

**Contagion Castration: Lacan's Extimacy and Fanon's Sociogeny on
Anti-Indigenous Environmental Racism and COVID-19¹**

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Introduction: A Sickness of the Land

Recent eruptions of racism signal how we've been inflamed by more than coronavirus. On March 27th, 2020, two Métis, Jake Sansom and Maurice Cardinal, were murdered about 225 kilometers northeast of Amiskwacîwâskahikan (Edmonton) while exercising their Métis hunting rights. Subsequent reports observe that this tragedy was motivated by an anti-Indigenous racism which is increasing because of COVID-19.² Settler-colonialism is contagious.

I want to take this occasion to briefly sketch a theory of environmental racism which draws from Lacan and Fanon in order to advance the following thesis: *settler-colonialism is a sickness of the land*.³ I begin with Lacan's topology of "extimacy" as one avenue by which to spatialize environmental racism. This topology posits that the psychical and affective tenacity of racism is caused by repressed libido which is outwardly projected onto racialized others.⁴ But this view commits a category error whereby racial antagonisms at the level of the social are explained as being caused by frustrations and transgressions of enjoyments at the level of the individual. Consequently, Lacanian theory subtends a pernicious quietism through its eschewal of political revolutions in the street for libidinal ones on the couch.⁵ For this reason, critical theorists of race, such as Hortense Spillers, charge Lacan as having "no eyes for the grammar and politics of power."⁶ I position Fanon's concept "sociogeny" as a re-writing of extimacy that diagnoses environments—not individuals—as carriers of pathology.⁷ While the position I here develop is Lacanian, it should be noted that I only seek to use Lacan as a construct towards an approach that goes beyond his

own arguably quietist politics. In this vein, I understand racism related to COVID-19 as merely the latest outbreak of a much more rapacious sickness that has been infecting the land since at least 1492.

Lacan: Decolonisation Interminable

Extimacy conceptualizes how social antagonism arises from a perennial struggle at the very core of the subject—namely, castration. Lacan conveys this relationship between the inner-and-outer literally by fashioning his neologism “extimacy” from the prefix *ex-* (*extérieur*) and the adjective “intimacy” (*intimate*). Paul Kingsbury explains that “[b]y asserting that the interior is present in the exterior and vice versa, Lacanian theory problematizes, and this is a crucial point—*by rendering topological*—a profusion of binary distinctions between, for example, outside–inside, truth–fiction, man–woman,” etc.⁸ As a topology, extimacy is capacious enough for Lacan to argue that the unconscious is “outside” of the subject;⁹ that the subject is (not merely de-centered but) “ex-centric”;¹⁰ that the gaze is inscribed in the object instead of the subject;¹¹ and that the *objet petit a* is “in you more than you.”¹² Most importantly, though, extimacy attends to how *jouissance* can be experienced as alienating. “From a Lacanian perspective,” Kingsbury rejoins, “‘irrational’ social antagonism takes place not only because of a contrived rejection or reification of an imaginary ‘Other’, but also because the Other is extimate.”¹³ Extimacy situates racial antipathy at the fraught interstices of the Other and *jouissance*: “the real in the symbolic.”¹⁴ Environments of enmity are founded upon *kernel*s—or, in light of our current times, *viruses*—of race-inflected enjoyment-as-suffering.

Racism cannot therefore be disrupted through mere symbolic-shifts or imaginary-recognitions since the cause of such antagonism is real-*jouissance*. In this light, the animus behind the so-called “Chinese Virus” is that the racial other will rob my capacity to enjoy by infecting me with

“his” virus—ergo, the racism as “theft of enjoyment” hypothesis.¹⁵ This hypothesis further asserts that racist hate is fueled by the fantasy that “my” jouissance will be stolen by others who are in possession of their own “foreign” jouissance.¹⁶ In his seminar on *Extimité*, Jacques-Alain Miller reiterates that “racism is founded on what one imagines about the Other’s jouissance; it is hatred of the particular way, of the Other’s own way, of experiencing jouissance.”¹⁷ As I show in more detail elsewhere,¹⁸ the antinomy facing multicultural societies is that greater tolerance for the other results in even greater “confrontation of incompatible modes of jouissance.”¹⁹

Racism is inextricable from society. Tellingly, this is the point Lacan “punctuates” *...ou pire* with—writing that,

...when we come back to the root of the body, if we are to reassert the value of the word brother [...] you should know that what rises up, the ultimate consequences of which have yet to be seen—which takes root in the body, in the *fraternity* of the body—is racism.²⁰

Lacan’s paradoxical thesis is that fraternity causes racism. When aligned with Freud’s anthropological writings, this paradox indicates a connection between racism and castration. Recall that, for Freud, fraternity is the social bond which forms between the brothers of the primal horde after they have murdered their father. As Freud chronicles in *Totem and Taboo*, the brothers killed their father in order to usurp his sexual dominion but, in a tragic twist of fate, found themselves subject to his prohibition instead: “What had up to then been prevented by [the father’s] actual existence was thenceforward prohibited by the sons themselves.”²¹ These archaic brothers found themselves needing to repress their libidos in order to avoid sundering in-fighting. Fraternity is indeed the bedrock of civilization but is itself predicated on a substratum of castration.

Freud’s theory of anti-Semitism conjoins racism and castration. “The castration complex is the deepest unconscious root of anti-Semitism,” he writes, “for even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his penis...and this gives them a right to despise Jews.”²²

Anti-Semitism is actually a fear of castration; a fear that my “brOther” will purloin “that ‘extimate thing’ around which my desire circles.”²³ Thus racism is as old as castration and civilization.

Insofar as racism is endemic to civilization, it seems to me that Freudian-Lacanian theory remains untenable for colonized subjects seeking to challenge the myriad forms of segregation inherent to settler-society. This theorization tacitly concedes that racist entanglements can never be overcome since this would require the obliteration of society as such. In Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s words, “Freud’s pessimistic vision of ‘analysis interminable’ would then refer us to a process of decolonisation interminable.”²⁴ Perhaps this is why Fanon is so vehement that “Freud’s discoveries are of no use to us whatsoever.”²⁵

Fanon: The Sociogenic Epidemic

Sociogeny rectifies the forfeit of “decolonisation interminable” by rewriting the extimacy of racial antagonism as an outer “atmospheric force.”²⁶ Similar to Lacan’s construction of extimacy, Fanon assembles sociogeny from the prefix socio- (*society*) and suffix -geny (from *phylogeny/ontogeny*).

In her articulation of the concept, Romy Opperman explains that,

Sociogeny overcame what were then the dominant tendencies in both psychiatry and psychoanalysis; countering both psychiatry’s focus on organic and inherited constitution (phylogeny) and psychoanalysis’s focus on the individual (ontogeny).²⁷

I follow Opperman in seeing the “dialectic” behind *Black Skin, White Masks* as overcoming binaries of inner and outer, phylogeny and ontogeny.²⁸ Sociogeny asserts that the colonized subject’s alienation can neither be ascribed to physical constituents (phylogenesis) nor individual histories (ontogenesis) but the *social environments* that administer removal from Indigenous forms of life which contest the settler order; and “it is the latter that needs treatment.”²⁹

Fanon’s tenure at Blida provided the ideal setting for him to trial his theory of sociogeny. Assisted by Jacques Anzoulay and François Sanchez, Fanon conducted research on local

Indigenous Peoples while instituting reforms which took the plasticity of Freudian doctrine to its limits. His objective was to test “the connection of the neurological with the psychiatric and of the psychiatric with the social.”³⁰ Fanon’s hypothesis was that the unconscious is not caused by repression but “symbolic determinants,” requiring a heterodox approach that “considers the specificity of the colonial subjective experience.”³¹ His experiments concluded that while “it is true that neurological problems are often at the origin of mental illness [...] psychiatric syndromes in themselves are irreducible to them.”³² Azeen Khan notes that Fanon’s subsequent resignation from Blida “implicate[s] the French colonial system as both the cause of mental breakdown through the systematic dehumanization of Algerians and the site of the impossibility of rehabilitation.”³³ You cannot cure individuals of racism by analyzing their castration complexes because racism is not individual: it is social.

But we would be rash to read Fanon’s departure from Blida as a literal resignation from psychoanalysis. As David Marriott³⁴ and Alice Cherki³⁵ note, sociogeny is not a *rejection* of Freud but a *revision* of his psychoanalysis of the social bond as informed by colonial contexts. In fact, Marriott calls sociogeny an “explicit engagement” with Freud’s *Nachträglichkeit* and—I would add—Lacan’s *après-coup*.³⁶

Freud developed *Nachträglichkeit* while working through his early articles on the “Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” and early collaborations with Josef Breuer on trauma.³⁷ In these nascent formulations, Freud posited that potentially traumatic experiences are deferred and, only later, experienced *as* trauma after being collaterally triggered. Lacan builds on this with his ontology of the real by theorizing that traumatically-initiating events—experienced as innocuous at first—hurl subjects into a prolonged “time of comprehension.”³⁸ Reflecting on this temporal stasis within colonial-contexts, Marriott writes that,

[I]n the colony, narcissistic desire appears to be equivalent to an incorporation that destroys it, a sacrifice that only becomes manifest afterward, that is, *nachträglich*, here registered *in the colonial subject's very untimeliness*, and so unable to recover or represent itself as an egoic presence.³⁹

The Indigenous person remains imprisoned not merely by the settler-occupation of her land but also by how the settler defines the very terms of temporal succession. Because she is Indigenous, that is, *original*, her sensation of time is racialized as a form of temporal aberrance.⁴⁰ The future of her decolonization cannot therefore be “a simple matter of what happened in the past, but involves a more complex articulation of time and repetition.”⁴¹ The real opened up by the event of settler-colonialism ultimately bids the Indigenous-subject to rupture the repetitive stasis hoisted upon her through what Žižek calls the “birth of a new subject.”⁴² Decolonization will therefore follow the temporal logic of the future anterior: *the Indigenous-subject's freedom is one that, through the invention of a new, decolonized subject, “will have been.”* By Marriott's accord, “psychoanalysis gives Fanon a name and a technique for thinking [this] invention,” whose “ultimate meaning describes the equally specific sense of sociogeny.”⁴³

Yet Marriott's rendering of sociogeny remains rooted in the temporal, thereby overshadowing the socio-ecological conditions by which settler-colonialism turns Indigenous persons into aliens on their own land⁴⁴—as what happened with Sansom and Cardinal. For this reason, I propose understanding sociogeny as a rewriting of Lacan's topology of extimacy which, in turn, allows us to contextually shift away from the temporalized logic of settler-*Nachträglichkeit* and towards the spatialized pathology of settler-*occupation*. Like extimacy, sociogeny spatializes racial antagonism. Unlike extimacy though, sociogeny posits that our *environments* themselves are sick—not the individuals who populate them—and that such racist environments structurally maintain genocide. By ignoring the sociogeny of settler-colonialism, we risk allowing the settler-state to

continue its genocidal erasure by environmentally castrating Indigenous forms of life which may contest its white supremacist order. Settler-colonialism is a sociogenic epidemic.

Recall that Fanon denied treating alienation on an individual level, seeking instead to change the milieu of his patients. A sociogenic approach is therefore always anchored in identifying *environments* as causes of social pathologies.⁴⁵ Extimacy, by contrast, views *individuals* as carriers of pathology and, therefore, the locus of analytical intervention. Yet the theory of sociogeny should not be read as a dismissal of Freud but, ironically, a radicalization of his doctrine that extends even beyond Lacan's orthodoxy. *Pace* Lacan, Fanon's return reconceives colonial subjectivity not in terms of castration but racist-environments that contagiously spread the "seemingly atavistic quality of the colonized, whence the need endlessly to police the borders of self and state."⁴⁶ Sociogeny allows us to see how it is the environment—not the subject—that is racist. Only by overturning such environments will colonized subjects shatter this colonizing-stasis: "by analyzing it we aim to destroy it."⁴⁷ Where extimacy resigns in quietism, sociogeny traffics in revolution.

Conclusion: Survivance

Upon his third visit to the United States in 1975, Lacan remarked that "What I call history is the history of epidemics."⁴⁸ Just as we can understand sociogeny as a rewriting of extimacy, so too can we read Lacan's declaration as an overwriting of Freud's infamous aversion: "don't they realize we're bringing them the plague?"⁴⁹ What Freud is getting at here is the fact that, unlike doctors who give their patients cures, psychoanalysts give their analysands symptoms. Lacan's added twist to this is that "the plague" is whatever becomes the founding social discourse of a time. And, as I have been expounding it, "our" plague is not coronavirus but settler-colonialism.

My thesis was that settler-colonialism is a sickness of the land. I offered extimacy as one way of understanding this but concluded that sociogeny, as a rewriting of extimacy, provided an insurgent and revolutionary diagnosis of this sickness. Given the predictions of subsequent outbreaks of COVID-19 as well as our ever-increasing over-proximity due to globalization, I fear that “our” environments are becoming even sicker. Lacan himself may have been privy to this when he predicted that,

Mankind is entering a period that has been called ‘global,’ in which it will find out about this something that is emerging from the destruction of an old social order that I shall symbolize by the Empire whose shadow was long cast over a great civilization, such that something very different is replacing it, something that carries a very different meaning, the imperialisms, whose question runs as follows: what can we do so that human masses, which are destined to occupy the same space, not only geographically, but sometimes in a familial sense, remain separate?⁵⁰

I take particular note of Lacan’s gesture here towards “separation” as a prophylactic. Perhaps, then, the proper vaccine we should be investing in is separation *qua* Indigenous sovereignty.

I regretfully began with an episode of death but, following the praxis of Gerald Vizenor, would like to conclude with an ethics of Indigenous *survivance*.⁵¹ Survivance is a “practice,” not an ideology; it comprises how Indigenous Peoples make creative negotiations amid colonial dispossession in order to renounce the dominance of the settler-state. But, above all, “[s]urvivance is an intergenerational connection to an individual and collective sense of presence and resistance in personal experience and the word, or language, made particularly through stories.”⁵² So, as sick as the land may be, the fact that we, as Indigenous Peoples, have been *resisting* and *surviving* over centuries of contagion speaks volumes to our collective immunity, resolve, perseverance, and *survivance*. As a white-coded Métis, I recognize the settler-state as a site of immense trauma for my kin; but I also see it as a sacred site of critical *healing* where Indigenous and decolonizing praxis can shift us away from death and destruction and towards *resurgence*.⁵³ This healing won’t be

done on the psychoanalyst's divan however. Settler-colonialism is the disease and sovereignty is the cure.

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² Brandi Morin, "Metis Hunters' Killings Not Racially Motivated, Say Alberta RCMP. Locals Aren't So Sure," *Huffington Post*, 2 April 2020; Chris Stewart, "Metis hunter in Alberta says threats not new in province," *APTN*, 6 April 2020.

³ I am extrapolating from Diné scholar Kelsey Dayle John's (2019) recent extension of disability towards "land-disablement." John herself takes cues from Jasbir Puar's (2017) excellent work on disability and colonialism. See: Kelsey Dayle John, "Animal Colonialism—Illustrating Intersections Between Animal Studies and Settler Colonial Studies through Diné Horsemanship" *Humanimalia* 10:2 (2019); Jasbir Puar, *The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

⁴ J.-A Miller, "Extimité," in *Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure and Society*, eds. M. Bracher, M.W. Alcorn, R.J. Cortell, and F. Massardier-Kenney (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 74–87; Derek Hook, "Racism and *jouissance*: Evaluating the 'racism as (the theft of) enjoyment' hypothesis," *Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society*, 23 (2018): 244-266; S. Žižek, *Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbours*, (London: Penguin, 2016).

⁵ I am especially thinking of Lacan's chide epithet to the student demonstrators who had the temerity to interrupt his seminar: "What you, as revolutionaries, aspire to is a Master. You will have one." J. Lacan, *The Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* (1992a), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: WW Norton, 1992), 126.

⁶ Hortense Spillers, in *Female Subjects in Black and White: Race, Psychoanalysis, Feminism*, eds. E. Abel, B. Christian and H. Moglen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 140.

⁷ I follow David Macy in understanding sociogeny as a "briocolage" methodology (161). My intention here is to stage an, admittedly perfunctory, intervention into debates surrounding the meaning of the concept. Contemporary interpretations of sociogeny are replete with controversy over the degree to which it remains congruent with psychoanalysis. Romy Opperman (2019) offers a somewhat agnostic approach to this debate whereas Cherki (2017) and Marriott (2011) speak to the lasting influence psychoanalysis retained over Fanon. Alvarez (2015), Gordon (2006), Sorentino (2001), and Wynter (2001) offer important dismissals. Cf., Lewis R. Gordon, "Is the Human a Teleological Suspension of Man? Phenomenological Exploration of Sylvia Wynter's Fanonian and Biodicean Reflections," in *Caribbean Reasonings: After Man, Towards the Human: Critical Essays on Sylvia Wynter*, ed. Anthony Bogue, (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2006); David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Biography II* (London: Verso, 2012); Sara-Maria Sorentino, "The Sociogeny of Social Death: Blackness, Modernity, and its Metaphors in Orlando Patterson," *Rhizomes*, Issue 29 (2016); Sylvia Wynter, "Toward the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of Conscious Experience, and What It Is Like To Be 'Black,'" in *National Identities and Sociopolitical Changes in Latin America*, eds. Mercedes F. Cogan-Durán and Antonio Moriana-Gómez. (London: Routledge, 2001).

⁸ Paul Kingsbury, "The extimacy of space," *Social & Cultural Geography*, 8:2 (2007), 246.

⁹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: WW Norton, 1998), 123.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–55* (New York: Norton, 1991), 9.

¹¹ Lacan, S XI: 85.

¹² *Ibid*, 268.

¹³ Kingsbury, 250.

¹⁴ Miller (1994): 75.

¹⁵ Derek Hook (2018) exemplifies the racism as "theft of enjoyment" hypothesis with various "libidinal treasures" that the racist is in fear of losing. For the white nationalist this libidinal treasure might manifest in anxiety over losing English as a common tongue due to an influx of immigration (255). "The essence of the matter," Miller explains, "is that the Other is unfairly subtracting from you a part of your *jouissance*" (2017: 39). As Hook notes, such objects take on a phallic quality insofar as they are plagued—pun intended—by the spectre of castration (256). Cf., J.A. Miller,

“Extimate Enemies,” in *The Lacanian Review (Hurly-Burly) No. 3*, trans. Frédéric-Charles Baitinger, Azeen Khan, and Roger Litten (Paris: New Lacanian School, 2017): 30-42.

¹⁶ Hook 2018; Žižek 2016.

¹⁷ Miller (1994): 80.

¹⁸ Wayne Wapeemukwa, “Neighbourly Love and the Trump Effect,” *Division/Review: A Quarterly Psychoanalytic Forum* (2016).

¹⁹ Miller (1994): 80.

²⁰ J. Lacan, *Seminar XIX: Ou Pire...* ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. A.R. Price (Polity, London, 2018), 236.

²¹ S. Freud, *Standard Edition 13*, (London: Hogarth Press, 1913), 143.

²² S. Freud, *Standard Edition 10* [1909] (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), 36n1. Note, however, that castration is not “real” until it is seen. Gwen Bergner (1995) interlinks Freud and Fanon on the scopoc by pointing out how the visual integrates sexual as well as racial difference. According to Freud, a boy may see a girl’s genitals without registering castration (*SE* 17: 25). What must transpire is a visual crisis: “the sight of the female genitals” (*SE* 19: 173-9). Only at this point does castration become a “fact” (*SE* 19: 253). Correspondingly, Fanon was not a “Negro” until the little boy saw and screamed it so. Visually racialized, Fanon felt his skin excoriate not unlike castration: “a hemorrhage that left congealed black blood all over my body” (Fanon 92). In Homi Bhabha’s words, “the white man’s eyes break up the black man’s body and in that act of epistemic violence its own frame of reference is transgressed, its field of vision disturbed” (135). Cf., Gwen Bergner, “Who Is That Masked Woman? Or, the Role of Gender in Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks,” in “Colonialism and the Postcolonial Condition,” special issue, *PMLA*, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Jan 1995), 75-88. Modern Language Association; K. Homi Bhabha, “Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche, and the Colonial Condition,” in *Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999); S. Freud, *Standard Edition 17 (1917-1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works* (1955); S. Freud, *Standard Edition 19: The Ego and the Id and Other Works [1923-1925]* (London: Hogarth Press, 1961).

²³ Marc De Kesel, *Eros and Ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII*, trans. Sigi Jottkandt (New York: SUNY Press, 2009), 146.

²⁴ Henry Louis Gates Jr., “Critical Fanonism,” *Critical Inquiry* (1991), 446.

²⁵ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 84.

²⁶ Romy Opperman, “A Permanent Struggle Against an Omnipresent Death: Revisiting Environmental Racism with Frantz Fanon,” *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2019), 58.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 64.

²⁸ Fanon (2008), 30.

²⁹ Opperman (2019), 65.

³⁰ Jean Khlafa, “Fanon and Psychiatry,” *Nottingham French Studies*, 54.1 (2015), 66.

³¹ A. Khan, “The Subaltern Clinic,” *boundary 2*, 46, no. 4 (1 November 2019), 202.

³² Khlafa (2015), 66.

³³ Khan (2016), 185.

³⁴ David Marriott, “Inventions of Existence: Sylvia Wynter, Frantz Fanon, Sociogeny, and ‘the Damned,’” *CR: The New Centennial Review* 11, no. 3 (2011): 45–89

³⁵ Alice Cherki, “Foreword,” In *Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics*, eds. Nigel C. Gibson and Roberto Benuduce (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2017).

³⁶ Marriott (2011), 64.

³⁷ S. Freud, *Standard Edition 3 (1893-1899): Early Psycho-Analytic Publications* (1962), 43-70; S. Freud, *Standard Edition 2 (1893-1895): Studies on Hysteria* (1955).

³⁸ J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink, Héloïse Fink, and Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton 2006), 161-175.

³⁹ Marriott (2011), 64.

⁴⁰ Mark Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination* (Durham: Duke UP, 2017), 68. In *Firsting and Lasting*, Jean O’Brien makes a similar observation. Speaking to this “untimeliness,” she observes how settler historical chronicles cast “Indians [as] resid[ing] in an ahistorical temporality,” possessing a certain quality of “timelessness.” Jean O’Brien, *Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians Out of Existence in New England* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 105.

⁴¹ Marriott (2011), 64.

⁴² S. Žižek, “Descartes and the post-traumatic subject,” *Filozofski vestnik* XXIX, no. 2 (2008), 9–29.

⁴³ Marriott (2011), 69.

⁴⁴ Here I recognize Vine Deloria Jr.'s (2003) distinction between Western and Indigenous metaphysics. For Deloria, Western metaphysics derives meaning from the world in temporal terms whereas Indigenous modes of thought privilege space and land. Deloria concludes: "When one group is concerned with the philosophical problem of space and the other with the philosophical problem of time, then the statements of either group do not make much sense when transferred from one context to the other without the proper consideration of what is taking place." Cf., Vine Deloria Jr., *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 2003), 76.

⁴⁵ Fanon (2008), 145-6. In fact, Lina Alvarez directly links Fanon's sociogenic approach to Marx's eleventh thesis from his *Theses on Feuerbach*, which Fanon himself alludes to at the very beginning of *Black Skin, White Masks*. Cf., Lina Alvarez, "Frantz Fanon Lecteur de Karl Marx: Révolutionnaire Praxis et Sociogénèse." *AUC Interpretationes* 5, no. 1 (2015): 95-113.

⁴⁶ Marriott (2011), 65.

⁴⁷ Fanon (2008), xvi. To put it plainly, this sociogenic take on racist environments requires colonized subjects to attend to the various imagos, stereotypes, and other colonial "masks" by which the colonized subject hates and enslaves himself—what his environment reflects back unto him. As Achille Mbembe writes, "if there is a secret to the colony, it is clearly this: *the subjection of the native by way of desire*." Achille Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason*, trans. Laurent Dubois (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 119.

⁴⁸ J. Lacan, "Conference at Yale University," *Scilicet* 6/7 (Paris: Seuil, 1975).

⁴⁹ J. Lacan (2006), *Écrits*, 336

⁵⁰ J. Lacan, "Address on Child Psychoses," trans. B. Khiara-Foxton and A.R. Price, *Hurly Burly: The International Lacanian Journal of Psychoanalysis*, No. 8 (2012), 270-271

⁵¹ Gerald Vizenor, *Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance* (Valencia: Univeristat de Valencia, 1999). I here also take cues from Michelle M. Jacob's (2013) praxis of not "stopping short" at the "soul wound," cf., Michelle M. Jacob, *Yakama Rising: Indigenous Cultural Revitalization, Activism, and Healing* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2013).

⁵² G. Vizenor, E. Tuck & K.W. Yang, "Resistance is in the blood," in *Youth resistance and theories of change*, eds. E. Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 107.

⁵³ M. M. Jacob, K. Gonzales, C. Finley & S. RunningHawk Johnson, "Theorizing Indigenous Student Resistance, Radical Resurgence, and Reclaiming Spiritual Teachings about Tma'áakni (Respect)," *Religions* 10, no. 4 (2019), 286.