News and updates from the Department of Philosophy at SFU

Winter weather, heavy snow and campus closure came and went during February. Despite the season, SFU profs were busy beyond the classroom.

Delivered

Grad Chair Holly Andersen gave the Balter Distinguished Lecture, "The Nonconservation of causation as a conserved quantity" at UNC Chapel Hill at the beginning of February.

Abstract: This talk lays out a counterintuitive consequence of the causal nexus of Salmon understood in terms of transfer of conserved quantities: even though the causation is comprised of transferred or propagated conserved quantities, causation is not itself conserved. I elaborate and extend Salmon’s graphical representation of the nexus for modeling singular causation, and then show how a peculiar (1998) diagram has far-reaching implications for causation. X interactions in the causal nexus conserve edges, but Y and lambda interactions do not. As a result, causation as the transfer of conserved quantities is not itself conserved. This allows for the definition of some measures on causation, causal amplification and dampening, in terms of changes in the number of edges entering and exiting nodes. I conclude by showing how this nexus could serve as ‘pixels’ in which patterns can be identified.

Associate professor Endre Begby gave a talk called "Two Perspectives on Non-Ideal Epistemology" at the Central APA at the end of February, as part of a panel on "Echo Chambers and Non-Ideal Epistemology". 

Abstract: Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in “applied” epistemology, especially within social epistemology. Lately, there seems to be a dawning awareness that this development is hampered by certain “idealizations” which carry over from traditional epistemological inquiry. Many hold that we should jettison these idealizations and devote ourselves fully to the pursuit of a “non-ideal epistemology.” This paper develops one perspective on the shape that such a non-ideal epistemology might take. I argue, in particular, that our approach should begin from an acknowledgement of two important dimensions of non-ideality. One is a dimension of endogenous non-ideality: human beings display distinctive kinds of intrinsic cognitive limitations (e.g., limitations on working memory); these limitations force us to work with modes of mental representation which entail marked information loss at various stages of cognitive processing. The other is a dimension of exogenous non-ideality: human beings have only limited access to the total information that bears on their inquiries; quite often, the particular selection of information that we have access to is a result of “interference” from human peers or social institutions. I contend that any viable notion of epistemic normativity must take these dimensions of non-ideality into account. Nonetheless, I also argue that relative to these dimensions of non-ideality, it is important to retain an idealizing perspective: we have a legitimate interest in determining what constitutes optimal epistemic performance given these non-ideal starting points, so that we can set our normative expectations for ordinary epistemic subjects with reference to that ideal. The result is a complex stance on the role of idealizations in epistemological inquiry. I then turn to assessing the usefulness of this stance by seeing what light it can shed on a number of related socio-epistemic phenomena, including the “shared reality bias,” echo chambers, and epistemic partiality in friendship.

In a couple of weeks, he'll be presenting "Philosophical Implications of Homesign" as part of the annual Mind & Language workshop in London.

Abstract: In this talk, I develop some philosophical implications of the phenomenon of homesign, i.e., spontaneous gesture systems devised by deaf children for the purpose of communicating with their non-signing peers. In particular, I point to evidence suggesting that homesign gestures can exhibit a range of semantic properties and ask what this might tell us about the way the semantics-pragmatics distinction is standardly theorized in philosophical discourse. Finally, I use these thoughts to cast critical light on a recent line of experimental research which claims to show that homesigners (and other language-delayed deaf subjects) display long-lingering deficits in theory-of-mind development.

Assistant professor Nic Fillion was involved in two outreach opportunities for teachers, delivering a workshop to Metro Vancouver science teachers at the beginning of March and taking part in a Professional Development day on critical thinking.

Assistant professor Chelsea Rosenthal is presenting at the Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop this month — "What Decision Theory Can't Tell Us About Moral Uncertainty."

Looking Ahead

Dr. Andersen is giving the keynote—"Using Mechanisms and Causation"— for the Biomedical Physiology and Kinesiology Annual Research Day at SFU in April. 

I will discuss the idea of mechanisms and causation from the perspective of philosophy of science. The focus will be on how thinking about mechanisms, especially their structure and organization, can help with experimental research. Abstract conceptual tools like mechanisms facilitate thinking about experimental procedures, including how to set them up, how to draw justified inferences from the results, and in giving effective explanations. I will provide some useful distinctions from philosophical discussions of causation, causal modelling, and mechanisms, to show how these ideas can be used.

She will also be speaking at Pacific APA in April, in a session on Causation and Causal modelling.

Former Grad Chair, Kathleen Akins is an invited speaker at the University of Waterloo in Kitchener Ontario at the annual Brain Day run by the Centre for Theoretical Neuroscience alongside speakers John Maunsell, Micheal Arbib, and Venod Menon. 

Endre Begby is taking part in an APA Public Event coordinated by FASS Associate Dean and Philosophy professor, Lisa Shapiro. The Philosophy of Fake News takes place on Wednesday, April 17th and will focus on "Confronting the Disinformation Age". The event will comprise short popular presentations from Begby, Regina Rini, and Jennifer Nagel, followed by public discussion.