Available for downloading, free of charge, at
http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/beyond_experience.
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NORMAN SWARTZ
BEYOND
EXPERIENCE
Metaphysical Theories and
Philosophical Constraints
Second Edition
Copyright © Norman Swartz, 2001
Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada
http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/beyond_experience/index.htm
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Legal Notice
Copyright © Norman Swartz, 2001
ISBN 0-9730084-0-7 (e-version)
ISBN 0-9730084-1-5 (CD-ROM)
Although Beyond Experience: Metaphysical Theories and
Philosophical Constraints, Second Edition (the
"Book") is being made available for download on the World Wide Web (WWW)
it is not in the public domain. The author, Norman Swartz, holds and
retains full copyright.
All persons wishing to download a copy of this Book, or parts thereof,
for their own personal use, are hereby given permission to do so.
Similarly, all teachers and schools (e.g. colleges and universities)
are given permission to reproduce copies of this Book, or parts,
for sale to their students provided that the selling price
does not exceed the actual cost of reproduction, that is,
neither this Book nor any of its parts may be sold for profit.
Any commercial sale of this Book, or its parts, is strictly and
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Electronic text (etext), such as this Book, lends itself easily
to cut-and-paste. That is, it is easy for persons to cut out
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or when this is done, the excerpts must be credited to this
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plagiarists are cautioned that it is an easy matter to trace any
unauthorized quotations from this Book.
The immediately preceding paragraph is, unfortunately, a legal
necessity and it may give an incorrect impression. I do hope you
will enjoy this Book and will not be deterred by the need to
forestall persons misusing this Book.
You can contact the author at:
swartz@sfu.ca He welcomes your
comments and suggestions. Other of his writings can be found at
http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/contents.htm
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Contents
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Foreword by Nicholas Rescher / vii |
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Acknowledgments / ix |
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Preface to the second edition / xii |
1 |
Presenting philosophy / 3 |
2 |
The metaphysical impulse / 9 |
3 |
Theories: What they are and what they are not / 24 |
4 |
Underdeterminism (I) / 39 |
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4.1 |
The interconnectedness of science and metaphysics / 39 |
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4.2 |
Case study: Francis Bacon's account of induction / 42 |
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4.3 |
Metaphysical strands in The New Organon / 55 |
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4.4 |
Case study: Rumford and the Calorists / 59 |
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4.5 |
The ineliminability of unproved presuppositions / 69 |
5 |
Underdeterminism (II) / 75 |
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5.1 |
Human history / 75 |
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5.2 |
Listening and probing for extraterrestrial intelligence / 80 |
6 |
Putting concepts under stress / 90 |
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6.1 |
The limits on science / 90 |
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6.2 |
Vagueness / 97 |
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6.3 |
Conceptual analysis / 100 |
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6.4 |
Possible worlds / 108 |
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6.5 |
Methodological concerns / 113 |
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7 |
Putting concepts under stress (II) – Pains / 118 |
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7.1 |
Case study: Shared out-of-body pains / 118 |
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7.2 |
Case study: Unfelt pains / 130 |
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7.3 |
Case study: Pains in the absence of nervous systems / 134 |
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7.4 |
Case study: Must pains hurt? / 139 |
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Postscript / 144 |
8 |
Space and time / 145 |
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8.1 |
Is it possible to explain what space and time are? / 145 |
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8.2 |
A neo-Leibnizian theory of space / 148 |
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8.3 |
Objections and replies to the neo-Leibnizian theory / 157 |
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8.4 |
Interlude: The expression "x does not exist" / 171 |
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8.5 |
Positive and negative theories of time / 172 |
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8.6 |
The generalized concept of space / 180 |
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8.7 |
Extension in time / 186 |
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8.8 |
Taylor on spatial and temporal analogies / 190 |
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8.9 |
Is there a temporal analog of the "right/left" problem? / 203 |
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8.10 |
On the connectedness of space and the connectedness of time / 214 |
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8.11 |
Time travel / 224 |
9 |
Properties / 245 |
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9.1 |
The one and the many / 228 |
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9.2 |
Cataloguing properties and relations / 234 |
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9.2.1 |
Primary versus secondary properties / 235 |
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9.2.2 |
Manifest versus dispositional properties / 241 |
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9.2.3 |
Binary properties; comparative and quantitative properties / 245 |
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9.2.4 |
Intensive versus extensive properties; eliminable and ineliminable concepts / 247 |
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9.2.5 |
Emergent versus nonemergent properties / 251 |
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9.2.6 |
Qualities versus relations / 254 |
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9.3 |
Realism and its rivals; abstract and concrete entities / 261 |
10 |
Individuation / 274 |
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10.1 |
Physical objects / 274 |
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10.2 |
Identity-at-a-time versus identity-through-time / 278 |
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10.3 |
Positive and negative theories of individuation / 279 |
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10.4 |
The metaphysical and epistemological dimensions of the problem of individuation / 280 |
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10.5 |
Positive theories: Substratum as individuator / 281 |
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10.6 |
Negative theories: Qualities and relations as individuator / 284 |
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10.6.1 |
Relational properties; haecceity / 285 |
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10.6.2 |
Ordinal properties / 290 |
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10.6.3 |
Spatial and temporal relations / 292 |
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10.6.4 |
Impenetrability / 295 |
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10.6.5 |
Does individuation presuppose absolute space? / 303 |
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10.6.6 |
The solution: A more radical negative theory / 307 |
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10.7 |
Nonphysical objects / 311 |
11 |
Identity-through-time / 328 |
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11.1 |
Is the problem of identity solely an epistemological one? / 328 |
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11.2 |
Is identity incompatible with change? / 331
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11.3 |
Qualitative identity and identity-through-time / 333 |
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11.4 |
Parts and properties revisited / 333 |
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11.5 |
Positive theories: Substance as identifier / 335
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11.6 |
Negative theories: Identity without enduring substance / 337 |
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11.6.1 |
Space-time paths / 338 |
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11.6.2 |
Identity-preserving relations / 341 |
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11.6.3 |
Case study: The ship of Theseus / 344 |
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11.6.4 |
Case study: Mitosis / 351 |
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11.6.5 |
Ineliminable vagueness in the criterion of identity / 354 |
12 |
Persons / 358 |
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12.1 |
The raccoon's tale / 358 |
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12.2 |
Persons and human beings / 359 |
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12.3 |
Why individuation and identity collapse in the case of persons / 361 |
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12.4 |
Is there a self? / 363 |
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12.5 |
The principal contemporary theories of personhood / 367 |
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12.6 |
Case study: Tim's plaint / 381 |
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12.7 |
What more might there be to the concept of personal identity? / 385 |
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12.8 |
Case study: Can there be justice after death? / 390 |
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Glossary / 397 |
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Further reading / 409 |
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References / 415 |
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Names index / 427 |
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Subject index / 433 |
{page vii}
Foreword
Grappling with issues that are both inherently interesting and
unavoidably controversial is the lifeblood of philosophy. A good
introduction to the subject must convey the sense of excitement
that characterizes lively controversies. Doing this well –
avoiding the mock combat of straw men and artificial opponents
– is far from easy, which is why relatively few good
introductions are the work of one single writer. The present book is
an exception to this rule. For Norman Swartz has managed to
combine a good sense of the complexities that always lurk behind the
surface of philosophical issues with an easy, nontechnical mode
of exposition accessible to the interested nonspecialist. His
book is at once readable, informative, and stimulating.
One can learn about philosophy by reading, but one can learn to
philosophize only by thinking about the issues. But philosophical
thinking requires recourse to problems, concepts, and methods,
and these are obtained most efficiently and effectively via the
printed page. What a book can do is to extend a congenial
invitation to learning. The difficulty is finding books with the right
combination of accessibility-with-profundity and of
breadth-with-depth. In this regard, the interests of the beginner –
student or interested reader alike – are well served by
Beyond Experience which, I have found, provides constantly
stimulating discussion of a wide range of challenging questions.
The very nature of philosophy is such that it is easier to pose
problems than to enforce conclusions. Even the plausible data of
the field – the deliverances of 'plain logic', of ordinary
common sense, and of science – are not of so fixed a
character that they always resist the corrosive impact of critical
scrutiny. Moreover the 'data' of philosophy (whatever they are)
underdetermine the conclusions: there are always alternatives
that must be weighed by standards that we bring to our
philosophizing rather than extract from it. To present philosophy in a
dogmatic way is accordingly to betray the enterprise
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by impoverishing it – by putting out of sight concepts, issues, and
problems that deserve and need to have their place in
philosophy's complex terrain. In this connection, what is particularly
appealing about this book is its undogmatic approach. Its author
is more concerned that readers should appreciate the
many-sidedness and complexity of the issues than that they take away a
predilection for one particular answer. This insistence on
readers thinking for themselves rather than pressing for the
endorsement of one particular view is certainly one of the book's
most attractive features.
Those who give Beyond Experience
an attentive reading are in
for a treat. They will come away not only with a better sense of
what philosophy is all about, but will also experience the
enjoyable stimulus of thinking philosophically.
Nicholas Rescher
University Professor of Philosophy
University of Pittsburgh
{page ix}
Acknowledgments
Four colleagues, three of whom I have never met, have played
essential roles in making it possible for me to bring this book
into being.
William Saywell, the president of
Simon Fraser University, took it upon himself to recommend to the
board of governors a sabbatical leave for me under special terms
for the academic year
1988-89. Without his confidence in the project, his enthusiasm,
and his arranging supplementary financial support, I would not
have been able to undertake writing this book.
If William Saywell provided the opportunity, Nicholas Rescher
provided the sustenance. In the fall of 1988, when I had written
about the first third of the manuscript, I read Rescher's
editorial in the American Philosophical Quarterly:
A substantial divide apparently separates the issues that
intrigue philosophers themselves from those which non-philosophers
think that philosophers ought to discuss. For, like other
professionals, we philosophers favor shoptalk over popularization and
prefer addressing our colleagues and 'the public' at large. We
incline to salve our consciences with the comforting reassurance
that our field has become too technical for that sort of thing.
But has it? Perhaps we have
simply become too impatient to deal
with the complexities of simple exposition and self-indulgently
prefer technicalities laden with presuppositions and laborsaving
complexities to the clear and patient discussion of fundamentals.
A considerable host of philosophers
from Hume to Russell and
beyond show that it is possible to do both technical philosophy
and popular communication – occasionally even in one and the
same book. ... If philosophy loses out on its
educative {page x}
mission towards the reading public at large, the fault lies not
in our stars – or in the very subject – but in ourselves.
([172], 347)1
Once you have read chapter 1 in this book, you will understand
why I was startled and delighted to find Rescher writing this. On
opposite sides of the continent, we were simultaneously writing
identical thoughts about the practice of philosophy. I sent him
immediately what I had already written, and he wrote back,
encouraging me in my effort and graciously accepting my
invitation to write the Foreword to this volume. But his kindness did
not end there. Throughout the year that followed, when I often
became exhausted and discouraged, Rescher kept pushing me on with
reassurances and suggestions. There is no way I can repay him.
But neither – I am sure – does he expect repayment. All
I can hope is that someday I might, in turn, be privileged to
pass such generosity on to some other writer.
1. Abbreviated citations are used throughout this
book. Bracketed numbers in parentheses are cross-references to
the References section, pp. 415-26. Numbers following the
brackets are page citations. Thus "([172], 347)" refers to page 347 in
the item cited as no. 172 in the References section.
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If Saywell was the impetus and Rescher the sustainer, then Ron
Schoeffel, senior house editor, and Bill Harnum, marketing
manager, at the University of Toronto Press, were the patrons. I
had earlier discussed this project with some other editors, but
they had warned that the general public would not read
philosophy. Schoeffel and Harnum reacted differently. They were not
willing to 'write off' the general public, believing that not
just university students and their teachers, but nonacademics as
well, have both an appetite and an ability to read serious philosophy.
But it must be clear that a book of this size cannot have
called upon the assistance of just four other persons. Many
others, as well, contributed substantially to this volume.
The British Columbia provincial government, under its Work/Study Program,
and Robert Brown, the dean of arts at Simon Fraser University,
provided funding for my two stalwart research assistants, Hyne-Ju
Cho and Armin Meyerholz.
Moira Gutteridge, a friend and colleague
(Fraser Valley College and Capilano College), drew the splendid
illustrations for chapters8 and 11. Lorraine Ourom, executive editor
at the Press, was
in charge {page xi}
of the production editing. Throughout the months of
preparing the manuscript for publication, she good-naturedly
accommodated an inordinate number of fussy requests from this
author. John St James copy-edited this book. Unfortunately, a
good copy-editor's contribution to a book, unlike a good
illustrator's, is by its very nature invisible. But those who
have seen my original manuscript and have seen John's expert,
extensive, and indispensable repair of it know what a considerable
improvement he has wrought. Probably unwisely, I have sometimes
refused his advice. What stylistic idiosyncrasies occur, I assure
you are my own.
Two readers who were engaged by the
University of Toronto Press, and who remain anonymous, painstakingly
read the penultimate draft of the manuscript. They provided a number of
astute suggestions which I have been pleased to adopt, and they caught
some errors which I have corrected. But I am sure that they have
not spotted every error or challenged me on every unclarity. In
due course, readers may tell me what these are. But whatever
these errors may turn out to be, I, who wrote them, am alone
responsible for them.
Dennis Bevington and Professors John Len Berggren, Raymond D.
Bradley, Roger C. Buck, Warren Goldfarb, Raymond E. Jennings,
Hugh Johnston, E.L. Pattullo, Mark Skinner, Kenneth B. Storey,
Don Todd, and Robert Todd provided invaluable assistance in
tracking down some of the bibliographical materials I needed.
Professors Harvey Gerber, Leigh Palmer, and Lawrence Dill
obligingly lent a hand with certain details in mathematics,
astronomy, and ichthyology, respectively.
And the editors of Analysis, The Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, and Ratio kindly gave permission for me to
reprint, as sections of chapters in this book, revised versions
of certain of my earlier papers. The particulars of original
publication are to be found herein as footnotes at the outset of
each of the relevant sections. The curator of the Joseph
Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, gave me permission to
quote from the unpublished papers of Clarence Darrow.
Last to be mentioned, but foremost in importance, is Sylvia, my
wife and helpmate. Throughout the thousands of hours I spent
working on this book, by her quiet encouragement and unfailing
love, she provided the needed perspective and balance. For she is
the secure reminder that I am first a husband and a father, a son
and a brother, and then – but only then – a philosopher.
February, 1991
{page xii}
Preface to the second edition
All known typographical errors in the first edition (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press), 1991, have been corrected. There
are, in addition, numerous small changes throughout.
A postscript (pp. 144ff), further
exploring the matter of
out-of-body sensations, has been added to chapter seven.
I would like to thank the many university
and college instructors who have adopted the first edition for use in their
metaphysics courses. Thanks, too, to all those – instructors and
students alike – who have written to me with comments, questions, and
suggestions.
By making this book available, both as
a single file and as
multiple files (chapter-by-chapter), I hope instructors who wish
to use selected chapters as parts of their course materials will
now find it easy to do so.
Additional materials of mine can be found at
http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/contents.htm
Please do feel welcome to send me
your comments. I can be reached by email at: swartz@sfu.ca.
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