Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships

Anke Kessler, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2355, Revised Version: January 2000


Keywords: Information Structure, Hierarchies,

JEL-Classification: D82, D83

Abstract

This paper studies an agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor the agent's productive effort. We consider several monitoring technologies which differ in the quantity (frequency) and the quality (accuracy) of the information they deliver. We show that the frequency of monitoring is irrelevant if the supervisor is honest or if the supervisor colludes with the agent but monitoring evidence can only be concealed and not forged. In either case, a first-best can be achieved if monitoring is sufficiently precise even though unbounded punishments are not feasible. Only if monitoring evidence can be falsified, the principal benefits

both from the frequency and the accuracy of the supervisor's observations. The findings therefore indicate that employee should opt for accurate rather than frequent

checks on their employees under a wide range of circumstances.


kessler@wipol.uni-bonn.de

Copyright © 2000 Anke Kessler