity for engaging in rational argument. Rational argument has operated in ways that set up as its opposite an irrational Other, which has been understood historically as the province of women and other exotic Others. In schools, rational deliberation, reflection, and consideration of all viewpoints has become a vehicle for regulating conflict and the power to speak, for transforming "conflict into rational argument by means of universalized capacities for language and reason."<sup>11</sup> But both students and professor entered C&I 607 with investments of privilege and struggle already made in favor of some ethical and political positions concerning racism and against other positions. The context in which this course was developed highlighted that fact. The demands that the Minority Student Coalition delivered to the administration were not written in the spirit of engaging in rationalist, analytical debates with those holding other positions. In a racist society and its institutions, such debate has not and cannot be "public" or "democratic" in the sense of including the voices of all affected parties and affording them equal weight and legitimacy. Nor can such debate be free of conscious and unconscious concealment of interests, or assertion of interests which some participants hold as non-negotiable no matter what arguments are presented.

As Barbara Christian has written, "... what I write and how I write is done in order to save my own life. And I mean that literally. For me literature is a way of knowing that I am not functioning, that whatever I feel/know is *not* Christian is an African-American woman writing about the literature of African-American women, but her words are relevant to the issues raised by the context of C&I 607. I understood the words written by the Minority Student Coalition and spoken by other students/professors of difference<sup>13</sup> on campus to have a similar function: they serve as a reality check for survival. It is inappropriate to respond to such words by subjecting them to rationalist debate about their validity. Words spoken for survival come already validated in a radically different arena of proof and carry no option or luxury of choice. (This is not to say, however, that the positions of students of color, or of any other group, were to be taken up unproblematically—an issue I will address below).

I drafted a syllabus and circulated it for suggestions and revisions to students I knew to be involved in the Minority Student Coalition, and to colleagues who shared my concerns. The goal of "Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogics," as stated in the revised syllabus, was to define, organize, carry out, and analyze an educational initiative on campus that would win semiotic space for the marginalized discourses of students against racism. Campus activists were defining these discourses and making them available to other groups, including the class, through documents, demonstrations, discussions, and press conferences.

The syllabus also listed the following assumptions underlying the course:

1. Students who want to acquire knowledge of existing educational media theory and criticism for the purposes of guiding their own educational

practice can best do so in a learning situation that interrelates theory with concrete attempts at using media for education.

2. Current situations of racial and sexual harassment and elitism on campus and in the curriculum demand meaningful responses from students and faculty, and responses can be designed in a way that accomplishes both academic and political goals.
3. Often, the term "critical education" has been used to imply, but also to hide positions and goals of anti-racism, anti-classism, anti-sexism, and so forth. Defining this course as one that explores the possibility of using media to construct anti-racist pedagogies asserts that these are legitimate and imperative goals for educators.
4. What counts as an appropriate use of media for an anti-racist pedagogy cannot be specified outside of the contexts of actual educational situations; therefore student work on this issue should be connected to concrete initiatives in actual situations.
5. Any anti-racist pedagogy must be defined through an awareness of the ways in which oppressive structures are the result of *intersections* between racist, classist, sexist, ableist, and other oppressive dynamics.
6. Everyone who has grown up in a racist culture has to work at unlearning racism—we will make mistakes in this class, but they will be made in the context of our struggle to come to grips with racism.

Naming the political agenda of the course to the extent that I did seemed relatively easy. I was in the fourth year of a tenure-track position in my department, and felt that I had "permission" from colleagues to pursue the line of research and practice out of which this course had clearly grown. The administration's response to the crisis on campus gave further "permission" for attempts to alleviate racism in the institution. However, the directions in which I should proceed became less clear once the class was under way. As I began to live out and interpret the consequences of how discourses of "critical reflection," "empowerment," "student voice," and "dialogue" had influenced my conceptualization of the goals of the course and my ability to make sense of my experiences in the class, I found myself struggling against (struggling to unlearn) key assumptions and assertions of current literature on critical pedagogy, and straining to recognize, name, and come to grips with crucial issues of classroom practice that critical pedagogy cannot or will not address.

#### From critical rationalism to the politics of partial narratives

The students enrolled in "Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogics" included Asian American, Chicano/a, Jewish, Puerto Rican, and Anglo-European men and women from the United States, as well as Asian, African, Icelandic, and Canadian international students. It was evident after the first class meeting that all of us agreed, but with different understandings and agendas, that racism was a prob-

tem on campus that required political action. The effects of the diverse social positions and political ideologies of the students enrolled, my own position and experiences as a woman and a feminist, and the effects of the course's context on the form and content of our early class discussions quickly threw the rationalist assumptions underlying critical pedagogy into question.

These rationalist assumptions have led to the following goals: the teaching of analytic and critical skills for judging the truth and merit of propositions, and the interrogation and selective appropriation of potentially transformative moments in the dominant culture.<sup>14</sup> As long as educators define pedagogy against oppressive formations in these ways, the role of the critical pedagogue will be to guarantee that the foundation for classroom interaction is reason. In other words, the critical pedagogue is one who enforces the rules of reason in the classroom—"a series of rules of thought that any ideal rational person might adopt if his/her purpose was to achieve propositions of universal validity."<sup>15</sup> Under these conditions, and given the coded nature of the political agenda of critical pedagogy, only one "political" gesture appears to be available to the critical pedagogue. S/he can ensure that students are given the chance to arrive logically at the "universally valid proposition" underlying the discourse of critical pedagogy—namely, that all people have a right to freedom from oppression guaranteed by the democratic social contract, and that in the classroom, this proposition be given equal time *vis-à-vis* other ~~alternatives~~ <sup>alternatives</sup> ~~alternatives~~ <sup>alternatives</sup> articulated and reasonably distinct moral positions.<sup>16</sup>

Yet educators who have constructed classroom practices dependent upon analytic critical judgment can no longer regard the enforcement of rationalism as a self-evident political act against relations of domination. Literary criticism, cultural studies, post-structuralism, feminist studies, comparative studies, and media studies have by now amassed overwhelming evidence of the extent to which the myths of the ideal rational person and the "universality" of propositions have been oppressive to those who are not European, White, male, middle-class, Christian, able-bodied, thin, and heterosexual.<sup>17</sup> Writings by many literary and cultural critics, both women of color and White women who are concerned with explaining the intersections and interactions among relations of racism, colonialism, sexism, and so forth, are now employing, either implicitly or explicitly, concepts and analytical methods that could be called feminist poststructuralism.<sup>18</sup> While poststructuralism, like rationalism, is a tool that can be used to dominate, it has also facilitated a devastating critique of the violence of rationalism against its Others. It has demonstrated that as a discursive practice, rationalism's regulated and systematic use of elements of language constitutes rational competence "as a series of exclusions—of women, people of color, of nature as historical agent, of the true value of art." In contrast, poststructuralist thought is not bound to reason, but "to discourse, literally narratives about the world that are admittedly *partial*. Indeed, one of the crucial features of discourse is the intimate tie between knowledge and interest, the latter being understood as a 'standpoint' from which to grasp 'reality'."<sup>19</sup>

The literature on critical pedagogy implies that the claims made by documents, demonstrations, press conferences, and classroom discussions of students of color and White students against racism could rightfully be taken up in the classroom and subjected to rational deliberation over their truth in light of competing claims. But this would force students to subject themselves to the logics of rationalism and scientism which have been predicated on and made possible through the exclusion of socially constructed irrational Others—women, people of color, nature, aesthetics. As Audre Lorde writes, "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house,"<sup>20</sup> and to call on students of color to justify and explicate their claims in terms of the master's tools—tools such as rationalism, fashioned precisely to perpetuate their exclusion—colludes with the oppressor in keeping "the oppressed occupied with the master's concerns." As Barbara Christian describes it:

The literature of people who are not in power has always been in danger of extinction or cooption, not because we do not theorize, but because what we can even imagine, far less who we can reach, is constantly limited by societal structures. For me, literary criticism is promotion as well as understanding, a response to the writer to whom there is often no response, to folk who need the writing as much as they need anything. I know, from literary history, that writing disappears unless there is a response to it. Because I write about ~~others~~ <sup>others</sup> who are now writing, I hope to help ensure that their tradition has continuity and survives.<sup>21</sup>

In contrast to the enforcement of rational deliberation, but like Christian's promotion and response, my role in C&I 607 would be to interrupt institutional limits on how much time and energy students of color, White students, and professors against racism could spend on elaborating their positions and playing them out to the point where internal contradictions and effects on the positions of other social groups could become evident and subject to self-analysis.

With Barbara Christian, I saw the necessity to take the voices of students and professors of difference at their word—as "valid"—but not without response.<sup>22</sup> Students' and my own narratives about experiences of racism, ableism, elitism, fat oppression, sexism, anti-Semitism, heterosexism, and so on are partial—partial in the sense that they are unfinished, imperfect, limited; and partial in the sense that they project the interests of "one side" over others. Because those voices are partial and partisan, they must be made problematic, but not because they have broken the rules of thought of the ideal rational person by grounding their knowledge in immediate emotional, social, and psychic experiences of oppression,<sup>23</sup> or are somehow lacking or too narrowly circumscribed.<sup>24</sup> Rather, they must be critiqued because they hold implications for other social movements and their struggles for self-definition. This assertion carries important implications for the "goal" of classroom practices against oppressive formations, which I will address later.

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#### Have we got a theory for you!<sup>25</sup>

As educators who claim to be dedicated to ending oppression, critical pedagogues have acknowledged the socially constructed and legitimated authority that teachers/professors hold over students.<sup>26</sup> Yet theorists of critical pedagogy have failed to launch any meaningful analysis of or program for reformulating the institutionalized power imbalances between themselves and their students, or the essentially paternalistic project of education itself. In the absence of such an analysis and program, their efforts are limited to trying to transform negative effects of power imbalances within the classroom into positive ones. Strategies such as student empowerment and dialogue give the illusion of equality while in fact leaving the authoritarian nature of the teacher/student relationship intact.

"Empowerment" is a key concept in this approach, which treats the symptoms but leaves the disease unnamed and untouched. Critical pedagogues employing this strategy prescribe various theoretical and practical means for sharing, giving, or redistributing power to students. For example, some authors challenge teachers to reject the vision of education as inculcation of students by the more powerful teacher. In its place, they urge teachers to accept the possibility of education through "reflective examination" of the plurality of moral positions before the presumably rational teacher and students.<sup>27</sup> Here, the goal is to give students the analytical skills they need to make them as free, rational, and objective as teachers supposedly are to choose positions on their objective merits. I have already argued that in a classroom in which "empowerment" is made dependent on rationalism, those perspectives that would question the political interests (sexism, racism, colonialism, for example) expressed and guaranteed by rationalism would be rejected as "irrational" (biased, partial).

A second strategy is to make the teacher more like the student by redefining the teacher as learner of the student's reality and knowledge. For example, in their discussion of the politics of dialogic teaching and epistemology, Shor and Freire suggest that "the teacher selecting the objects of study knows them *better* than the students as the course begins, but the teacher *re-learns* the objects through studying them with their students."<sup>28</sup> The literature explores only one reason for expecting the teacher to "re-learn" an object of study through the student's less adequate understanding, and that is to enable the teacher to devise more effective strategies for bringing the student "up" to the teacher's level of understanding. Giroux, for example, argues for a pedagogy that "is attentive to the histories, dreams, and experiences that . . . students bring to school. It is only by beginning with these subjective forms that critical educators can develop a language and set of practices"<sup>29</sup> that can successfully mediate differences between student understandings and teacher understandings in "pedagogically progressive" ways.<sup>30</sup> In this example, Giroux leaves the implied superiority of the teacher's understanding and the undefined "progressiveness" of this type of pedagogy unproblematic and untheorized.

A third strategy is to acknowledge the "directiveness"<sup>31</sup> or "authoritarianism"<sup>32</sup> of education as inevitable, and judge particular power imbalances between teacher and student to be tolerable or intolerable depending upon "towards what and with whom [they are] directive."<sup>33</sup> "Acceptable" imbalances are those in which authority serves "common human interests by sharing information, promoting open and informed discussion, and maintaining itself only through the respect and trust of those who grant the authority."<sup>34</sup> In such cases, authority becomes "emancipatory authority," a kind of teaching in which teachers would make explicit and available for rationalist debate "the political and moral referents for authority they assume in teaching particular forms of knowledge, in taking stands against forms of oppression, and in treating students as if they ought also to be concerned about social justice and political action."<sup>35</sup> Here, the question of "empowerment for what" becomes the final arbiter of a teacher's use or misuse of authority.

But critical pedagogues consistently answer the question of "empowerment for what?" in ahistorical and depoliticized abstractions. These include empowerment for "human betterment,"<sup>36</sup> for expanding "the range of possible social identities people may become,"<sup>37</sup> and "making one's self present as part of a moral and political project that links production of meaning to the possibility for human agency, democratic complicity, and transformative social action."<sup>38</sup> As a result, student empowerment has been defined in the broadest possible humanistic terms, and becomes a "capacity to act effectively" in a way that fails to challenge any identifiable social or political position, institution, or group.

The contortions of logic and rhetoric that characterize these attempts to define "empowerment" testify to the failure of critical educators to come to terms with the essentially paternalistic project of traditional education. "Emancipatory authority"<sup>39</sup> is one such contortion, for it implies the presence of, or potential to power by bringing to light and teaching the subjugated histories, experiences, stories, and accounts of those who suffer and struggle.<sup>40</sup> Yet I cannot unproblematically bring subjugated knowledges to light when I am not free of my own learned racism, fat oppression, classism, ableism, or sexism. No teacher is free of these learned and internalized oppressions. Nor are accounts of one group's suffering and struggle immune from reproducing narratives oppressive to another's—the racism of the women's movement in the United States is one example.

As I argued above, "emancipatory authority" also implies, according to Shor and Freire, a teacher who knows the object of study "better" than do the students. In fact I understood racism no better than my students did, especially those students of color coming into class after six months (or more) of campus activism and whole lives of experience and struggle against racism—nor could I ever hope to. My experiences with and access to multiple and sophisticated strategies for interpreting and interrupting sexism (in White middle-class contexts) do not provide me with a ready-made analysis of or language for understanding my own

implications in racist structures. My understanding and experience of racism will always be constrained by my white skin and middle-class privilege. Indeed, it is impossible for anyone to be free from these oppressive formations at this historical moment. Furthermore, while I had the institutional power and authority in the classroom to enforce "reflective examination" of the plurality of moral and political positions before us in a way that supposedly gave my own assessments equal weight with those of students, in fact my institutional role as professor would always weight my statements differently from those of students.

Given my own history of white-skin, middle-class, able-bodied, thin privilege and my institutionally granted power, it made more sense to see my task as one of redefining "critical pedagogy" so that it did not need utopian moments of "democracy," "equality," "justice," or "emancipated" teachers—moments that are unattainable (and ultimately undesirable, because they are always predicated on the interests of those who are in the position to define utopian projects). A preferable goal seemed to be to become capable of a sustained encounter with currently oppressive formations and power relations that refuse to be theorized away or fully transcended in a utopian resolution—and to enter into the encounter in a way that both acknowledged my own implications in those formations and was capable of changing my own relation to and investments in those formations.

**The repressive myth of the silent teacher**

At first glance, the concept of "student voice" seemed to offer a pedagogical strategy in this direction. This concept has become highly visible and influential in current discussions of curriculum and teaching, as evidenced by its appearance in the titles of numerous presentations at the 1989 American Educational Research Association Convention. Within current discourses on teaching, it functions to efface the contradiction between the emancipatory project of critical pedagogy and the hierarchical relation between teachers and students. In other words, it is a strategy for negotiating between the directiveness of dominant educational relationships and the political commitment to make students autonomous of those relationships (how does a teacher "make" students autonomous without directing them?). The discourse on student voice sees the student as "empowered" when the teacher "helps" students to express their subjugated knowledges.<sup>41</sup> The targets of this strategy are students from disadvantaged and subordinated social class, racial, ethnic, and gender groups—or alienated middle-class students, without access to skills of critical analysis, whose voices have been silenced or distorted by oppressive cultural and educational formations. By speaking, in their "authentic voices," students are seen to make themselves visible and define themselves as authors of their own world. Such self-definition presumably gives students an identity and political position from which to act as agents of social change.<sup>42</sup> Thus, while it is true that the teacher is directive, the student's own daily life experiences of oppression chart her/his path

toward self-definition and agency. The task of the critical educator thus becomes "finding ways of working with students that enable the full expression of multiple 'voices' engaged in dialogic encounter,"<sup>43</sup> encouraging students of different race, class, and gender positions to speak in self-affirming ways about their experiences and how they have been mediated by their own social positions and those of others.

Within feminist discourses seeking to provide both a place and power for women to speak, "voice" and "speech" have become commonplace as metaphors for women's feminist self-definitions—but with meanings and effects quite different from those implied by discourses of critical pedagogy. Within feminist movements, women's voices and speech are conceptualized in terms of self-definitions that are oppositional to those definitions of women constructed by others, usually to serve interests and contexts that subordinate women to men. But while critical educators acknowledge the existence of unequal power relations in classrooms, they have made no systematic examination of the barriers that this imbalance creates for the kind of student expression and dialogue they prescribe.

The concept of critical pedagogy assumes a commitment on the part of the professor/teacher toward ending the student's oppression. Yet the literature offers no sustained attempt to problematize this stance and confront the likelihood that the professor brings to social movements (including critical pedagogy) interests of her or his own race, class, ethnicity, gender, and other positions. S/he does not play the role of disinterested mediator on the side of the oppressed group.<sup>44</sup> As an Anglo, middle-class professor in C&I 607, I could not unproblematically "help" a student of color to find her/his authentic voice as a student of color. I could not unproblematically "affiliate" with the social groups my students represent and interpret their experience to them. In fact, I brought to the classroom privileges and interests that were put at risk in fundamental ways by the demands and defiances of student voices. I brought a social subjectivity that has been constructed in such a way that I have not and can never participate unproblematically in the collective process of self-definition, naming of oppression, and struggles for visibility in the face of marginalization engaged in by students whose class, race, gender, and other positions I do not share. Critical pedagogues are always implicated in the very structures they are trying to change.

Although the literature recognizes that teachers have much to learn from their students' experiences, it does not address the ways in which there are things that I as a professor could *never know* about the experiences, oppressions, and understandings of other participants in the class. This situation makes it impossible for any single voice in the classroom—including that of the professor—to assume the position of center or origin of knowledge or authority, of having privileged access to authentic experience or appropriate language. A recognition, contrary to all Western ways of knowing and speaking, that all knowings are partial, that there are fundamental things each of us cannot know—a situation alleviated only

in part by the pooling of partial, socially constructed knowledges in classrooms—demands a fundamental retheorizing of “education” and “pedagogy,” an issue I will begin to address below.

When educational researchers writing about critical pedagogy fail to examine the implications of the gendered, raced, and classed teacher and student for the theory of critical pedagogy, they reproduce, by default, the category of generic “critical teacher”—a specific form of the generic human that underlies classical liberal thought. Like the generic human, the generic critical teacher, is not of course, generic at all. Rather, the term defines a discursive category predicated on the current mythical norm, namely: young, White, Christian, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied, thin, rational man. Gender, race, class, and other differences become only variations on or additions to the generic human—“underneath, we are all the same.”<sup>45</sup> But voices of students and professors of difference solicited by critical pedagogy are not additions to that norm, but oppositional challenges that require a dismantling of the mythical norm and its uses as well as alternatives to it. There has been no consideration of how voices of, for example, White women, students of color, disabled students, White men against masculinist culture, and fat students will necessarily be constructed in opposition to the teacher/institution when they try to change the power imbalances they inhabit in their daily lives in schools.

Critical pedagogues speak of student-voices as “sharing”—their experiences and understandings of oppression with other students and with the teacher in the interest of “expanding the possibilities of what it is to be human.”<sup>46</sup> Yet White women, women of color, men of color, White men against masculinist culture, fat people, gay men and lesbians, people with disabilities, and Jews do not speak of the oppressive formations that condition their lives in the spirit of “sharing.” Rather, the speech of oppositional groups is a “talking back,” a “defiant speech”<sup>47</sup> that is constructed within communities of resistance and is a condition of survival.

In C&I 607, the defiant speech of students and professor of difference constituted fundamental challenges to and rejections of the voices of some classmates and often of the professor. For example, it became clear very quickly that in order to name her experience of racism, a Chicana student had to define her voice in part through opposition to—and rejection of—definitions of “Chicana” assumed or taken for granted by other student/professor voices in the classroom. And in the context of protests by students of color against racism on campus, her voice had to be constructed in opposition to the institutional racism of the university’s curriculum and policies—which were represented in part by my discourses and actions as Anglo-American, middle-class woman professor. Unless we found a way to respond to such challenges, our academic and political work against racism would be blocked. This alone is a reason for finding a way to express and engage with student voices, one that distances itself from the abstract, philosophical reasons implied by the literature on critical pedagogy when it fails to context-

tualize its projects. Furthermore, grounding the expression of and engagement with student voices in the need to construct contextualized political strategies rejects both the voyeuristic relation that the literature reproduces when the voice of the professor is not problematized, and the instrumental role critical pedagogy plays when student voice is used to inform more effective teaching strategies.

The lessons learned from feminist struggles to make a difference through defiant speech offer both useful critiques of the assumptions of critical pedagogy and starting points for moving beyond its repressive myth.<sup>48</sup> Within feminist movements, self-defining feminist voices have been understood as constructed collectively in the context of a larger feminist movement or women’s marginalized subcultures. Feminist voices are made possible by the interactions among women within and across race, class, and other differences that divide them. These voices have never been solely or even primarily the result of a pedagogical interaction between an individual student and a teacher. Yet discourses of the pedagogy of empowerment consistently position students as individuals with only the most abstract of relations to concrete contexts of struggle. In their writing about critical pedagogy, educational researchers consistently place teachers/professors at the center of the consciousness-raising activity. For example, McLaren describes alienated middle-class youth in this way:

... these students do not recognize their own self-representation and suppression by the dominant society, and in our vitiated learning environments they are not provided with the requisite theoretical constructs to help them understand why they feel as badly as they do. Because teachers lack a critical pedagogy, these students are not provided with the ability to think critically, a skill that would enable them to better understand why their lives have been reduced to feelings of meaninglessness, randomness, and alienation. . . .<sup>49</sup>

In contrast, many students came into “Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogies” with oppositional voices already formulated within various antiracism and other movements. These movements had not necessarily relied on intellectuals/teachers to interpret their goals and programs to themselves or to others.

Current writing by many feminists working from antiracism and feminist post-structuralist perspectives recognizes that any individual woman’s politicized voice will be partial, multiple, and contradictory.<sup>50</sup> The literature on critical pedagogy also recognizes the possibility that each student will be capable of identifying a multiplicity of authentic voices in her/himself. But it does not confront the ways in which any individual student’s voice is already a “teeth-gritting” and often contradictory intersection of voices constituted by gender, race, class, ability, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or ideology. Nor does it engage with the fact that the particularities of historical context, personal biography, and subjectivities split between the conscious and unconscious will necessarily render each expression of student voice partial and predicated on the absence and marginalization of alternative voices. It is impossible to speak from all voices at



once, or from any one, without the traces of the others being present and interactive. Thus the very term "student voice" is highly problematic. Pluralizing the concept as "voices" implies correction through addition. This loses sight of the contradictory and partial nature of all voices.

In C&I 607, for example, participants expressed much pain, confusion, and difficulty in speaking, because of the ways in which discussions called up their multiple and contradictory social positionings. Women found it difficult to prioritize expressions of racial privilege and oppression when such prioritizing threatened to perpetuate their gender oppression. Among international students, both those who were of color and those who were White found it difficult to join their voices with those of U.S. students of color when it meant a subordination of their oppressions as people living under U.S. imperialist policies and as students for whom English was a second language. Asian-American women found it difficult to join their voices with other students of color when it meant subordinating their specific oppressions as Asian-Americans. I found it difficult to speak as a White woman about gender oppression when I occupied positions of institutional power relative to all students in the class, men and women, but positions of gender oppression relative to students who were White men, and in different terms, relative to students who were men of color.

Finally, the argument that women's speech and voice have not been and should not be constructed primarily for the purpose of communicating women's experiences to men is commonplace within feminist movements. This position takes the purposes of such speech to be survival, expansion of women's own understandings of their oppression and strength, sharing common experiences among women, building solidarity among women, and political strategizing. Many feminists have pointed to the necessity for men to "do their own work" at unlearning sexism and male privilege, rather than looking to women for the answers. I am similarly suspicious of the desire by the mostly White, middle-class men who write the literature on critical pedagogy to elicit "full expression" of student voices. Such a relation between teacher/student becomes voyeuristic when the voice of the pedagogue himself goes unexamined.

Furthermore, the assumption present in the literature that silence in front of a teacher or professor indicates "lost voice," "voicelessness," or lack of social identity from which to act as a social agent betrays deep and unacceptable gender, race, and class biases. It is worth quoting bell hooks at length about the fiction of the silence of subordinated groups:

Within feminist circles silence is often seen as the sexist defined "right speech of womanhood"—the sign of woman's submission to patriarchal authority. This emphasis on woman's silence may be an accurate remembering of what has taken place in the households of women from WASP backgrounds in the United States but in Black communities (and in other diverse ethnic communities) women have not been silent. Their voices can be heard. Certainly for

Black women our struggle has not been to emerge from silence to speech but to change the nature and direction of our speech. To make a speech that compels listeners, one that is heard . . . Dialogue, the sharing of speech and recognition, took place not between mother and child or mother and male authority figure, but with other Black women. I can remember watching, fascinated, as our mother talked with her mother, sisters, and women friends. The intimacy and intensity of their speech—the satisfaction they received from talking to one another, the pleasure, the joy. It was in this world of woman speech, loud talk, angry words, women with tongues sharp, tender sweet tongues, touching our world with their words, that I made speech my birthright—and the right to voice, to authorship, a privilege I would not be denied. It was in that world and because of it that I came to dream of writing, to write.<sup>51</sup>

White women, men and women of color, impoverished people, people with disabilities, gays and lesbians, are not silenced in the sense implied by the literature on critical pedagogy. They are not talking in their authentic voices, or they are declining/refusing to talk at all, to critical educators who have been unable to acknowledge the presence of knowledges that are challenging and most likely inaccessible to their own social positions. What they/we say, to whom, in what context, depending on the energy they/we have for the struggle on a particular day, is the result of conscious and unconscious assessments of the power relations and safety of the situation.

As I understand it at the moment, what got said—and how—in our class was the product of highly complex strategizing for the visibility that speech gives without giving up the safety of silence. More than that, it was a highly complex negotiation of the politics of knowing and being known. Things were left unsaid, or they were encoded, on the basis of speakers' conscious and unconscious assessments of the risks and costs of disclosing their understandings of themselves and of others. To what extent had students occupying socially constructed positions of privilege at a particular moment risked being known by students occupying socially constructed positions of subordination at the same moment? To what extent had students in those positions of privilege relinquished the security and privilege of being the knower?<sup>52</sup>

As long as the literature on critical pedagogy fails to come to grips with issues of trust, risk, and the operations of fear and desire around such issues of identity and politics in the classroom, their rationalistic tools will continue to fail to loosen deep-seated, self-interested investments in unjust relations of, for example, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.<sup>53</sup> These investments are shared by both teachers and students, yet the literature on critical pedagogy has ignored its own implications for the young, White, Christian, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied man/pedagogue that it assumes. Against such ignoring Mohanty argues that to desire to ignore is not cognitive, but performative. It is the incapacity or refusal "to acknowledge one's own implication in the information."<sup>54</sup> [Learning] involves a necessary implication in the radical alterity of the un-

known, in the desire(s) not to know, in the process of this unresolvable dialectic."<sup>55</sup>

**From dialogue to working together across differences**

Because student voice has been defined as "the measures by which students and teacher participate in dialogue,"<sup>56</sup> the foregoing critique has serious consequences for the concept of "dialogue" as it has been articulated in the literature on critical pedagogy. Dialogue has been defined as a fundamental imperative of critical pedagogy and the basis of the democratic education that insures a democratic state. Through dialogue, a classroom can be made in to a public sphere, a locus of citizenship in which:

Students and teachers can engage in a process of deliberation and discussion aimed at advancing the public welfare in accordance with fundamental moral judgments and principles. . . . School and classroom practices should, in some manner, be organized around forms of learning which serve to prepare students for responsible roles as transformative intellectuals, as community members, and as critically active citizens outside of schools.<sup>57</sup>

Dialogue is offered as a pedagogical strategy for constructing these learning conditions, and consists of ground rules for classroom interaction using language. These rules include the assumptions that all members have equal opportunity to speak, all members respect other members' rights to speak and feel safe to speak, and all ideas are tolerated and subjected to rational critical assessment against fundamental judgments and moral principles. According to Henry Giroux, in order for dialogue to be possible, classroom participants must exhibit "trust, sharing, and commitment to improving the quality of human life." While the specific form and means of social change and organization are open to debate, there must be agreement around the goals of dialogue: "All voices and their differences become unified both in their efforts to identify and recall moments of human suffering and in their attempts to overcome conditions that perpetuate such suffering."<sup>58</sup>

However, for the reasons outlined above—the students' and professor's asymmetrical positions of difference and privilege—dialogue in this sense was both impossible and undesirable in C&I 607. In fact, the unity of efforts and values unproblematically assumed by Giroux was not only impossible but potentially repressive as well. Giroux's formula for dialogue requires and assumes a classroom of participants unified on the side of the subordinated against the subordinators, sharing and trusting in an "us-ness" against "them-ness." This formula fails to confront dynamics of subordination present among classroom participants, and within classroom participants, in the form of multiple and contradictory subject positions. Such a conception of dialogue invokes the "all too easy polemic that opposes victims to perpetrators," in which a condition for collective

purpose among "victims" is the desire for home, for synchrony, for sameness.<sup>59</sup> Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty call for creating new forms of collective struggle that do not depend upon the repressions and violence needed by "dialogue" based on and enforcing a harmony of interests. They envision collective struggle that starts from an acknowledgment that "unity"—interpersonal, personal, and political—is necessarily fragmentary, unstable, not given, but chosen and struggled for—but not on the basis of "sameness."<sup>60</sup>

But despite early rejections of fundamental tenets of dialogue, including the usually unquestioned emancipatory potentials of rational deliberation and "unity," we remained in the grip of other repressive fictions of classroom dialogue for most of the semester. I expected that we would be able to ensure all members a safe place to speak, equal opportunity to speak, and equal power in influencing decisionmaking—and as a result, it would become clear what had to be done and why. It was only at the end of the semester that I and the students recognized that we had given this myth the power to divert our attention and classroom practices away from what we needed to be doing. Acting as if our classroom were a safe space in which democratic dialogue was possible and happening did not make it so. If we were to respond to our context and the social identities of the people in our classroom in ways that did not reproduce the oppressive formations we were trying to work against, we needed classroom practices that confronted the power dynamics inside and outside of our classroom that made democratic dialogue impossible. During the last two weeks of the semester, we reflected in class on our group's process—how we spoke to and/or silenced each other across our differences, how we divided labor, made decisions, and treated each other as visible and/or invisible. As students had been doing with each other all along, I began to have informal conversations with one or two students at a time who were extremely committed on personal, political, and academic levels to breaking through the barriers we had encountered and understanding what had happened during the semester. These reflections and discussions led me to the following conclusions.

Our classroom was not, in fact, a safe space for students to speak out or talk back about their experiences of oppression both inside and outside of the classroom. In our class, these included experiences of being gay, lesbian, fat, women of color working with men of color, white women working with men of color, and men of color working with White women and men.<sup>61</sup> Things were not being said for a number of reasons. These included fear of being misunderstood and/or disclosing too much and becoming too vulnerable; memories of bad experiences in other contexts of speaking out; resentment that other oppressions (sexism, heterosexism, fat oppression, classism, anti-Semitism) were being marginalized in the name of addressing racism—and guilt for feeling such resentment; confusion about levels of trust and commitment surrounding those who were allies to another group's struggles; resentment by some students of color for feeling that they were expected to disclose "more" and once again take the burden of doing

the pedagogic work of educating White students/professor about the consequences of White middle-class privilege; and resentment by White students for feeling that they had to prove they were not the enemy.

Dialogue in its conventional sense is impossible in the culture at large, because at this historical moment, power relations between raced, classed, and gendered students and teachers are unjust. The injustice of these relations, and the way in which those injunctions distort communication, cannot be overcome in a classroom, no matter how committed the teacher and students are to "overcoming conditions that perpetuate suffering." Conventional notions of dialogue and democracy assume rationalized, individualized subjects capable of agreeing on universalizable "fundamental moral principles" and "quality of human life" that become self-evident when subjects cease to be self-interested and particularistic about group rights. Yet social agents are not capable of being fully rational and disinterested; and they are subjects split between the conscious and unconscious and among multiple social positionings. Fundamental moral and political principles are not absolute and universalizable, waiting to be discovered by the disinterested researcher/teacher; they are "established intersubjectively by subjects capable of interpretation and reflection."<sup>62</sup> Educational researchers attempting to construct meaningful discourses about the politics of classroom practices must begin to theorize the consequences for education of the ways knowledge, power and desire are mutually implicated in each other's formations and deployments.

By the end of the semester, participants in the class agreed that commitment to rational discussion about racism in a classroom setting was not enough to make that setting a safe place for speaking out and talking back. We agreed that a safer space required high levels of trust and personal commitment to individuals in the class, gained in part through social interactions outside of class—potlucks, field trips, participation in rallies and other gatherings. Opportunities to know the motivations, histories, and personal stakes of individuals in the class should have been planned early in the semester.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, White students/professor should have shared the burden of educating themselves about the consequences of their White-skin privilege, and to facilitate this, the curriculum should have included significant amounts of literature, films, and videos by people of color and White people against racism—so that the students of color involved in the class would not always be looked to as "experts" in racism or the situation on the campus.

Because all voices within the classroom are not and cannot carry equal legitimacy, safety, and power in dialogue at this historical moment, there are times when the inequalities must be named and addressed by constructing alternative ground rules for communication. By the end of the semester, participants in C&I 607 had begun to recognize that some social groups represented in the class had had consistently more speaking time than others. Women, international students for whom English was a second language, and mixed groups sharing ideological and political languages and perspectives began to have very significant interac-

tions outside of class. Informal, overlapping affinity groups formed and met unofficially for the purpose of articulating and refining positions based on shared oppressions, ideological analyses, or interests. They shared grievances about the dynamics of the larger groups and performed reality checks for each other. Because they were "unofficial" groups constituted on the spot in response to specific needs or simply as a result of casual encounters outside of the classroom, alliances could be shaped and reshaped as strategies in context.

The fact that affinity groups did form within the larger group should not be seen as a failure to construct a unity of voices and goals—a possibility unproblematically assumed and worked for in critical pedagogy. Rather, affinity groups were necessary for working against the way current historical configurations of oppressions were reproduced in the class. They provided some participants with safer home bases from which they gained support, important understandings, and a language for entering the larger classroom interactions each week. Once we acknowledged the existence, necessity, and value of these affinity groups, we began to see our task not as one of building democratic dialogue between free and equal individuals, but of building a coalition among the multiple, shifting, intersecting, and sometimes contradictory groups carrying unequal weights of legitimacy within the culture and the classroom. Halfway through the semester, students renamed the class Coalition 607.

At the end of the semester, we began to suspect that it would have been appropriate for the large group to experiment with forms of communication other than dialogue. These could have brought the existence and results of affinity group interactions to bear more directly on the larger group's understandings and practices. For example, it seemed that we needed times when one affinity group (women of color, women and men of color, feminists, White men against masculinist culture, White women, gays, lesbians) could "speak out" and "talk back" about their experience of Coalition 607's group process or their experience of racial, gender, or other injustice on the campus, while the rest of the class listened without interruption. This would have acknowledged that we were not interacting in class dialogue solely as individuals, but as members of larger social groups, with whom we shared common and also differing experiences of oppression, a language for naming, fighting, and surviving that oppression, and a shared sensibility and style. The differences among the affinity groups that composed the class made communication within the class a form of cross-cultural or cross-subcultural exchange, rather than the free, rational, democratic exchange between equal individuals implied in critical pedagogy literature.

But I want to emphasize that this does not mean that discourses of students of difference were taken up and supported unconditionally by themselves and their allies. There had been intense consciousness-raising on the UW-Madison campus between African-American students, Asian-American students, Latino/a, Chicano/a students, Native American students, the men and women of color, about the different forms racism had taken across the campus, depending on eth-

nicity and gender—and how no single group's analysis could be adopted to cover all other students of color.

Early in the semester, it became clear to some in Coalition 607 that some of the anti-racism discourses heard on campus were structured by highly problematic gender politics, and White women and women of color could not adopt those discourses as their own without undercutting their own struggles against sexism on campus and in their communities. We began to define coalition-building not only in terms of what we shared—a commitment to work against racism—but in terms of what we did not share—gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and other differences. These positions gave us different stakes in, experiences of, and perspectives on, racism. These differences meant that each strategy we considered for fighting racism on campus had to be interrogated for the implications it held for struggles against sexism, ableism, elitism, fat oppression, and so forth.

We agreed to a final arbiter of the acceptability of demands/narratives by students of color and our class's actions on campus. Proposals would be judged in light of our answers to this question: To what extent do our political strategies and alternative narratives about social difference succeed in alleviating campus racism, while at the same time managing *not to undercut* the efforts of the other social groups to win self-definition?

**A pedagogy of the unknowable**

Like the individual students themselves, each affinity group possessed only partial narratives of its oppressions—partial, in that they were self-interested and predicated on the exclusion of the voices of others—and also in the sense that the meaning of an individual's or group's experience is never self-evident or complete. No one affinity group could ever "know" the experiences and knowledges of another, nor the social positions that were not their own. Nor can social subjects who are split between the conscious and unconscious, and cut across by multiple, intersecting, and contradictory subject positions, ever fully "know" their own experiences. As a whole, Coalition 607 could never know with certainty whether the actions it planned to take on campus would undercut the struggle of other social groups, or even that of its own affinity groups. Realizing that there are partial narratives that some social groups or cultures have and others can never know, but that are necessary to human survival, is a condition to embrace and use as an opportunity to build a kind of social and educational interdependency that recognizes differences as "different strengths" and as "forces for change." In the words of Audre Lorde, "Difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening."<sup>64</sup>

In the end, Coalition 607 participants made an initial gesture toward acting out the implications of the unknowable and the social, educational, and political in-

terdependency that it necessitates. The educational interventions against racism that we carried out on campus were put forth as Coalition 607's statement about its members' provisional, partial understanding of racial oppression on the UW-Madison campus at the moment of its actions. These statements were not offered with the invitation for audiences to participate in dialogue, but as a speaking out from semiotic spaces temporarily and problematically controlled by Coalition 607's students. First, we took actions on campus by interrupting business-as-usual (that is, social relations of racism, sexism, classism, Eurocentrism as usual) in the public spaces of the library mall and administrative offices. (The mall is a frequent site for campus protests, rallies, and graffiti, and was chosen for this reason.) These interruptions consisted of three events.

At noon on April 28, 1988, a street theater performance on the library mall, "Meet on the Street," presented an ironic history of university attempts to coopt and defuse the demands of students of color from the 1950s through the 1980s. The affinity group that produced this event invited members of the university and Madison communities who were not in the class to participate. That night, after dark, "Scrawl on the Mall" used overhead and movie projectors to project towering images, text, and spontaneously written "graffiti" on the white walls of the main campus library. Class members and passersby drew and wrote on transparencies for the purpose of deconstructing, defacing, and transforming racist discourses and giving voice to perspectives and demands of students of color and White students against racism. For example, students projected onto the library a page from the administration's official response to the Minority Student Coalition demands, and "edited" it to reveal how it failed to meet those demands. Throughout the semester, a third group of students interrupted business-as-usual in the offices of the student newspaper and university administrators by writing articles and holding interviews that challenged the university's and the newspaper's response to the demands by students of color.

These three events disrupted power relations, however temporarily, within the contexts in which they occurred. Students of color and White students against racism opened up semiotic space for discourses normally marginalized and silenced within the everyday uses of the library mall and administrators' offices. They appropriated means of discourse production—overhead projectors, microphones, language, images, newspaper articles—and controlled, however problematically, the terms in which students of color and racism on campus would be defined and represented within the specific times and spaces of the events. They made available to other members of the university community, with unpredictable and uncontrollable effects, discourses of antiracism that might otherwise have remained unavailable, distorted, more easily dismissed, or seemingly irrelevant. Thus students engaged in the political work of changing material conditions within a public space, allowing them to make visible and assert the legitimacy of their own definitions, in their own terms, of racism and anti-racism on the UW campus.

Each of the three actions was defined by different affinity groups according to different priorities, languages of understanding and analysis, and levels of commitment with various kinds of public action. They were "unified" through their activity of mutual critique, support, and participation, as each group worked through, as much as possible, ways in which the others supported or undercut its own understandings and objectives. Each affinity group brought its proposal for action to the whole class, to assess the ways that action might affect the other groups' self-definitions, priorities, and plans for action. Each group asked the others for various types of labor and support to implement its proposed action. During these planning discussions, we concluded that the results of our interventions would be unpredictable and uncontrollable, and dependent upon the subject positions and changing historical contexts of our audiences on the mall and in administrative offices. Ultimately, our interventions and the process by which we arrived at them had to make sense—both rationally and emotionally—to us, however problematically we understand "making sense" to be a political action. Our actions had to make sense as interested interpretations and constant rewritings of ourselves in relation to shifting interpersonal and political contexts. Our interpretations had to be based on attention to history, to concrete experiences of oppression, and to subjugated knowledges.<sup>65</sup>

**Conclusion**

For me, what has become more frightening than the unknown or unknowable, are social, political, and educational projects that predicate and legitimate their actions on the kind of knowing that underlies current definitions of critical pedagogy. In this sense, current understandings and uses of "critical," "empowerment," "student voice," and "dialogue" are only surface manifestations of deeper contradictions involving pedagogies, both traditional and critical. The kind of knowing I am referring to is that in which objects, nature, and Others are seen to be known or ultimately knowable, in the sense of being "defined, delineated, captured, understood, explained, and diagnosed" at a level of determination never accorded to the "knower" herself or himself.<sup>66</sup>

The experience of Coalition 607 has left me wanting to think through the implications of confronting unknowability. What would it mean to recognize not only that a multiplicity of knowledges are present in the classroom as a result of the way difference has been used to structure social relations inside and outside the classroom, but that these knowledges are contradictory, partial, and irreducible? They cannot be made to "make sense"—they cannot be known, in terms of the single master discourse of an educational project's curriculum or theoretical framework—even that of critical pedagogy. What kinds of classroom practice are made possible and impossible when one affinity group within the class has lived out and arrived at a currently useful "knowledge" about a particular oppressive formation on campus, but the professor and some of the other students can

never know or understand that knowledge in the same way? What practice is called for when even the combination of all partial knowledges in a classroom results in yet another partial knowing, defined by structuring absences that mark the "terror and loathing of any difference?"<sup>67</sup> What kinds of interdependencies between groups and individuals inside and outside of the classroom would recognize that every social, political, or educational project the class takes up locally will already, at the moment of its definition, lack knowledges necessary to answer broader questions of human survival and social justice? What kind of educational project could redefine "knowing" so that it no longer describes the activities of those in power "who started to speak, to speak alone and for everyone else, on behalf of everyone else?"<sup>68</sup> What kind of educational project would redefine the silence of the unknowable, freeing it from "the male-defined context of Absence, Lack, and Fear," and make of that silence "a language of its own" that changes the nature and direction of speech itself?<sup>69</sup>

Whatever form it takes in the various, changing, locally specific instances of classroom practices, I understand a classroom practice of the unknowable right now to be one that would support students/professor in the never-ending "moving about" Trinh Minh-Ha describes:

After all, she is this Inappropriate/Other who moves about with always at least two/four gestures: that of affirming "I am like you" while pointing insistently to the difference; and that of reminding "I am different" while unsettling every definition of otherness arrived at.<sup>70</sup>

In relation to education, I see this moving about as a strategy that affirms "you know me/I know you" while pointing insistently to the interested partialness of those knowings; and constantly reminding us that "you can't know me/I can't know you" while unsettling every definition of knowing arrived at. Classroom practices that facilitate such moving about would support the kind of contextually, politically and historically situated identity politics called for by Alcoff, hooks, and others.<sup>71</sup> That is, one in which "identity" is seen as "nonessentialized and emergent from a historical experience"<sup>72</sup> as a necessary stage in a process, a starting point—not an ending point. Identity in this sense becomes a vehicle for multiplying and making more complex the subject positions possible, visible, and legitimate at any given historical moment, requiring disruptive changes in the way social technologies of gender, race, ability, and so on define Otherness and use it as a vehicle for subordination.

Gayatri Spivak calls the search for a coherent narrative "counterproductive" and asserts that what is needed is "persistent critique"<sup>73</sup> of received narratives and a priori lines of attack. Similarly, unlike post-liberal or post-Marxist movements predicated on repressive unities, Minh-ha's "moving about" refuses to reduce profoundly heterogeneous networks of power/desire/interest to any one a priori, coherent narrative. It refuses to know and resist oppression from any a priori line of attack, such as race, class, or gender solidarity.

But participants in Coalition 607 did not simply unsettle every definition of knowing, assert the absence of a priori solidarities, or replace political action (in the sense defined at the beginning of the chapter) with textual critique. Rather, we struggled, as S. P. Mohanty would have us do, to "develop a sense of the profound *contextuality* of meanings [and oppressive knowledges] in their play and their ideological effects."<sup>74</sup>

Our classroom was the site of dispersed, shifting, and contradictory contexts of knowing, that coalesced differently in different moments of student/professor speech, action, and emotion. This situation meant that individuals and affinity groups constantly had to change strategies and priorities of resistance against oppressive ways of knowing and being known. The antagonist became power itself as it was deployed within our classroom—oppressive ways of knowing and oppressive knowledges.

This position, informed by post-structuralism and feminism, lets no one off the hook, including critical pedagogues. We cannot act as if our membership in or alliance with an oppressed group exempts us from the need to confront the "grey areas which we all have in us."<sup>75</sup> As Minh-ha reminds us, "There are no social positions exempt from becoming oppressive to others. . . . any group—any position—can move into the oppressor role,"<sup>76</sup> depending upon specific historical contexts and situations. Or as Mary Gentile puts it, "everyone is someone else's 'Other'."<sup>77</sup>

Various groups struggling for self-definition in the United States have identified the mythical norm deployed for the purpose of setting the standard of humanness against which Others are defined and assigned privilege and limitations. At this moment in history, that norm is young, White, heterosexual, Christian, able-bodied, thin, middle-class, English-speaking, and male. Yet, as Gentile argues no individual embodies, in the essentialist sense, this mythical norm.<sup>78</sup> Even individuals who most closely approximate it experience a dissonance. As someone who embodies some but not all of the current mythical norm's socially constructed characteristics, my colleague Albert Selvin wrote in response to the first draft of this article: "I too have to fight to differentiate myself from a position defined for me—whose terms are imposed on me—which limits and can destroy me—which does destroy many White men or turns them into helpless agents. . . . I as a White man/boy was not allowed—by my family, by society—to be anything *but* cut off from the earth and the body. That condition is *not* was not an essential component or implication of my maleness."<sup>79</sup>

To assert multiple perspectives in this way is not to draw attention away from the distinctive realities and effects of the oppression of any particular group. It is not to excuse or relativize oppression by simply claiming, "we are all oppressed." Rather, it is to clarify oppression by preventing "oppressive simplifications,"<sup>80</sup> and insisting that it be understood and struggled against contextually. For example, the politics of appearance in relation to the mythical norm played a major role in our classroom. Upon first sight, group members tended to draw alliances

and assume shared commitments because of the social positions we presumed others to occupy (radical, heterosexual, anti-racist person of color, and so on). But not only were these assumptions often wrong, at times they denied ideological and personal commitments to various struggles by people who appeared outwardly to fit the mythical norm.

The terms in which I can and will assert and unsettle "difference" and unlearn my positions of privilege in future classroom practices are wholly dependent on the Others/others whose presence—with their concrete experiences of privileges and oppressions, and subjugated or oppressive knowledges—I am responding to and acting with in any given classroom. My moving about between the positions of privileged speaking subject and Inappropriate/d Other cannot be predicted, prescribed, or understood beforehand by any theoretical framework or methodological practice. It is in this sense that a practice grounded in the unknowable is profoundly contextual (historical) and interdependent (social). This reformulation of pedagogy and knowledge removes the critical pedagogue from two key discursive positions *s/he* has constructed for her/himself in the literature—namely, origin of what can be known and origin of what should be done. What remains for me is the challenge of constructing classroom practices that engage with the discursive and material spaces that such a removal opens up. I am trying to unsettle received definitions of pedagogy by multiplying the ways in which I am able to act on and in the university both as the inappropriate/d Other and as the privileged speaking/making subject trying to unlearn that privilege.

This semester, in follow-up to Coalition 607, Curriculum and Instruction 800 is planning, producing, and "making sense" of a day-long film and video event combatting oppressive knowledges and ways of knowing in the curriculum, pedagogy, and everyday life at UW-Madison. This time, we are not focusing on any one formation (race or gender or ableism). Rather, we are engaging with each other and working against oppressive social formations on campus in ways that try to "find a commonality in the experience of difference without compromising its distinctive realities and effects."<sup>81</sup>

Right now, the classroom practice that seems most capable of accomplishing this is one that facilitates a kind of communication across differences that is best represented by this statement: "If you can talk to me in ways that show you understand that your knowledge of me, the world, and 'the Right thing to do' will always be partial, interested, and potentially oppressive to others, and if I can do the same, then we can work together on shaping and reshaping alliances for constructing circumstances in which students of difference can thrive."

This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the Tenth Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, Bergamo Conference Center, Dayton, Ohio, October 26–29, 1988. It was part of a symposium entitled "Reframing the Empirical 'I/Eye': Feminist, Neo-Marxist, and Post-Structuralist Challenges to Research in Education."

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riculum and instruction, UW-Madison, for her insights and hours of conversations about the meanings of C&I 607. They have formed the backbone of this chapter.

#### Notes

1. By "critique," I do not mean a systematic analysis of the specific articles or individual authors' positions that make up this literature, for the purpose of articulating a "theory" of critical pedagogy capable of being evaluated for its internal consistency, elegance, powers of prediction, and so on. Rather, I have chosen to ground the following critique in my interpretation of my experiences in C&I 607. That is, I have attempted to place key discourses in the literature on critical pedagogy in relation to my interpretation of my experience in C&I 607—by asking which interpretations and "sense making" those discourses facilitate, which do they silence and marginalize, and what interests do they appear to serve.
2. By "the literature on critical pedagogy," I mean those articles in major educational journals and special editions devoted to critical pedagogy. For the purpose of this article, I systematically reviewed more than thirty articles appearing in journals such as *Harvard Educational Review*, *Curriculum Inquiry*, *Educational Theory*, *Teachers College Record*, *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, and *Journal of Curriculum Studies* between 1984 and 1988. The purpose of this review was to identify key and repeated claims, assumptions, goals, and pedagogical practices that currently set the terms of debate within this literature. "Critical pedagogy" should not be confused with "feminist pedagogy," which constitutes a separate body of literature with its own goals and assumptions.
3. Some of the more representative writings on this point can be found in Michelle Fine, "Silencing in the public schools," *Language Arts*, 64 (1987), 157-174; Henry Giroux, "Radical pedagogy and the politics of student voice," *Interchange*, 17 (1986), 48-69; and Roger Simon, "Empowerment as a pedagogy of possibility," *Language Arts*, 64 (1987), 370-382.
4. See Henry A. Giroux and Peter McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement: The case for democratic schooling," *Harvard Educational Review*, 56 (1986), 213-238; and Ira Shor and Paulo Freire, "What is the 'dialogical method' of teaching?" *Journal of Education*, 169 (1987), 11-31.
5. Shor and Freire, "What is the 'Dialogical Method'?" and Henry A. Giroux, "Literacy and the pedagogy of voice and political empowerment," *Educational Theory*, 38 (1988), 61-75.
6. Daniel P. Liston and Kenneth M. Zeichner, "Critical pedagogy and teacher education," *Journal of Education*, 169 (1987), 117-137.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
9. Giroux, "Literacy and the pedagogy of voice," p. 75.
10. Liston and Zeichner, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
11. Valerie Walkerdine, "On the regulation of speaking and silence: Subjectivity, class, and gender in contemporary schooling," in Carolyn Steedman, Cathy Urwin, and Valerie Walkerdine (Eds.), *Language gender and childhood*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985) p. 205.
12. Barbara Christian, "The race for theory," *Cultural Critique*, 6 (Spring, 1987), 51-63.
13. By the end of the semester, many of us began to understand ourselves as inhabiting intersections of multiple, contradictory, overlapping social positions not reducible either to race, or class, or gender, and so on. Depending upon the moment and the context, the degree to which any one of us "differs" from the mythical norm (see conclusion) varies along multiple axes, and so do

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the consequences. I began using the terms "students of difference," "professor of difference," to refer to social positionings in relation to the mythical norm (based on ability, size, color, sexual preference, gender, ethnicity, and so on). This reminded us of the necessity to reconstruct how, within specific situations, particular socially constructed differences from the mythical norm (such as color) get taken up as vehicles for institutions such as the university to act out and legitimate oppressive formations of power. This enabled us to open up our analysis of racism on campus for the purpose of tracing its relations to institutional sexism, ableism, elitism, anti-Semitism, and other oppressive formations.

14. Giroux and McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement," p. 229.
15. Stanley Aronowitz, "Postmodernism and Politics," *Social Text*, 18 (Winter, 1987/1988), p. 99-115.
16. Liston and Zeichner, "Critical Pedagogy," p. 120.
17. For an excellent theoretical discussion and demonstration of the explanatory power of this approach, see Julian Henriques, Wendy Hollway, Cathy Urwin, Couze Venn, and Valerie Walkerdine, *Changing the subject: Psychology, social regulation, and subjectivity* (New York: Methuen, 1984); Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Spinster/Aunt Lute, 1987); Theresa de Lauretis, ed., *Feminist studies/critical studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Hal Foster, ed., *Discussions in contemporary culture*, (Seattle: Bay Press, 1987); Chris Weedon, *Feminist practice and poststructuralist theory* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
18. Weedon, *Feminist practice and poststructuralist theory*, pp. 40-41.
19. Aronowitz, "Postmodernism and Politics," p. 103.
20. Audre Lorde, *Sister outsider* (New York: The Crossing Press, 1984), p. 112.
21. Christian, "The race for theory," p. 63.
22. For a discussion of the thesis of the "epistemic privilege of the oppressed," see Uma Narayan, "Working together across difference: Some considerations on emotions and political practice," *Hypatia*, 3 (Summer, 1988), 31-47.
23. For an excellent discussion of the relation of the concept of "experience" to feminism, essentialism, and political action, see Linda Alcof, "Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism: The identity crisis in feminist theory," *Signs*, 13(Spring, 1988), 405-437.
24. Narayan, "Working together across difference," pp. 31-47.
25. This subtitle is borrowed from Maria C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman's critique of imperialistic, ethnocentric, and disrespectful tendencies in White feminists' theorizing about women's oppression, "Have we got a theory for you! Feminist theory, cultural imperialism, and the demand for 'the woman's voice,'" *Women's Studies International Forum* (1983), 573-581.
26. Nicholas C. Burbules, "A theory of power in education," *Educational Theory*, 36 (Spring, 1986), 95-114; Giroux and McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement," pp. 224-227.
27. Liston and Zeichner, "Critical pedagogy and teacher education," p. 120.
28. Shor and Freire, "What is the 'dialogical method' of teaching?," p. 14.
29. Giroux, "Radical pedagogy," p. 64.
30. Giroux, "Radical pedagogy," p. 66.
31. Shor and Freire, "What is the 'dialogical method' of teaching?," p. 22.
32. Burbules, "A theory of power in education?"; and Giroux and McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement," pp. 224-227.
33. Shor and Freire, "What is the 'dialogical method' of teaching?," p. 23.

34. Burbules, "A theory of power in education," p. 108.
35. Giroux and McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement," p. 226.
36. Walter C. Parker, "Justice, social studies, and the subjectivity/structure problem," *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 14 (Fall, 1986), p. 227.
37. Simon, "Empowerment as a pedagogy of possibility," p. 372.
38. Giroux, "Literacy and the pedagogy of voice," pp. 68-69.
39. Giroux and McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement," p. 225.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
41. Shor and Freire, "What is the 'dialogical method' of teaching?" p. 30; Liston and Zeichner, "Critical pedagogy," p. 122.
42. Simon, "Empowerment as a pedagogy of possibility," p. 380.
43. Simon, "Empowerment as a pedagogy of possibility," p. 375.
44. Aronowitz, "Postmodernism and politics," p. 111.
45. Alcoff, "Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism," p. 420.
46. Simon, "Empowerment as a pedagogy of possibility," p. 372.
47. bell hooks, "Talking back," *Discourse*, 8 (Fall/Winter, 1986/1987), p. 123-128.
48. bell hooks, "Pedagogy and Political Commitment: A Comment" in *Talking back: Thinking feminist, thinking Black* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), pp. 98-104.
49. Peter McLaren, *Life in schools*, (New York: Longman, 1989), p. 18.
50. Alcoff, "Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism"; Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera, de la Loretis, Feminist studies' critical studies*; Hooks, *Talking back*; Trinh T. Minh-ha, *Woman, native, Other* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Weedon, *Feminist practice and poststructuralist theory*.
51. hooks, *Talking back*, p. 124.
52. Susan Hardy Aiken, Karen Anderson, Myra Dinerstein, Judy Lensink and Patricia MacCorquodale, "Trying transformations: Curriculum integration and the problem of resistance," *Signs*, 12 (Winter 1987), 225-275.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
54. Shoshana Felman, "Psychoanalysis and education: Teaching terminable and interminable," *Yale French Studies*, 63 (1982), 21-44.
55. S. P. Mohanty, "Radical teaching, radical theory: The ambiguous politics of meaning," in *Theory in the classroom*, ed. Cary Nelson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 155.
56. Giroux & McLaren, "Teacher education and the politics of engagement," p. 235.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
58. Giroux "Literacy and the pedagogy of voice," p. 72.
59. Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Feminist politics: What's home got to do with it?" in *Feminist Studies/Critical studies*, ed. Theresa de Lauretis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 208-209.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
61. Discussions with students after the semester ended and comments from students and colleagues on the draft of this article have led me to realize the extent to which some international students and Jews in the class felt unable or not safe to speak about experiences of oppression inside and outside of the class related to those identities. Anti-Semitism, economic and cultural imperialism, and the rituals of exclusion of international students on campus were rarely named and
- never fully elaborated in the class. The classroom practices that reproduced these particular oppressive silences in C&I 607 must be made the focus of sustained critique in the follow-up course, C&I 800. "Race, Class, Gender, and the Construction of Knowledge in Educational Media."
62. John W. Murphy, "Computerization, postmodern epistemology, and reading the postmodern era," *Educational Theory*, 38 (Spring, 1988), 175-182.
63. Lugones and Spelman (1983) assert that the only acceptable motivation for following Others into their worlds is friendship. Self-interest is not enough, because "the task at hand for you is one of extraordinary difficulty. It requires that you be willing to devote a great part of your life to it and that you be willing to suffer alienation and self-disruption . . . whatever the benefits to you may accrue from such a journey, they cannot be concrete enough for you at this time and they are not worth your while" ("Have we got a theory for you," p. 576). Theoretical or political "obligation" is inappropriate, because it puts White/Anglos "in a morally self-righteous position" and makes people of color vehicles of redemption for those in power (p. 581). Friendship, as an appropriate and acceptable "condition" under which people become allies in struggles that are not their own, names my own experience and has been met with enthusiasm by students.
64. Lorde, *Sister outsider*, p. 112.
65. Martin & Mohanty, "Feminist politics," p. 210.
66. Alcoff, "Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism," p. 406.
67. Lorde, *Sister outsider*, p. 113.
68. Trinh T. Minh-ha, "Introduction," *Discourse*, 8 (Fall/Winter, 1986/1987), p. 7.
69. Minh-ha, "Introduction," p. 8.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
71. Alcoff, "Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism"; bell hooks, "The politics of radical black subjectivity," *Zeta Magazine* (April, 1989), pp. 405-436.
72. hooks, "The politics of radical black subjectivity," p. 54.
73. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 272.
74. S. P. Mohanty, "Radical teaching, radical theory," p. 169.
75. Minh-ha, "Introduction," p. 6.
76. A. Selvin, personal correspondence (October 24, 1988).
77. Mary Gentile, *Film feminisms: Theory and practice*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 7.
78. Gentile, *Film feminisms*, p. 7.
79. A. Selvin, personal correspondence.
80. Gentile, *Film feminisms*, p. 7.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 7.