Against the Public "Dictatorship of the Bourgeoise": The Project of an Emancipatory Critique of Television in *Public Sphere and Experience*

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The decades-long, unending debates about the different definitions and scopes of the *public sphere* speak to the central role the concept has played since the 1960s and continues to play in contemporary social, political, and cultural theory. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Jürgen Habermas examines the history and meaning of the public sphere as an institution constitutive of modern bourgeois society. His theories were later used as an important reference point in attempts to lay groundwork for a critical theory of the construction of bourgeois society. The most pertinent of these "answers" to Habermas's understanding of the public sphere is without a doubt Negt and Kluge's in *Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere*, which develops a broader, more emancipatory concept of the public sphere.

Upon comparing the subtitles of the two publications, the difference in their critical emphases is already clear: Habermas, with "An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society," prioritizes the role of the bourgeoisie in the emergence of the public sphere. Negt and Kluge, on the other hand, with "Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere," are suggesting that in Habermas's examination of the public sphere, social actors and impulses—historical as well as those in the normative structure of his argument—*other* than the bourgeoisie are not given their due consideration. It is along these lines that the concept of the proletariat takes on a strategic meaning in Negt and Kluge's work.

Habermas concentrates his efforts on the emergence of the modern public sphere in the Europe of the late-18th and early-19th century. This new bourgeois public sphere differentiated itself in its organizational structure and function from the earlier feudal form of a "representative" publicness, which primarily and much more directly served as a stage for the hegemony of the dominant classes.[1] According to Habermas's narrative, the new bourgeois public sphere fashions itself out of private parties, which, without direct recourse to the legitimated language of the dominant classes, assemble in salons, coffee houses, etc. in order to discuss the topics which were relevant to them: political, economic, or cultural affairs, processes, and events. Such a salon-public demands a socially instantiated, conceptual surrogate in which both the "general interest" and *pars pro toto* the demands of all members of society in matters of the common good are represented.[2] This new bourgeois public sphere produces the concept of "public opinion," which has, in turn, a constitutive meaning for state power in the nation-state, itself a form of political organization that emerges during the same time period. This constitutive meaning is intensified through the economic clout of the bourgeoisie and, in this way, an *economically reinforced* public opinion becomes the legitimizing basis for implementing the state's interests, which, within the bourgeois-capitalist state, intersect with those of the bourgeois public sphere.

Habermas goes on to argue that the roles of the public sphere and of public opinion are intensified in most European states accompanying the establishment of representative democracy as the paradigmatic, institutionalized form of power.[3] The public sphere becomes a kind of regulative mechanism for state power, with its own administrative institutions and organizational structure. Over the course of the 20th century, the means of executing political power were ultimately transformed from the traditional mode of repressive domination to a form of

sovereignty whereby the structures and mechanisms of the production of ideological hegemony would be borrowed from those in the bourgeois public sphere.

Habermas perceives these transformations of the public sphere as transformations of a *historically specific institution*. Nevertheless, the public sphere remains for him a contrafactual, normative ideal. In this normative aspect, the public sphere is the site of free, rational communication. But as a matter of actual historical development, Habermas's narrative of the public sphere is one of decline: Above all in the 20th century, together with the increasing influence of mass media, there arose new possibilities and measures for media manipulation—as well as production—of public opinion, which also had the effect of obscuring the nearly limitless potential of ideological manipulation belonging to those in power. Therefore, Habermas speaks repeatedly of a "refeudalisation of the public sphere" in the 20th century and draws attention to the fact that even popular entertainment and advertisement have "in the form of *public relations* already assumed a political character."[4] With this assertion, he finds himself comfortably within the framework of classical critical theory, which sought to expose the political function of the culture industry as a system-stabilizing ideological education.

In terms of its normative significance, Habermas sees the bourgeois public sphere as an inclusive, democratic, and emancipatory form of social engagement. Through this institution of the public sphere, society defends its interests against the state and market. How, and to what extent, the interests of the bourgeois public sphere—as a self-appointed defender of the entire society—could then be differentiated from those of the capitalist state is a question justifiably posed by countless critics of Habermas's concept.[5] Among those who put forth this fundamental critique, there are none more politically charged or theoretically far-reaching than Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge in their *Public Sphere and Experience*. Decisive for Negt and Kluge's

project is the connection between the theoretical analysis of the category of the public sphere and a plan for its practical redesign, which aims for an inclusive and democratic structure of the political process. In particular, the attempt to create and represent public forms of experience (hence the title) is the central aim of their study.

The point of departure for Negt and Kluge's critique of Habermas's public sphere is his equation of the bourgeois public sphere with the public sphere *per se*. The bourgeois public sphere claims to represent the entire society and its interests, even though bourgeois forms of both life and production remain thoroughly particular to the bourgeoisie. Therefore, such a public sphere is incapable of reflecting the experience of the "whole of society."[6] Seen in this light, the concept of experience takes on a challenging meaning in Negt and Kluge's argument: "The public sphere possesses a use-value when social experience organizes itself within it."[7] Their critique centres precisely on this unrepresented content of experience, which is ultimately the specific *proletarian* character of the public sphere.

Along these lines, Negt and Kluge develop the concept of the "proletarian public sphere," which they understand as an "historical counterconcept to the bourgeois public sphere."[8] According to Negt and Kluge, the "proletarian public sphere" reflects the experience of social production in noticeably greater measure than in the bourgeois public sphere alone:

> Whereas it is self-evident that the bourgeois public sphere is not a reference point for bourgeois interests alone, it is not generally assumed that proletarian experience and its organization likewise form a crystallizing point: namely, for a public sphere that reflects the interests and experiences of the overwhelming majority of the population, insofar as these experiences and interests are real.[9]

Here, Negt and Kluge view the relationship of the two forms of public sphere as dialectical, in which the bourgeois and the proletarian public sphere—always battling and competing—influence and ground each other, and through this make the public sphere a

significant historical form of organization for life and its experience in the modern world.

In their enduring struggle, however, the two forms of the public sphere have different instruments of power at their disposal. Negt and Kluge refer to the contemporary organization of the public sphere as the "dictatorship of the bourgeoise."[10] Analyzing possible structures of organization and spheres of action for the proletarian public sphere, the authors search out new forms of expression for the "interests and experiences of the masses" and new roads toward the "emancipation of the majority of the population."[11] In so doing, Negt and Kluge focus on "new mass media" and especially on television, which for them harbours great potential to become an effective means of communicating the lived experience of the proletarian public sphere. And yet, in terms of its social organization and structures of financing, television remains primarily an effective megaphone, and therefore an effective instrument of power, for the *bourgeois* public sphere. In the third chapter of their book, Negt and Kluge offer a well-founded and detailed criticism of the different aspects of television that make it such an influential institution of the "consciousness industry" (this important notion by Hans Magnus Erzensberger will be elaborated further in the article). The title of this chapter already largely addresses its central thesis: "Public-Service Television: The Bourgeois Public Sphere Translated into Modern Technology."

Adorno's Critique of Television

In the intellectual circles of the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) there was already at the beginning of the 1970s a great tradition of critical approaches to television production and, more generally, television's social function. The basic precepts of the Marxist critique of television were influenced by Critical Theory, chiefly by Adorno's writings on television. A continuity

emerged along these lines between the critique of the bourgeois public sphere and the media-critical positions of the first-generation Frankfurt School theorists.

In the essays "Prolog zum Fernsehen" (Prologue to Television) and "Fernsehen als Ideologie" (Television as Ideology), Adorno analyzes the content of television from the early 1950s and its implicit ideological messages. Both essays touch upon studies that Adorno conducted in 1952 and 1953 for the Hacker Foundation in America. In these texts, he sees television as a medium that synthesizes preexisting mass media such as film and radio. Because of this, television has the ability to more extensively and with greater intensity shift and capture the public's consciousness.[12]

Television becomes omnipresent, occupying the last refuges of private existence spared by the culture industry. For the viewer it produces a "duplicate of the world" and allows no sphere of thought or perception free in which one can comprehend that the "world of media and the culture industry" and, above all else, the world of television, are "not the world."[13] The world of television forbids any conceivable alternative to existing social relationships and cements these in the consciousness of the television viewer as something natural and normative. In this way, television becomes the most effective weapon of ideological manipulation:

> People are not changed but rather fixated on the unavoidable. It is probably the case that television transforms them again into what they are already, only *more* of what they are already. . . . That would explain the general tendency, economically founded, of modern society not to progress beyond itself, or the status quo, but rather to ceaselessly strengthen the status quo and, where it threatens to disappear, conjure it again.[14]

It is this ideological function of television, following Adorno, which makes it more than just another medium of the culture industry. It "serves the purpose of beating mindless free time into an inch of its life." Television produces "the world as appearance," and this appearance becomes an impervious ideology which achieves a level of intensity, efficiency, and dimension that would

have been unthinkable in any other medium before. It reaches millions of consumers and "stands in as a kind of voice of the [now industrially planned and fabricated] objective spirit."[15] Television productions—in all of their numerous forms—promote "censorship and the practicing of a conformist behaviour,"[16] which restricts the freedom of thought necessary for change or social and political emancipation. Television secures a particularly inescapable omnipresence of the culture industry in all corners of existence, and with this the potency of its ideological captivation: "The culture industry smirks: 'become what you are!' And its lies are precisely in this repetitive validating and hardening of the way of being that the course of man's toil in the world has brought about."[17] Yet those responsible for this state of affairs are also the numerous intellectuals who are responsible for the production of television content and other media of the culture industry and **"**due to masochism, or material interest, or both, become their heralds."[18]

Although in his analysis Adorno focuses on the content of commercial US-American television of the 1950s, his critique of the ideological function of television as an institution remains relevant for an understanding of the messages and the practical functions of the public sphere in the FRG in the 1960s and 1970s.

Enzensberger and His Impact

The central ideas of Adorno's critique of television were to continue to be applied by German leftist intellectuals to the content, formats, and even the organizational structures of public-service television. One of them, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, in observing the new omnipresence and ideological monopoly of mass media, saw a further development of the culture industry into a "consciousness industry." In this new stage, mass media increasingly took the reins of ideological control in late industrial society. In his famous and much-discussed 1970

essay, "Constituents of a Theory of the Media," published in the journal *Kursbuch*, Enzensberger calls for a new "socialist media theory" and an emancipatory use of media that would abrogate the existing separation between consumers and producers. Inspired by Brecht's radio theory and his recommendation to repurpose the apparatus of radio "from distribution over to communication,"[19] Enzensberger describes in "Constituents" his vision of a redesign of mass media through collective initiatives of media activists "from below" as well as through democratic self-organization. Technically speaking, according to Enzensberger, electronic media "are egalitarian in structure:" they know "no contradiction between transmitter and receiver" and every transistor radio is "by the nature of its construction, at the same time a potential transmitter."[20] Therefore, the problem of "repressive uses of media" does not have to do with the technology, but rather with the organizational structure of mass media as social institutions: "The development from a mere distribution medium to a communications medium is technically not a problem. It is consciously prevented for understandable political reasons."[21] A repressive use of media, which describes the behaviour of FRG public-service television toward its viewers, is characterized by, among other things, the cultivation of the viewer into a politically passive and an (in the state's interest) indoctrinated individual.

A year after the publication of Enzensberger's "Constituents," Friedrich Knilli published his essay collection *Die Unterhaltung der deutschen Fernsehfamilie: Ideologiekritische Kurzanalysen von Serien* (The Entertainment of the German Television Family: Short Ideological Analyses of Series). Its author, a pioneer of German-language Media Studies, further developed this critique of television as an instrument belonging to those in power and used to impact the consciousness industry according to their interests:

> The cynicism in the consciousness industry increases. Meanwhile, those who work for it are defanged and proletarianised and yet at the same time become more steadfast their resistance against this undemocratic indoctrination machine. It is truly no medium for the masses, but rather an unmistakable medium of class, which has long been waging the battle from above, in the form of psychological warfare.[22]

This fragment is especially interesting in its mention of an increasing "resistance" against the "undemocratic indoctrination machine" from the side of the intellectuals and cultural producers, who, despite being required to serve the consciousness industry in order to survive economically within the capitalist system, are at the same time, through their service, practicing critique.

The belief that the media of the consciousness industry, especially television, can be repurposed into sites of social critique and emancipatory, political enlightenment was in the 1960s and 70s characteristic of artists and intellectuals, who at the time sought out many ideologically subversive projects in television. Several representatives of the *New German Cinema* [23] come to mind— Volker Schlöndorff, Alexander Kluge, Rainer Werner Fassbinder—who, beginning in the 1970s, also realized numerous television projects. One of the essential motivations for Alexander Kluge's longstanding, fruitful work in television was this very hope: that television could be transformed from a medium of the consciousness industry into one of emancipatory political education.[24] However this may be, the greatest portion of television productions in the 1970s, using different forms of entertainment, primarily served the purpose of an implicit ideological indoctrination.

In his article "Die öffentlich-rechtliche Lust am Show-Business" (The Public-Service Interest in Show Business), from the same essay collection already mentioned, Friedrich Knilli pinpoints the form this indoctrination potential often takes:

> The entertainment officials have taken the family, after it has been reduced to a consumer-group, and made it into something to be watched, something that appears to adopt communicative functions. Indeed, the entertainment officials, who are responsible for the survival of the state, have transformed the question of poverty and wealth into one of happiness and personal virtue: Everyone and anyone can become a hot shot with just a little bit of luck and skill.[25]

The unique aspect of FRG public television, however, was that the entertainment format did not only serve the purely commercial interests of the broadcast networks. According to the official program of the FRG public broadcast from the moment of its founding till now, the apparatus of public-service television is an instrument to form public opinion.[26] This programmatic objective has an obvious priority over the function of entertainment. Furthermore, entertainment can be used for the purpose of covertly forming opinion especially effectively. Such a shift in the strategic focus of public-service television is summarized as follows by Knilli, and not without a sarcasm that brings Adorno to mind:

> In public-service show business, the reckless managers have been replaced by cautious public opinion polls, boozy playboys by sober administrative lawyers and ordinaries for public education. In the grounds of the oldest profession of the world a new global economy for a young and vigorous industry has risen, but the state bureaucracies keep careful watch to make sure that all the good fun doesn't lead to ruin.[27]

These critical-theoretical positions of television critique make up a small but quite representative selection of a much more comprehensive literature,[28] a selection which requires its own particular, idea-historical examination. Yet even this small sketch should bring to light the contemporary discourse and intellectual tradition within which Negt and Kluge developed their own approaches to the problematics of public-service television. The primary concern of their chapter on television, read within the scope of the central theses of *Public Sphere and Experience***,** also becomes clearer. This concern is, namely, to examine the actual function of public-service broadcast as a site of the normative formation of opinion in the bourgeois public

sphere and, on the basis of this examination, to conceive of the forms, mechanisms, and strategies with whose help television can be expropriated from the monopoly of the bourgeois public sphere. Only after this expropriation can public broadcast be made useful for the proletarian public sphere as well and, in so doing, be made to serve a socially broader emancipation and democratization of the media landscape.

Negt and Kluge's Critique of Public-Service Television

The basis for Negt and Kluge's discussion is composed of diverse positions and theses on the social role and social function of television, which they present in a kind of quote-collage at the beginning of the chapter "Public-Service Television: The Bourgeois Public Sphere Translated into Modern Technology." Both the described institutional functions and the perspectives bound to them (or not bound to them) occupy a spectrum that stretches from directors, department heads, and other functionaries of public-service television to academic media theorists and public intellectuals. In this collage of quotations, one finds different views of the functions of television in society: for example, the notion of its tasks as an **"**apedagogic" social pedagogy in a sense of presenting normative role models and systems of values, or the opinion that television has become an "alternative to napping" and through this serves to restructure our leisure time.[29]

After juxtaposing such varying ideas, Negt and Kluge search out the fundamental agreement among them, which is "that, far from being direct communication between human beings or groups, television is programmed."[30] The impossibility of communication with the viewer and his or her needs lies already in the organizational structure of the radio broadcast and television networks of the FRG:

> The public media are prevented from molding the viewers' needs in such a way that they become totally assimilated to the production logic of television; indeed, the price of such considerations is that, in this generalized type of communication with viewers, television cannot develop their needs and interests in an emancipatory direction.[31]

The emphasis upon both the meaning of the "production logic of television" and a precise and detailed analysis of the conditions of public-service television's production is an essential supplement to the traditional critique of television, which is in large part either a more general critique of form and culture or a critique of content of individual programs. In contrast, Negt and Kluge have critical aspirations with a social-theoretical sweep: Their analysis of the conditions of public-service television's production, its organizational structure, and the functional mechanisms within both its political and economic contexts aims to open new, more effective horizons of critique for a truly democratic and inclusive remodeling of the institution. Most essentially, their analysis strives, through an exacting institutional analysis and critique, to broaden the methodological approaches and fields of study within the critique of ideology. For Negt and Kluge, television production is a "historical process" in which social experience accumulates in "material . . . and information" and therefore must also be analyzed with this in mind.[32] Only an examination adhering to this dictum offers the resources for a practical transformation of television into a medium that does not only represent the opinions, interests, and ideologies of the bourgeois public sphere, but also the proletarian public sphere (which in fact should be the primary goal of public mass media).

Negt and Kluge emphasize that the critique of public-service television, in order to be successful and productive, must take on very different medial forms:

> Written or oral critique must almost always remain ineffectual against the real products of a large apparatus. Products can be attacked only with counterproducts. Television criticism must set out from the historical corpus of the medium, namely, television as an industrial enterprise.[33]

An emancipatory transformation of television is possible only when it is oriented toward the agents of production. For this, it is not enough to change individual broadcasts, but "its entire history, which determines that program."[34]

Also especially pertinent, in context of the multifaceted Marxist critique of public mass media, is Negt and Kluge's analysis of the short- and long-term interests of consumers and producers in media production. In the actual relations within social production, it is not possible to avoid that "all television programs, no matter whether they are entertainment, news, or documentary, have a use-value and a commodity nature."[35] According to the authors, the difference between short- and long-term interests in capitalism is that short-term interests, on the one hand, are the interests of individual capitalists. The long-term interest, on the other hand, "as the interest of the capitalist system as a whole, constitutes itself in complex ways and is not necessarily held by individuals."[36] In the case of public-service television, long-term interests are expressed in terms of the "common good" and the "public interest." Long-term interests are also responsible for more direct ramifications, such as programming policies and censorship.

Being a large enterprise, television usually has no "individual capitalists," write Negt and Kluge; "the social character of all commodity production is clearer here than in the private sector."[37] Because of the specific organization of public-service television production in the FRG, in which public institutions delegate (or, in today's manager-jargon, "outsource") individual productions to private suppliers, public-service television still remains influenced by short-term, capitalist interests. In fact, within this system of private outsourcing on behalf of public-service television there exist several "monopolistic firms of the private sector."[38] There is, therefore, a contradiction between long-term and short-term interests to be found in almost every broadcast, no matter what the content or form is, or whether it is news, entertainment, or critical

documentation. Even when there is a recognizable element of culture-critical attitude, it is immediately levelled by its function as a product and component of the entertainment industry.[39]

Negt and Kluge address further contradictions and problems belonging to FRG public-service television, to its structures and formats of production, using numerous concrete examples from the television industry, statistical information, and their own observations and experiences. At the end of the chapter, after a sober, critical appraisal of the existing organizational principles and functional mechanisms of the public production apparatuses, Negt and Kluge justifiably pose the question: Which effective forms of critique and public control of television can be developed and put into practice? The critique by means of the market in bourgeois society, which through other channels can be highly effective, is diluted when it is delivered via mass media. Within the existing system of publicly organized media institutions, the interests of the viewer can only be narrowly and indirectly realized. All official instances of control can "supervise the output of television—within the limits of their purview and their special interests—but they cannot determine it."[40]

The possibilities of a fundamental self-critique of the television industry by its employees would be very limited, as such a critique would weaken (directly or indirectly) their career prospects. Any cultural critique would be assimilated by the "apparatus of the modern consciousness industry." The question concerning new ways of organizing an emancipatory critical practice, which would address television as a medium of mass-communication, remains essential for the authors. According to Negt and Kluge, there already exist, even if it is in large part unintentional, forms of production in television that offer radically different experiences than those accumulated in the bourgeois public sphere. Public media does possess the potential to develop adequate and democratic strategies of organization and representation and, along with

this, also develop the interests of the proletarian public sphere.

This should become the task both of an effective, strategically considered, emancipatory critique of television and of a focused sociopolitical struggle—especially seeing as public media in the FRG still continue to serve the interests of the bourgeois public sphere, a status quo that will not change on its own. This state of affairs is succinctly summarized in the last sentence of the chapter "Public-Service Television": "It takes a long time to develop products that correspond to this level of the social production of consciousness. With the accumulation of this experience, one cannot wait for a societal leap to occur as if by magic."[41]

In his television projects and even more so with his founding of *dctp* (Development Company for Television Programs) and his activity within the organization, Alexander Kluge programmatically and consequently revamped, according to socially progressive views, current forms of production. As an essential part of this revamping, he saw through a transition from a theoretical critique of the television industry to a practical critique through "contraproducts."[42] In this way, the chapter "Public-Service Television" can be seen as a kind of foundational text for Kluge's later activities as television writer, director, and producer.

Conclusion

Almost a half-century after Negt and Kluge's study of public-service television in *Public Sphere and Experience*, its critique still strikes as surprisingly current and relevant. Despite the countless social, political, and technological transformations of the last decades, or perhaps thanks to them, public-service television in Germany remains just as it was before: a reliable megaphone for the bourgeois public sphere and its interests. For all intents and purposes, it seems that public media in Germany have become even more loyal to the interests of the bourgeois public sphere. Since

Negt and Kluge published their chapter on television, the organizational structures and conditions of production of the broadcast networks have in principle not changed at all. Despite the increase in popularity of new internet-based media, public-service television in Germany remains as ever an attractive and lucrative employer for cultural producers in different branches of cultural production. The working conditions of the younger generation of television employees become ever more precarious, to the extent that merciless self-censorship is necessary for survival in the work place, as Pierre Bourdieu already claimed to be the case 20 years ago in his essay *On Television*.[43]

In public discourse, especially in publicly-owned discourse, the leftist critique of television is being gradually dialed back. Criticism of public media *per se* is manipulatively painted as an item on the agenda of the "right" and is in this way discredited before it is even discussed. Because of this, public-service television as an industry becomes ever more an end in itself. Television needs its viewers merely for its own legitimation; critique of this self-sufficiency is not allowed. The strategies used as of late in German public-service television are best elucidated by Robert Michel's study on paradigmatic autonomization of power structures in modern social organizations: After a certain point, the self-perpetuation of an organization—and first and foremost the positions of power within the organization—become for its representatives far more important than the original, intrinsic goals and tasks of said organization.[44]

It would, therefore, be helpful in the current situation to analytically consider the leftist television and media critique in general and, most importantly, the theoretical positions and basic methodological approaches of Critical Theory to the problematics of mass media. In this context, grounded, discourse history studies in emancipatory, leftist media critique could offer a good

basis to transform the current critique-phobic and counterproductive defensive reflexes of public-service television into a practice of open and democratic exchange.

Notes

[1] See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 7.

[2] See ibid., 27 ff.

[3] See ibid., 80 ff.

[4] See ibid,. 195.

[5] A critique of the exclusively bourgeois nature of the Habermasian public sphere, as therefore a non-inclusive and in the broadest sense undemocratic concept, plays an important role the English-language reception of Habermas's work. See, for instance, Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 109-142. To this criticism Habermas offers an answer of sorts in the form of a comprehensive revision of his concept in *Between Facts and Norms*, and even further in, among other places, the forward to the 1990 re-edition of *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. See *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory on Laws and Norms*, trans. Wilhelm Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); as well as Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (1962; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 11-50.

[6] Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge: *Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere*, trans. Peter Labanyi, Jamie Owen Daniel, and Assenka Oksiloff (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 3-4.

[7] Ibid., 3.

[8] Ibid., 57 ff.

[9] Ibid., xlv.

[10] Ibid., 55.

[11] Ibid., xlvii.

[12] See Theodor W. Adorno, "Prolog zum Fernsehen," in *Eingriffe: Neun kritische Modelle* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 69-70.

[13] Ibid. The argument concerning the duplication of reality through the media of the culture industry was already made throughout *Dialectic of Enlightenment*—particularly in the chapter "Culture Industry as Mass Deception." See Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

[14] Adorno, "Prolog zum Fernsehen," 70.

[15] Ibid., 76.

[16] Ibid., 78.
[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 79-80.

[19] In an essay composed in 1932, "The Radio as Apparatus of Communication," Brecht writes: "The radio would be the finest possible communication apparatus in public life, a vast network of pipes. That is to say, it would be if it knew how to receive as well as to transmit, how to let the listener speak as well as hear, how to bring him into a relationship instead of isolating him." Bertolt Brecht, "The Radio as Apparatus of Communication," in Alfonso Gumucio Dagron and Thomas Tufte, eds., *Communication for Social Change Anthology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, vol. 1* (Springfield, NJ: Communication for Social Change Consortium, 2006), 3.

[20] Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Constituents of a Theory of the Media," in *Critical Essays*, eds. Reinhold Grimm and Bruce Armstrong, trans. Stuart Hood (New York: Continuum, 1982), 48.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Friedrich Knilli: "Vorwort," in *Die Unterhaltung der deutschen Fernsehfamilie. Ideologiekritische Kurzanalysen von Serien* (Munich: Hanser, 1971), 16.

[23] See Thomas Elsaesser, *New German Cinema*: *A History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989).

[24] See Matthias Uecker, *Anti-Fernsehen? Alexander Kluges Fernsehproduktionen* (Marburg: Schüren, 2000); and see Christian Schulte, ed., *Kluges Fernsehen: Alexander Kluges Kulturmagazine* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002).

[25] Friedrich Knilli, "Die öffentlich-rechtliche Lust am Show-Business," in *Die Unterhaltung der deutschen Fernsehfamilie. Ideologiekritische Kurzanalysen von Serien* (München: Hanser, 1971), 115-116.

[26] See Ulrich Saxer, "Zur Institutionsgeschichte des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks," in Christa-Maria Ridder, Wolfgang R. Langenbucher, Ulrich Saxer, and Christian Steininger, eds., *Bausteine einer Theorie des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks: Festschrift für Marie Luise Kiefer* (Wiesbaden: VS, 2005), 121-146.

[27] Knilli, "Die öffentlich-rechtliche Lust am Show-Business," 116.

[28] See Knut Hickethier, *Geschichte der Fernsehkritik in Deutschland* (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1994).

[29] Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*, 98 ff.

[30] Ibid., 99.

[31] Ibid., 100-101.

[32] Ibid., 103.

[33] Ibid., 103. This transition to a critique of television products through "counterproducts" is the very method Alexander Kluge would later put to use in his own television projects, which will the addressed in more detail later; see, among others, Ueker, *Anti-Fernsehen?*, 48-63.

[34] Ibid., 103.

[35] Ibid., 104.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., 110.

[39] Ibid., 126.

[40] Ibid., 124-125.

[41] Ibid., 129.

[42] See Uecker, *Anti-Fernsehen?*, 48-63; see also Schulte, *Kluges Fernsehen*, 8-9.

[43] See Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television*, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson (New York: The New Press, 1996), 1-10.

[44] See Robert Michels [1911]: *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie* (1911; Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 1970), 366.