STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL VETO FORMULA
| 7 & 50 Formula |
|
|||
| Province | Power to Prevent | Power to Initiate | Power to Prevent | Power to Initiate |
| Ontario | .656 | .054 | 1.000 | .012 |
| Quebec | .529 | .044 | 1.000 | .012 |
| British Columbia | .529 | .044 | 1.000 | .012 |
| Alberta | .465 | .039 | 1.000 | .012 |
| Manitoba | .452 | .038 | .333 | .004 |
| Saskatchewan | .452 | .038 | .333 | .004 |
| Nova Scotia | .439 | .036 | .500 | .006 |
| New Brunswick | .439 | .036 | .500 | .006 |
| Newfoundland | .439 | .036 | .500 | .006 |
| P.E.I. | .439 | .036 | 0 | 0 |
| PARLIAMENT | 1.00 | .083 | 1.000 | .012 |
| With the informal commitment of Nova Scotia & New Brunswick to
support PEI, then Newfoundland becomes unable to effect the outcome of
any regional majority. PEI's Power to Prevent would become .500 and
its Power to Initiate would become .006
However, Newfoundland's values for both measures would become zero! Source: Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, , "The Regional Veto Formula and Its Effects on Canada's Constitutional Amendment Process", (1997) 30 Canadian Journal of Political Science, 339 |