add market failures…

Summer 2016 Economics 409-3W reading/discussion list

Revised as of February 9, 2016

Main Classroom Discussion Paper for the first week

p Schumpeter, J. [1954] History of Economic Analysis, Part 1: Scope and Method

Classroom Discussion Papers for Presentation

1 p Arrow, K. [1959] Towards a theory of price adjustment, in M. Abramovitz (ed.) Allocation of Economic Resources (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press)

2 u Clower, R. [1959] Some theory of an ignorant monopolist, Econ. J., 69, 705–16.

3 u Richardson, G. [1959] Equilibrium, expectations and information, Econ. J., 69, 225–37.

4 p Hayek, F. [1933/39] Price expectations, monetary disturbances and malinvestments, in Profits, Interest and Investments (London: Routledge)

5 u Hayek, F. [1937/48] Economics and knowledge, Economica, 4 (NS), 33–54.

6 u Hayek, F. [1945/48] The uses of knowledge in society, Amer. Econ. Rev., 35, 519–30.

7 u Stigler, J. [1961] The economics of information, J. of Political Economy, 69, 213–25.

8 u Keynes, J. [1937] The general theory of employment, Quart. J. of Econ., 51, 209–23.

9 u Davidson, P. [1991] Is probability theory relevant for uncertainty? a post-Keynesian perspective, J. of Econ. P., 5, 129–43.

10 u Arrow, K. [1994] Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, Amer. Econ. Rev., Proc., 84, 1–9.

11 p Hicks, J. [1976] Some questions of time in economics, in A. Tang, F. Westfield and J. Worley (eds.) Evolution, Welfare and Time in Economics (Toronto: Heath), 135–51.

12 p Robinson, J. [1974] History versus equilibrium, Thames Papers in Political Economy.

13 u Stigler, J. and G. Becker [1977] De gustibus non est disputandum, Amer. Econ. Rev., 67, 76–90.

14 u Summers, L. [1991] Scientific illusion in empirical macroeconomics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 93, 129–48.

15 u Mankiw, G. [2006] The macroeconomist as scientist and engineer, J. of Econ. P., 20, 29–46.

16 u Kirman, A. [1992] Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?, J. of Econ. P., 6, 117–36.

17 u Alchian, A. [1950] Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory, J. of Political Economy, 58, 211–21.

18 u Winter, S. [1971] Satisficing, selection and the innovating remnant, Quart. J. of Econ., 85, 237–61.

19 u Nelson, R. and Winter, S. [1974] Neoclassical vs. evolutionary theories of economic growth: critique and prospectus, Economic Journal, 84, 886–905.

20 u Hodgson, G. [1997] The evolutionary and non-Darwinian economics of Joseph Schumpeter, J. of Evolutionary Econ., 7, 131–45.

21 u Simon, H. [1955] A behavioral model of rational choice, Quart. J. of Econ., 69, 99–118.

22 u Sent, E-M. [1997] Sargent versus Simon: bounded rationality unbound, Camb. J. of Econ., 21, 323–38.

23 u Sent, E-M. [2004] Behavioral economics: How psychology made its (limited) way back to economics, History of Political Economy, 36, 735–60.

24 u Hollis, M. and Sugden, R. [1993] Rationality in action, Mind, 102, 1–35.

25 u Binmore, K. [1997] Rationality and backward induction, J. of Econ. Methodology, 4, 23–41.

26 u Binmore, K. [2011] Interpreting knowledge in the backward induction problem, Episteme, 8, 248–61.

27 u Rubinstein, A. [1991] Comments on the interpretation of game theory, Econometrica, 59, 909–24.

28 p Samuelson, P. [1987] Out of the closet: A program for the Whig history of economic science, History of Economics Society Bulletin, 9, 51–60.

29 p Leijonhufvud, A. [1987] The uses of the past, (a paper presented to the 1987 HES meetings in Boston).

30 u Backhouse, R. [2001] How and why should we write the history of Twentieth-Century economics, J. of the Hist. of Econ. Th., 23, 423–51.

31 u Colander, D. [2004] The strange persistence of the IS-LM model, History of Political Economy, 36, 305–22.

32 u Weintraub, R. [2005] Autobiographical memory and the historiography of economics, J. of the Hist. of Econ. Th., 21, 1–11.

33 u Weintraub, R. [2007] Economic science wars, J. of the Hist. of Econ. Th., 29, 268–82.

Common background readings (PDF versions available on the web page: www.sfu.ca/~boland)

z Boland, L. [1986/87/93] Methodology for a New Microeconomics (Boston: Allen and Unwin)

z Boland, L. [1992] The Principles of Economics: Some Lies My Teachers Told Me (London: Routledge)

z Boland, L. [1997] Critical Economic Methodology (London: Routledge)

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u available on web: try WWW.JSTOR.ORG or Library’s e-journals z pdf available on web p = to be provided to class BG = background reading

Bounded Rationality

19 u Börgers, T. [1996] On the relevance of learning and evolution to economic theory Econ. J. 106, 1374–85 .

27 u Hynes, J.A. [2001] Economics’ past and present: Historical analysis and current practice, J. of the Hist. of Econ. Th. 23, 181–95.

28 u Walker, D. [1999] The relevance for present economic theory of economic theory writting in the past, J. of the Hist. of Econ. Th. 21, 7–25.

24 u Starmer, C. [2000] Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk,
J. of Econ. L. 1, 332–82 .

15 u Machina, M. [1987] Choice under uncertainty: problems solved and unsolved, J. of Econ. P. 1, 121–54 Snow

30p Basu, K. [1996] Notes on evolution, rationality and norms, J. of Institutional & Theoretical Econ., 152, 739–50

32 u Radner, R. [1996] Bounded rationality, indeterminacy, and the theory of the firm Econ. J. 106, 1360-73

18u Williamson, O. [1981] The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, J. of Econ. Lit.., 19, 1537–68

27(26)p Vanberg, V. [1996] Institutional evolution within constraints, J. of Institutional & Theoretical Econ., 152, 690–96

28(27)p Witt, U. [1996] A “Darwinian Revolution” in economics?, J. of Institutional & Theoretical Econ., 152, 707–15

21 (17)u Kaldor, N. [1934] The equilibrium of the firm Econ. J. 44, 60–76 Jinjie

22 (18)u Coase, R. [1937] The nature of the firm Economica 4 (NS), 386–405 Raymond

10 Kreps, D. [1990] The problems of game theory

11 Kreps, D. [1990] Bounded Rationality and retrospection

11a uHollis, M. and Sugden, R. [1993] Rationality in action, Mind, 102, 1–35

11b uRubinstein, A. [1991] Comments on the interpretation of game theory, Econometrica, 59, 909–24

Individualism, evolutionary and behavioural game theory and social knowledge

14a zWeibull, J. [1998] What have we learned from evolutionary game theory so far? Research Institute of Industrial Economics working paper 487, 1–29

BG: u Agassi, J. [1975] Institutional individualism, British Journal of Sociology, 26, 144–55

BG: u Starrett, D. [1976] Social Institutions, Imperfect Information, and the Distribution of Income, Quart. J. of Econ., 90, 261–84.

16u Camerer, C. [1997] Progress in Behavioral Game Theory, J. of Econ. P., 11, 167–88

17u Sugden, R. [1989] Spontaneous Order, J. of Econ. P., 3, 85–97

New Institutional Economics

12uKaldor, N. [1934] The equilibrium of the firm Econ. J. 44, 60–76

14u Hodgson, G. [1998] The approach of institutional economics, J. of Econ. Lit.., 36, 166–92

16u Williamson, O. [2000] The New Institutional Economics: taking stock, looking ahead, J. of Econ. Lit. 38, 595–613

BG: Winter, S. [1964] Economics ‘natural selection’ and the theory of the firm, Yale Economic Essays, 4, 225–72

BG: u Nelson, R. and Winter, S. [1973] Toward an evolutionary theory of economic capabilities, Amer. Econ. Rev., 63, 440–9

24uAkerlof, G. [2002] Behavioral macroeconomics and macroeconomic behavior, Amer. Econ. Rev., 92, 411–33

26p Hicks, J. [1976] Some questions of time in economics, in A. Tang, F. Westfield and J. Worley (eds.) Evolution, Welfare and Time in Economics (Toronto: Heath) 135–51

27p Robinson, J. [1974] History versus equilibrium Thames Papers in Political Economy

22a Albert, M. [2001] Bayesian learning and expectations formation, in D. Corfield and J. Williamson (eds), Foundations of Bayesianism (Boston: Kluwer), 341–62

31u {} Robson, A. [2001] The biological basis of economic behavior, J. of Econ. Lit., 39, 11–33

Common Knowledge and Game Theory

32u Geanakoplos, J. [1992] Common Knowledge, J. of Econ. P., 6, 53–82

33u Brandenburger, A. [1992] Knowledge and equilibrium in games, J. of Econ. P., 6, 83–101

12buArthur, B. [1994] Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality Amer. Econ. Rev., Proceedings, 84, 406–11

13u Reny, P., [1992] Rationality in extensive-form games, J. of Econ. P., 6, 103–17